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Abstract
The Islamic veil  has  become one of  the most  controversial  sartorial  items of  the
contemporary milieu and an ultimate symbol of unwanted British otherness. Fuelled
by  political  and  media  preoccupation  with  the  subject,  the  resentment  towards
Islamic  veiling  is  grounded  in  partial  and  often  erroneous  representations  of  a
‘veiled woman’ as on the one hand being a passive victim of patriarchal oppression
and on the other hand being an active threat to British security and identity. Based
upon  a  two-year  multi-sited  ethnographic  study,  this  thesis  contests  such  static
images of the veil. By deploying ethnographic interviewing, participant observation
and an analysis of the British mainstream press, social media, policies and artistic
representations, it explores veiling as experienced by British Muslim women from
diverse backgrounds. 
The central focus of this work is to accentuate the various implications that veiling
carries for the everyday lives and identities of Muslim women in Britain. This thesis
places  a  special  emphasis  on exploring intimate  sentiments  for  veiling:  the  very
reasons for adopting the hijab as well as perceptions of spirituality, modesty and
beauty. Arising from these different and often contradictory perspectives held by
Muslim women, the veil is not perceived as a rigid structure that is imposed on an
individual. It is rather viewed as an altering, hybrid and antagonistic concept that is
largely dependent on personal negotiations and appropriations.  
Whilst emphasising the role of female agency in shaping the semiotics of the veil,
this  thesis  simultaneously  examines  how  personal  values,  meanings  and  social
relations are shaped by broader social, political and religious discourses regarding
the veil. This thesis thus critically observes how and when the Islamic veil appears in
fashion, pop culture, art, public politics, legal rhetoric and the media and the ways
in which such representations influence Muslim women themselves. Subsequently,
the  ever-transforming  meanings  of  the  veil  are  observed  at  the  intersection  of
conflicting  processes,  shaped  by  representations,  British  and  European  political
dynamics and the women themselves.
Acknowledging  such  divergent  forces,  ethnographic  accounts  are  contextualised
within the macro perspective of  British  society  and its  practical  challenges.  This
thesis,  hence,  aims to contribute to  the field of  anthropology of  religion, gender,
fashion and citizenship with a timely case study. Close-up ethnographic accounts
and anthropological contextualisation of the topic moreover offer a profound insight
into the public polemics regarding the place of the Islamic veil in British society,
with the issue being rethought from an emic perspective of women who continue to
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Glossary 
Baju kurung A symbolic traditional costume in Malaysia that is very 
important in the fashion industry. 
Burqa An enveloping outer garment worn by women in some 
Islamic traditions to cover themselves in public.
Burkini A type of modesty swimsuit for women.
Chador A large piece of cloth that is wrapped around the head and 
upper body leaving only the face exposed.
Desi A loose term for the people, cultures, and products of South 
Asia and their diaspora.
Eid An Islamic religious holiday.
Fatwa A ruling on a point of Islamic law given by a recognized 
authority.
Fitna Unrest or rebellion, especially against a rightful ruler.
Hadith One of various reports describing the words, actions, or habits
of the Islamic prophet Muhammad.
Halal Any object or action which is permissible to use or engage in, 
according to Islamic law.
Haram Forbidden or proscribed by Islamic law.
Hijab Multiple meanings: veil; any head, face, or body covering 
worn by Muslim women that conforms to a certain standard 
of modesty; the seclusion of women and men in the public 
sphere (see Chapter III for further conceptualisations of the 
term).
Hijabi A woman wearing/observing the hijab.
ix
Ijtihad Independent reasoning.
Imam The title of a worship leader of a mosque and Muslim 
community.
Inshallah The Arabic language expression for "God willing" or "if God 
wills."
Jahiliya Ignorance of divine guidance, also Arabia before Islam.
Jilbab Any long and loose-fit coat or garment worn by some Muslim
women.
Keffiyeh A gender-neutral chequered black and white scarf; also a 
symbol of Palestinian nationalism.
Masha Allah An Arabic phrase translating as "God has willed", expresses 
appreciation, joy, praise, or thankfulness for an event or 
person that was just mentioned.
Munafiqun Hypocrites; a group decried in the Quran as outward 
Muslims who were secretly unsympathetic to the cause of 
Muslims.
Niqab A cloth that covers the face as a part of sartorial hijab.
Niqabi A woman wearing the niqab.
Purdah The practice in certain Muslim and Hindu societies of 
'screening' women from men or strangers. 
Ramadan The ninth month of the Islamic calendar, and is observed by 
Muslims worldwide as a month of fasting.
Revert A person who has converted to the Islamic faith.
 
Salat It is a physical, mental, and spiritual act of worship that is 
observed five times every day at prescribed times.
Sari A long piece of cloth that is wound around the body to make 




A suit consisting of loose trousers and long shirt or dress. 
Shia Muslims who believe Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law,
to be his rightful heir.
Sunni The mainstream sect of Islam. 
Surah A chapter of the Qur’an. 
Tob A traditional Sudanese dress, a 15-foot long piece of material 
wrapped around the body worn by both men and women.
Umma The Muslim community.
xi
Preface: The Hijab Tax
“My friend has this theory which she calls the hijab tax. If you wear the hijab, you have to
pay the tax. Say, if I wear the hijab, I have to be a happy person, otherwise people think 
I'm a crazy psychopath who wants to blow things up.”
Hannah
Hannah is a British hijabi, and one of the young women we will get to know
during  the  course  of  this  thesis.  Her  theory  of  the  hijab  tax  stems from and
reflects several decades' worth of experiences that veiled Muslim women have
lived  in  the  United  Kingdom,  their  struggles,  coping  strategies,  creative
subversions  and  intimate  reflections.  Hannah  and  other  women  who  will  be
presented in this thesis have all paid the inevitable hijab tax in their own way;
when applying for jobs, going about their daily business,  partaking in activist
engagement or exploring their sexuality, for example. Their stories reiterate over
and over again how being a visibly  Muslim woman  comes with innumerable
challenges. Their accounts also demonstrate that a relatively small piece of cloth
is  a  powerful  emblem  which  has  transcended  the  realm  of  religion  and
spirituality. In twenty first-century Britain it is an omnipotent political, cultural,
social and religious insignia with strong symbolic power.
It is precisely the symbolic power that the hijab holds in contemporary societies
that has inspired this thesis. During my master’s studies, I was closely following
the events that took place in France in 2011, which controversially resulted in the
inaugural European ban on the face veil in public spaces. It was not the populist
demagogy and the warped ideas of liberalism that shocked me back then; it was
the conspicuous absence of the voices of women who were at the centre of these
debates. Women who had been actively co-creating French society – as French
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citizens, permanent residents or visitors – had their voices ignored and trodden
on by the politicians,  activists,  imams and self-proclaimed community leaders
whom the mainstream media and politics found better-placed to comment on the
oppression, liberation and rights of veiled women.  
At the time, I was working on an EU-MENA media project, editing a feminist
radio programme, and felt nostalgic about the year I had spent studying abroad
in  Turkey.  The  events  in  France  brought  together  a  plethora  of  fields  that
interested me, and I could not stop thinking about various nuances of the burqa
ban  polemics  that  called  for  further  reflection.  I  was  wondering  about  the
feminist arguments, I was interested in how the meanings of the hijab and the
niqab travel through time and space, and how women cope with the aftermath of
the ban and with increasing Islamophobia.  I  decided to write  an article  for a
newspaper I  was working for at  the time.  As my desk research unfolded,  the
volume  of  data  and  further  questions  quickly  exceeded  the  word  count  and
rigidity of a single article...
Fast forward three years, I am sitting in a Brick Lane cafe with Hannah and a
friend. By now, I have interviewed over two dozen women and read, thought and
written about the hijab for nearly two years. Chatting to Hannah defies a single
story of the hijab and its wearers that is commonly reinforced by the media and
political discourses: the one focusing on Muslim women as oppressed victims of
an aggressive religion and corresponding political regimes. A conversation with
Hannah throws into relief alternative experiences of veiling and observing the
hijab. She speaks about how the hijab manifests her faith, fashion and feminism.
Hannah is well aware that wearing the hijab comes with 'the tax'. Centuries of
colonialism,  decades  of  Western  military  interventions  and  years  of  fearing
internal  enemies  have all  contributed to  deeply-rooted stereotypes  and biases
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which  are  exhibited  by  everyday  Islamophobia  and  institutionalised
discrimination  against  Muslim  women.  But  Hannah  has,  just  like  her  fellow
hijabis  in  the  UK  and  beyond,  developed  multiple  coping  strategies  and
subversive  responses  to  challenge  and  change  the  status  quo  and  promote
alternative  readings  of  the  hijab.  It  is  precisely  these  creative  responses  and
diversified meanings of veiling that lie in the focus of this ethnographic account. I
hope reading it will be half as interesting as years of researching it with the help
of fascinating women have been.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Terrorism,  oppression,  fundamentalism and victimhood are only a  few of  the
buzzwords that inevitably accompany discussions about Islamic headgear. The
Islamic  veil  has  become  one  of  the  most  controversial  sartorial  items  of
contemporary  milieu  and  an  ultimate  symbol  of  unwanted  British  otherness.
Fuelled  by  political  and  media  preoccupation  with  the  subject,  the  veil  is
frequently framed as a piece of cloth imposed on an individual by her religion
and  culture.  But  beyond  the  oft-peddled  static  images  of  oppressed  and
depressed  Muslim  women,  the  reality  is  far  more  dynamic.  In  multicultural
Britain in particular, women of all ages, ethnicities and economic backgrounds
purposefully  don  the  hijab.  Many see  it  as  an  important  element  of  modern
British  female  identity  and  a  powerful  manifestation  of  faith,  fashion  and
feminism.
It is thus clear that the hijab cannot be perceived as a simple garment, but has to
be considered in the context of the multiplicity and fluidity of the meanings that
it  holds  for  those  who  observe  it  as  well  as  their  families,  communities  and
societies.  For  a  majority  of  women,  embracing  the  hijab  is  not  just  about  a
particular  sartorial  presentation  but  about  a  set  of  visual,  spatial  and  ethical
guidelines with which they comply in their search for deeper spirituality. In the
context of the current political climate determined by the ongoing war on terror
and subsequent Islamophobia, the hijab can also transform into a compelling tool
for campaigning and resistance. For some other women, wearing the hijab brings
them closer to their cultures and countries of origin. These are indeed just some
of the reasons from a non-exhaustive lists of possibilities.
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Whilst the hijab is celebrated as a positive and important practice and symbol by
many, it continues to generate controversy at home and globally. Building upon
the  remnants  of  colonialism,  various  Western  foreign  interventions  in  recent
decades  have  additionally  fanned  the  negative  imagery  linked  to  Islamic
practices  of  veiling.  The hijab subsequently  remains entangled in the semiotic
webs of female oppression, international terrorism and threats at home. These
meanings contribute towards moulding public opinion on the veil, and affect the
ways in which women and their communities perceive themselves and respond
to these opinions in order to overcome innumerable challenges. Unavoidably, this
results in changing practices, attitudes and meanings.
It is precisely this tension and these metamorphoses that have inspired this thesis,
which  explores  multiple  and  rapidly  transforming  practices,  meanings  and
attitudes  towards  the  hijab  in  contemporary  Britain.  Indeed,  similar  scholarly
projects  have been  carried out,  and have been  sprouting especially  visibly  in
recent years, following 9/11, the 2005 London bombings and the recent series of
terrorist  attacks claimed by ISIS. For example,  Emma Tarlo has offered a rich
anthropological  insight  into  the  dynamic  veiling  practices  of  Londoners  and
Muslim fashion in Britain and elsewhere (2007, 2010, 2013); Reina Lewis, too, has
documented the diversified field of the Muslim fashion industry and its multiple
meanings (2013; 2015); Sara Silvestri has analysed British women's perspectives
on burqa bans (2008; 2012); Sariya Cheruvallil-Contractor has written about the
place of the hijab in Muslim feminism and the construction of British identities
(2011,  2012),  with  many  other  scholars  exploring  the  role  of  the  hijab  from
different angles.
Instead of focusing on one locality I wanted to look into the broader geographical
scope of Britain, and rather than investigating a single area of research, I  was
interested in delving into a plurality of different meanings that are constituted by
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and are constitutive of the symbolic practice of veiling. I felt that no discipline
could serve this purpose better than anthropology. With its rich theoretical corpus
and  methodological  approaches,  anthropology  is  well-positioned  to  explore
veiling practices from an emic Muslim female perspective.
Rather than peaking behind closed doors and veils, I consciously decided to work
with the breadth and wealth of accounts that are available publicly, and to listen
to female voices that wanted to be heard. By doing so, I wished to acknowledge
years of Muslim feminist engagement,  activism and creativity,  and the impact
they  have  made  in  British  society.  I  envisaged  to  contextualise  those  various
voices, different experiences and multiple nuances of veiling into a single timely
study, situated in the specific context of turbulent changes in the British political
and  social  landscape.  Against  this  time-  and  space-specific  backdrop,  the
ambition of my research is to investigate personal sentiments for wearing the veil
from British Muslim women and to explore these individual experiences in the
context of contemporary United Kingdom.
In order to address this ambition, this thesis follows two specific aims. Firstly, my
study aims to locate the Islamic veil  within the social milieu of contemporary
Britain, and to do so, I will analyse public responses towards the various forms of
the veil which women wear in the United Kingdom. Secondly, I will explore the
personal dimension of veiling in the UK by engaging the perspectives of Muslim
women, to understand their motivations for veiling, and the significance the veil
holds for them. In doing so, I will specifically focus on the alternative readings of
the Islamic veil  that go against the grain in relation to the political discourses
which dominate the mass media and thematise the veil as a tool of oppression.
These aims and objectives  will  funnel  back to  the overarching themes of  this
thesis:  faith,  fashion  and  feminism.  These  three  concepts  will  be  observed,
questioned and analysed from various vantage points.
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This introductory chapter will establish the research foundations for the thesis. I
will  outline  some  of  the  thoughts  and  challenges  behind  constructing  the
ethnographic field(s) and selecting a diverse group of respondents.  I  will  also
explore the rationale behind choosing and developing specific  methodological
approaches, alongside some ethical dilemmas that emerged when putting them
into practice. Finally, I will introduce the structure of this thesis and outline the
themes of the upcoming chapters.
1.1 The complexity of the field(s)
Traditionally,  anthropological  fieldwork  involves  the  total  immersion of  the
researcher in the field setting, typically located within a single community, for 24
hours a  day, seven days a week, for at least a year (Ellen, 1984: 66; Whitehead
2005). Influenced by such classic conceptualisations of fieldwork, I was initially
hoping to contour my research project in a way that would comply with textbook
requirements  and  recommendations  for  ethnographic  work.  However,  I  was
struggling to identify a single community which would suit the purposes of the
study  and  its  focus  on  the  dynamism  of  the  veil  located  in  the  plurality  of
meanings  and  motifs,  disparities  of  religious  and  political  engagement,  and
metamorphoses of its practices. 
Whilst I was indeed interested in local changes in the practices of observing the
hijab,  I  did  not  feel  that  the  conventional  single-site  mis-en-escene  of
ethnographic research could respond to the needs of my research aims. It was
thus necessary to reconsider the the traditional sites of ethnographic fieldowork
and seek more suitable alternatives for the purposes of this particular project (see
Marcus, 1995: 99). I eventually decided to move out from the single site and an
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explicitly local research setting to embrace a multi-sited ethnographic research
design, which followed women, events and projects across the UK. Rather than
settling for a specific geographical area, I let the research project take unexpected
trajectories in “tracing a cultural formation across and within multiple sites of
activity” (Marcus, 1998:34).
I  decided to  limit  the  geographical  scope of  my study to  Great  Britain.1 The
overwhelming majority of my activities and interviews took place in England,
with  only  a  few  of  them  conducted  in  Wales  and  Scotland.  Most  of  my
engagement  was  focused on Britain's major urban centres, particularly London,
Birmingham  and  Manchester.  As  I  lived  in  Durham  and  London  whilst
undertaking  my  research,  the  most  significant proportion  of  ethnographic
activities took place locally; in the North East of England – more specifically in
Newcastle, Darlington and Durham – and in London. Further research, especially
interviews and participant observation, was also undertaken in Cardiff, Bristol,
Edinburgh, Leicester, Liverpool, Cambridge and Oxford.
Pursuing multi-sited research allowed me to investigate the twofold processes of
global-local exchanges. I was able to observe how certain local events influence
wider communities and, in turn, how particular global events are reflected in the
lived experiences of local communities.  For example,  in one of the chapters,  I
explore how the global  fashion industry and trends are consumed, embedded
and appropriated in the everyday styles of British hijabis. In the same chapter, I
also observe how London-based designers whom I interviewed for the purpose
of this research influence broader fashion trends among Muslim and non-Muslim
women globally,  from the  Persian  Gulf  countries  to  the  US.  Especially  when
scrutinising transnational symbols such as the hijab, observing such exchanges in
1  My fieldwork was conducted exclusively in Great Britain, namely in England, Scotland and
Wales. However, I often speak about the United Kingdom more generally, especially when I
refer to policies and the media. 
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global,  political,  marketing,  cultural  and  social  circuits  can  be  particularly
significant.  Having  not  opted  for  a  multi-sited  approach,  grasping  the
interconnectedness of these multiple processes at local, national and global level
would not have been possible.  It  is only with this wider temporal and  spatial
scope offered by a  multi-sited  research  design that  I  was  able  to  capture  the
circulation of objects, meanings and identities (Marcus, 1998: 34).
A  multi-sited  approach  has  also  enabled  me  to  avoid  some  non-ignorable
logistical constrains. As my study features women who work, study and live an
active family life, engaging in participant observation for a prolonged period of
time, such as a year, would hardly have been appropriate. For example, following
women to their offices and lecture halls would not be possible,  whilst staying
with them for an extensive period of time might have caused inconvenience for
them  and  their  intimate  social  circles. The  same  practical  obstacles  are  also
recognised by David and Craven (2016) in their discussion of the challenges faced
by  feminist  ethnographers,  which  outlines  a  new  ethnographic  trend  of
researchers no longer spending years in one location undertaking research, but
instead  designing  ethnographic  projects  which  are  of  a  shorter  duration,  or
involve  research  across  various  locations (ibid.:  102).  By  drawing  on
anthropologist Susan Erikson and her research on global health across several
continents and with various constituencies on the topic of reproductive imaging,
David and Craven further underline the importance of making strategic choices
about where to conduct research, arguing that the lived experiences of research
participants should guide those decisions (ibid.).
In addition to multiple geographical sites around Great Britain, I identified one
field site that did allow me to partake in participant observation at all times – the
Internet. I argue that it is impossible to speak about activism, social change, the
circulation of symbols and urban cultures without acknowledging the importance
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of online engagement. In the case of studying the hijab in contemporary Britain,
the Internet plays a crucial role in forging meanings, identities and trends. Thus,
utilising online environments, particularly the social media, as another research
field(s) was unavoidable.
Drawing on Therese Tierney (2013: 81) and her writing on the public space of
social  media,  I  observed  two  important  trends  pertaining  to  online  hijab
communities. Firstly, I was interested in online social networks as an extension of
'real-life' interactions, based on geographical proximity and close contact, known
also as strong bond. With their approval, I 'followed' and 'liked' my respondents
online, consequently engaging in their lives and thoughts from the distance of my
desk.  Secondly,  I  also interacted with various niche or shared-interest  groups.
Based  on  knowledge  and  acquisition,  these  types  of  groups  extend  beyond
“physical  boundaries  of  neighbourhood  to  encompass  national  or  global
communities” (ibid.).  From hijab fashion blogs to activist Facebook groups to
feminist Twitter accounts, such niche groups provided an invaluable insight into
activities of British hijabis and their place in wider global networks.
Whilst in the field from August 2013 to November 2014, my time was mostly split
between Durham and London. When in Durham, I attended Friday sisters' circles
at  the Durham Islamic Society Mosque,  frequented activities  organised by the
Newcastle-based organisations and attended interviews around the region. Every
other week or so, I travelled to different parts of the UK. I normally organised my
visits  around  various  events  and  attempted  to  schedule  interviews  with
respondents around those dates. I was particularly interested in meeting the same
women  at  different  locations  and  accompanying  them  on  their  travels.
Throughout  the  entire  duration  of  my fieldwork,  I  continued pursuing  cyber
ethnography and recording interviews online, mostly via Skype.
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Despite its numerous advantages, I was aware that a multi-sited approach poses a
number  of  ethnographic  challenges  and  methodological  anxieties,  with  the
pivotal one lying in obtaining a profound and detailed corpus of qualitative data
(Falzon, 2009; Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995).  Being aware of the limitations of
such  an  ethnographic  approach,  I  ensured  that  I  upheld  the  quality  of  the
research by capitalising on the advantages of multiple locations. For instance, I
observed  the  impact  of  living  in  a  larger  Muslim  community  as  opposed  to
residing  in  a  Christian-majority/secular  social  environment,  compared  veiling
practices  in  different  locations  and  explored  whether  Islamophobia  is
experienced similarly across the board, to mention just a few examples.
All in all, this research is the result of a multi-sited research project which took
place  in  various  locations  around  Great  Britain,  mostly  in  urban  England.
However,  various  additional  sites  were  reached  digitally,  as  the  Internet
presented  a  central  research  site  for  both  interacting  with  respondents  and
engaging with niche hijab-related online communities.
1.2 The respondents
There are currently no statistics available about the estimated number of women
who wear any type of Islamic headgear in the UK. The available statistics are
limited to the findings of the 2011 census (UK Office of National Statistics, 2011;
Statistics  UK,  2012),  which  offers  an  estimated  number  of  2,706,066  Muslims
residing in England and Wales, of whom 48% are women. According to the same
census, Islam is the second largest religion in the United Kingdom with 4.5% of
the  total  population  identifying  as  Muslims.  The  majority  of  Muslims  in  the
country  live  in  England  (2,660,116),  whilst  only  a  small  proportion  reside in
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Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The census further shows that Islam is the
fastest-growing religious confession in the United Kingdom, as statistically the
Muslim population  increases  at  nearly  ten  times  the  rate  of  the  non-Muslim
population.  Furthermore,  the  vast  majority  of  British  Muslims  identify
themselves  as  belonging  to  the  Sunni  denomination;  Shia  or  Ahmadi
denominations  make up only  a  small  minority.  Ethnically,  the British  Muslim
population comes from a variety of backgrounds, with the largest  groups being
Pakistanis  and Bangladeshis,  followed by  Indians,  Arabs,  Kurds  and Africans
(ibid.).2 
When  designing  my  research,  I  wanted  to  capture  this  dynamic  and  varied
demographic  landscape  of  British  Muslims  by  selecting  respondents  from
different  ethnic  and  class  backgrounds.  My research  comprised  45  individual
interviews and about 20 further interviews with various professionals and other
individuals whose work or social engagement  was  relevant to  the focus of this
study.  This number is not exact, as many of the interviews were informal and
took  place  either  at  events  or  online,  with  some  of  them  being  limited  to
exchanging a couple of Facebook messages, or receiving a single email. Out of all
the interviewees, one person was male and two people were non-Muslim. Nine
interviewees, eight women and one man, were not British, and four of them did
not reside in Britain – those interviewees were chosen due to their expertise on
the subject;  for example,  some of  them are artists  whose work features at  the
beginning of each ethnographic chapter.
Out of 45 interviews with Muslim women, 30 women are of Asian origin.  The
women  in  this  group  identified  as  being  of  Pakistani,  Bangladeshi,  Indian,
Afghan, Maldivian, Iranian, Turkish and Bruneian backgrounds. Seven women
2 The 2011 census provided a fixed number of ethnic categories from which people could
choose, along with the additional option of 'Other'. It is thus not possible to have a more
detailed break down of British Muslims' ethnic backgrounds.
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identified themselves as Arab: Palestinian, Qatari, Yemeni, Omani, Egyptian and
Algerian. Five respondents are from African backgrounds, namely of Somali and
Nigerian  descent.  Moreover,  three  women  are  from  white  European
backgrounds, two of them from Britain and one from Bosnia (see Image 1). The
respondents'  ages  range from 17 to 45,  with the majority of  the women aged
between 22 and 35. I focused on this age group due to their active engagement in
social movements, fashion and other activities in the centre of this research. The
respondents come from different socio-economic classes, namely working class
and lower and upper-middle class.  While  English is  not  all  respondents'  first
language, all interviews were conducted in English.
Image 1: Ethnic breakdown of respondents
I sought respondents through different formal and informal channels. Firstly, I
opted for convenience or haphazard sampling, thus selecting respondents on the
basis of their accessibility and willingness to participate in the research (Nkwi,
2015: 83; Russell Bernard, 2006: 192). I deployed my existing links with various
Muslim women across the UK to engage the first  batch of  participants.  I  met
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additional respondents by attending various events and I also  wrote emails to
faith-based organisations and Islamic societies at different universities, and asked
the  administrators  of  subject-specific  Facebook  groups,  Google  groups  and
forums to disseminate my open call among their members.
Whilst  effective  in  reaching  and  engaging  respondents,  this  approach  only
included  women  whom  I  knew  or  met  coincidently  and  thus  excluded
representatives of some of the groups whom I wished to include in my research
project, for example niqab wearers or women of African descent. I reached these
specific  groups  by  utilising  purposive  or  judgement  sampling.  According  to
Patton (2002: 230), the rationale and power of such sampling lies in ethnographic
research selecting information-rich cases for study in depth.” For example,  by
speaking  to  certain  artists,  activists  or  fashion  designers,  I  was  able  to
comprehend a great deal about some of the issues of central importance to this
research. Moreover, I also selected additional respondents via so-called snowball
sampling. This strategy enabled me to involve more respondents; “because the
snowball  process  involves  respondents  nominating  other  respondents  and
identifying other possible chains of respondents, the likelihood of excluding is
minimised” (Fagan quoted in Fleischer, 1995: 23).
Although I tried to encompass a plurality of voices and ensure that the diversity
of British hijabis is reflected in the selection of my respondents, I do acknowledge
that my sample of women by no means mirrors the eclectic group of women that
this research project centres on.  Reflecting the experiences of all British hijabis
was never my intention. As already mentioned, the central aim of this project was
to capture the diversity of views of cultural and personal meanings, practices and
experiences  that  is  exhibited  by  veiled  women  in  Britain.  Against  this
background, I developed a sampling system which allowed for the development
and evaluation of a multitude of meanings and experiences (see Luborsky and
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Rubinstein, 1995).
1.3 Designing the multi-method research
As shown above, the nature of this particular project requires various sources and
multiple locations. Unavoidably, such a multi-sited ethnographic project is drawn
towards employing the multi-method research design. Therefore,  this research
project  transcends  the  traditional  anthropological  approach  to  fieldwork  by
expanding it to the analysis of various representations of the veil, ranging from
media depictions to artistic  portrayals,  to opinions expressed on social  media.
Combining  conventional  ethnographic  methods  in  the  form  of  participant
observation and semi-structured interviews with anthropological analyses of the
secondary  data  allowed me to  capture  the  multiple  and  diverse  meanings  of
veiling in the context of Great Britain.  
The  enclosed  table  (see  Table  1)  details  how  different  methods  assisted  in
addressing  different  research  aims  and objectives.  I  shall  now expand on the
methods  utilised  and  the  ways  in  which  they  were  deployed  during  my
fieldwork.
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Aims Objectives Corresponding methods
To locate the veil within
the social milieu of 
contemporary Britain.  
To examine differences and 
similarities in the perception 
of the veil and its various 





To analyse public responses 
towards the various forms of 
the veil in the UK.  
Critical discourse analysis
Digital ethnography 
To explore the personal 
dimension of veiling in 
the UK.  
To provide the emic 
perspective of Muslim 
women in the UK on 
decisions for veiling or not 






To identify how the veil 
influences the construction of
identity and otherness as 




Table 1: Aims and objectives of this research, with corresponding methods which address
them.
1.3.1 The vigilance of ethnographic interviewing  
In Anthropology of British Subjects, Jenny Hockey (2002: 209) writes that with
“heterogeneous  and  scattered”  research  sites,  dire  weather  and  “everything
interesting [happening]  behind closed doors”,  anthropologists  in  Britain  often
need  to  negotiate  “the  fluidity  and openness  of  participant  observation”  and
reduce it to semi-structured interviews and focus groups, alongside documentary
research. Studies based primarily upon interviewing have become prevalent in
anthropology (Davies, 2012; Spradley, 1979), especially when conducted in time-
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pressed and disperse Western urban contexts.  
With  this  particular  project  facing  such  conditions,  I  decided  to  deploy
ethnographic interviewing as a paramount research method. Although I initially
anticipated  only  30  interviews,  the  number  eventually  swelled due to  a  high
volume of interesting individuals that continued appearing on my research radar.
As already outlined, the interviews mostly centred on Muslim women wearing
different types of Islamic headgear,  from the headscarf to the full-face veil. All
face-to-face interviews took place at a location of the respondent's choice, with
some of the places including mosques, homes, offices, libraries, restaurants and
cafes,  university  buildings  and  parks.  Situating  interviews  into  a  known and
conformable  environment  increased  the  respondent's  confidence  and
simultaneously enabled me as a researcher to observe and engage with people in
their  usual  environment.  Due  to  the  familiarity  of  the  place,  the  interviews
tended to  be  informal  and  chatty,  and  occasionally  also  interrupted  by  other
activities,  such  as  children  playing  next  to  us  or  an  acquaintance  joining  in.
Rather than being an obtrusive nuisance,  such spontaneous interruptions only
added an additional ethnographic layer that prompted unexpected encounters
and conversations.     
The interview setting facilitated the creation of a dynamic conversational space
that partially followed a predesigned trajectory, but at the same time allowed the
respondents to co-create the conversation. Whilst the initial interviews were more
rigid in their structure and covered all of the areas of interest identified in the
pre-fieldwork research  phase,  I  was  continuously  updating the  questions  and
interviewing techniques as my research unfolded. I was eventually able to make
quicker connections and comparisons, and offer examples and references which
allowed me to  engage  in  more  profound conversations.  In  addition  to  semi-
structured interview questions, I occasionally accompanied my interviews with a
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set  of  photos,  memes,3 tweets  and  newspaper  articles  which  I  showed  to
respondents  to  seek  their  responses.  This  interview  approach  proved  to  be
especially  useful  for  opening  the  interviewing  sessions  with  more  reserved
respondents, encouraging them to open up, for reflecting on secondary sources
tended to be an easier introduction than speaking about their own experiences
would have been.
Nearly all interviews were recorded digitally using a voice recorder and directly
transcribed  in  order  to  ensure  the  best  possible  accuracy  of  transmitting  the
conversations (Hollan, 1998). Some informal interviews  were not recorded and
whilst writing these up I had to rely on my own post-interviewing notes. I tried
to omit any direct quotes when incorporating such data into the thesis. Moreover,
having been awarded a faculty grant, I was able to record five women with a
video camera. The filming took place in a series of locations and allowed me to
capture not only words but also meaningful facial expressions, body language,
hesitation and other expressions of the respondent’s emotional and psychological
state.
Following the advice by Les Back (2014), I did not rely exclusively on offering
faithfully transcribed  block quotations from interviews and instead paid more
attention  to  contextual  texture  of  the  conversations  with  my respondents.  As
maintained by Polsky,  “successful  field research  depends on the  investigator's
trained abilities to look at people,  listen to them,  think and feel with them, talk
with them rather than at  them” (1967: 119).  Knowing that transcription in not
description, I did not try to rely solely on recording technology to deliver my data
3 A meme is a term that was initially coined by Richard Dawkins in his 1976 book  The
Selfish Gene to describe any ideas, behaviours or styles that spread from person to person
within a culture. When I speak about memes in this thesis I refer to Internet memes -
visual and textual messages that spread speedily from person to person via the Internet,
largely  through  emails,  blogs,  forums,  imageboards,  social  networking  sites,  instant
messaging and video hosting services.
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and convey the women's narratives. I  stayed vigilant and attentive during my
interviews, informal chats and other social interactions in order to capture the
social vitality of the women.
1.3.2 Situating the interviews into broader contexts
In order to capture my respondents' vitality, participant observation was a crucial
element when conducting interviews. Just as much as I focused on the words that
were spoken, I equally paid attention to the ways in which things were said, the
context in which they came to life and to things that were left unsaid. Although in
most  cases  the  time  spent  with  respondents  did  not  involve  sufficiently
prolonged  interactions  of  traditional  participant  observation,  the  elements  of
participant observation remained strongly incorporated in the research design.
The  principles  of  participant  observation  were  implanted  onto  the
methodological  premises  of  the  research  in  two  principal  areas.   Firstly,  the
observatory practices were utilised at various events, mosque visits, home visits,
conferences, Quranic sisters' circles, Friday sermons, protests and fashion shows,
which  allowed  me  to  observe  respondents’ interactions  in  different  settings.
Whilst being actively involved in these activities as an (accepted) participant, I
was  able  to  witness  “situated  conversations”  and  “situated  actions”  within  a
compressed time period (Brockmann, 2011). I kept a notebook and a digital diary
monitoring all significant situations and conversations. Secondly, I had the chance
to accompany some of the women during their everyday activities in order to
observe  their  interactions  within  their  local  community  and  majority  British
society. These activities developed an understanding about how the veil facilitates
or hampers relations with the environment, with a special emphasis being placed
on behavioural changes between the public and private spheres.  
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Additionally, I also experienced veiling myself. During my fieldwork, I embraced
different  types  of  headgear  and  full-body  attire  in  different  spatial  and  time
contexts; I wore the hijab as part of ‘hijab day’ in Newcastle and took on the niqab
for a short period of time in London. Although not being Muslim, and having no
prior  personal  experience  with  Islamic  veiling,  this  methodological  approach
enabled me to observe and experience the self-perception in the public sphere
whilst  wearing  different  types  of  veil.  This  practice  also  gave  me  a  valuable
opportunity to test the applicability of common anti-niqab arguments, such as the
argument  that  the  niqab  obstructs  efficient  communication and  everyday  life
activities, from driving to hearing properly. However, I did not incorporate the
experiences of veiling into this thesis for a number of reasons. I strongly critique
the need for a non-Muslim woman to embrace the hijab in order to convey the
authentic  experience  of  wearing  it  –  an  idea  which  will  be  reinforced  when
analysing the examples of  common media reporting strategies.  Moreover,  this
thesis will argue that the hijab transcends the physical and practical dimensions
as  an  expression  of  faith,  spirituality  and  belonging.  It  is  due  to  these
phenomenologies that the wearing of the hijab for a day would not render an
acceptable or insightful experience.
1.3.3 Embedding and embodying the Internet
The role of the Internet and social media in forging and expressing contemporary
socialities  cannot  be  ignored,  and  it  is  thus  not  surprising  that  digital
ethnographic  methods  are  increasingly  thrusting  their  way  into  the
anthropological research corpus (Kozinets, 1998; Pink, 2009, 2012; Postill, 2010).
Taking advantage of the Internet and its everyday presence in the lives of my
respondents proved to be of paramount importance.
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As suggested by Christine Hine (2015), various social media platforms, including
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, as well as blogs, vlogs4 and YouTube are commonly
embedded into many different forms of fieldwork, as they offer a convenient way
to  sustain  continuous  contact  with  research  respondents.  Drawing  on
Schneidermann and her ethnographic study of hip hop in Uganda (2014), Hine
explains how social media was vital to the practices and routines of the studied
group and an integral part of the meaning of hip hop in their lives. Schneiderman
thus found it  essential to participate and observe the interplay between social
media  spaces  and  geographical  spaces  to  comprehend  the  various  forms  of
socialities and mobility that resulted. Social media, for her, provided an ongoing
sense  of  co-presence with the  field even when distant  from it  geographically.
Moreover, social media helped her facilitate fieldwork visits to Uganda and also
provided  the  contextual  background,  of  a  globally  interconnected  hip  hop
movement.
Following Schneiderman’s example, I  utilised social media for similar reasons.
Employing  social  media  has  facilitated  “a  longitudinal  dimension  to  the
research”  (Hine,  2015:  72)  through its  ability  to  sustain  a  close  link  with  the
respondents despite our physical distance and the impossibility of regular offline
interaction. My Internet presence was crucial in creating a wider and profounder
ethnographic  context  for  framing  the  face-to-face  encounters  and  interview
narratives. Moreover, social media played a central role in engaging respondents,
arranging  interviews  and  visits,  and  following  up  with  them  post-fieldwork.
Echoing Schneiderman, social media furthermore helped me to build a bigger
global picture of the hijab movement, which offered an important insight into the
circulation of identities, meanings, symbols and practices.
An  additional  significance  of  the  Internet  was  recognised  in  its  role  in
4 Vlog is a portmanteau of video and blog.
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contemporary activist movements. With this project being particularly attentive
to existing activist engagement  and listening to female voices, utilising a digital
toolbox represented a paramount element of ethnographic inquiry. In that sense,
the Internet enabled me to comprehend the breadth and diversity of activist and
feminist  voices  online.  I  was  able  to  analyse  the  digital  traces  of  public
conversations and activities captured in these cyber environments and observe
interactions  and  experiences  manifested  through  digital  communications  (see
Kozinets, 1998).
1.3.4 The politics and aesthetics of visual imagery 
A crucial part of the digital ethnography featured in this thesis was concerned
with exploring, analysing and contextualising various images of the hijab and
hijabis  which  are  circulated  online.  In  addition,  I  also  collated  visual
representations  of  the  hijab  in  offline  settings,  by  attending  exhibitions  and
museums during my fieldwork and tracing various images mentioned during the
interviews and referenced by respondents online. Following Mookherjee's advice
(2015: 178),  my aim was to “track the circulatory transmission of these images
and to trace their intertextual links with other depictions.” In other words, I was
interested  in  exploring  the  images  of  the  hijab(is)  at  the  triangulation  of  the
processes of production, representation and perception of images. 
In  that  sense,  I  did  not  perceive  the  meanings  of  various  photographs,
illustrations, drawings, paintings, street art murals, cartoons and Internet memes
as intrinsic or representative of 'reality'. Instead, I treated them as ethnographic
texts that are written in specific visual grammar codes which are unavoidably
decoded differently by different recipients. When read anthropologically, these
cultural  texts  assisted  me  in  uncovering  their  wider  cultural  and  social
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significance  and  the  ideological  messages  which  they  help  to  communicate,
naturalise and maintain (Knowles and Sweetman, 2004: 6). At the same time I
also acknowledged that analysing visual material is not limited to its semiotic
side exclusively. Equally important for anthropological inquiry is the relational
aspect of visuality. Images, just like any material objects, have agency (Gell, 1998)
and a social life of their own (Appadurai, 1986). As such, they have the capacity
to create their own socialities which can forge and maintain relationships. Taking
this into account, I did not just 'read' visual texts but paid special attention to the
ways in which people interact and 'socialise' with them.
In  that  respect,  I  echo  the  methodological  guidelines  outlined  by  Sarah  Pink
(2006). She points to an interdisciplinary body of literature, which highlights the
importance  of  researching  both  the  internal  meaning  of  an  image  as  well  as
examining how a certain image is made meaningful by those viewing it. Drawing
from the work of  Banks (2001),  Lister and Wells  (2001) and Rose (2001),  Pink
critiques  a  positivist  approach  to  the  visual  which  focuses  on  heavily
observational practices and instead proposes a more contemporary methodology
for  interpreting  visual  images  grounded in  a  multidisciplinary  approach.  She
insists that researching visual imagery should be located at the intersection of
four key areas, namely (I) the context of production, (II) the content of the image,
(III) the contexts in which images are viewed and (IV) the materiality and agency
of images (Pink, 2006: 29-32).
To  sum up,  I  was  interested  in  how and why  visual  texts  are  produced.  By
interviewing the artists and the creators of various internet images, I analysed the
context in which such content came to life and the intended messages behind
their inception. Furthermore,  I  observed how these messages were manifested
visually and what aesthetic codes were deployed for their representation. Lastly
and perhaps most importantly, I paid special attention to exploring how visual
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imagery is shared, circulated and consumed by my respondents and how it is
perceived through their own subjectivities. The visuals indeed evolve their “own
life through the context of display” (Tolia-Kelly,  2004: 682),  thus making them
particularly important when attempting to track “circulation through different
contexts of a manifestly material object of study” (Marcus 1995:106).
1.3.5 Unveiling power relations in the media and politics
To explore British public discourses on veiling, I also analysed selected media and
policy reports by following the principles of ‘critical discourse analysis’ (CDA).
CDA is an interdisciplinary method of scrutinising the discourses by focusing on
the ways in which social and political dominations are reproduced within the
texts  (Fairclough,  1993,  1995;  Wodak,  1996).  The  CDA  draws  upon  the
poststructuralist textual paradigms which define discourse as a social practice,
implying “a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the
situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it” (Fairclough &
Wodak, 1997: 258).
As it is particularly concerned with the rhetoric of racism and the ways in which
the  discourses  of  difference  and exclusion sustain  society  and its  phenomena
(Kolstø,  2009:  18;  Hammond  and  Wellington,  2012:  53),  CDA  was  able  to
illuminate the racist sentiments of British society towards the practice of Islamic
veiling.  With  the  majority  audience  having  merely  obscured  interpersonal
contacts with fully veiled Muslim women, media and political messages serve as
the sole transmitters of public knowledge (see Ameli et al, 2007: 8). Hence, the
investigation of social identities among Islamic women could not be undertaken
without taking into account the power of the media and political discourses that
are shaping the public perception of sartorial practices in question.
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The  attention  of  anthropological  inquiry  was  particularly  concerned  with  the
construction  of  difference  (Peterson,  2005:  56)  and  unmasking  ideologically
imbued structures of power, dominance and strategic exclusion” (Wodak, 1999:
8). Following Fairclough's method, my approach to CDA combined micro, meso
and  macro-level  interpretations  (Fairclough  2013:  352).  At  a  micro  level,  I
examined the choice of words as well as and visual and rhetorical devices that
were deployed for depicting Muslim women. I scrutinised the production and
consumption of  the text  at  a  meso level  by focusing on the placement  of  the
articles and choice and positioning of imagery in a media outlet, for example. At
a macro level, I focused on the intertextuality by mapping broader contextual and
social currents – for example various terror events in the UK and elsewhere – that
affected  the  production  of  a  text  (see  Fairclough,  2013:  352;  Mahadevan  and
Mayer, 2017)
Whilst I conducted a longer and more in-depth analysis of political and media
discourses on veiled women in the British media and in British politics in the
period from 2001  to  2014  (see  Sadar,  2014),  the  second chapter  of  this  thesis
includes  only  a  short  snippet  of  it.  However,  the  findings  were  crucial  to
furthering my own understanding of  the existing unbalanced power relations
prevalent in the dominant narratives.
In  summary,  to  manage  and  maximise  the  potential  of  multiple  sites  and  a
diverse body of respondents, I pursued a multi-method approach. Ethnographic
interviewing presented the pivotal research technique as it enabled me to capture
women's narratives on the veil and their experiences with it. Combining it with
participant  observation,  digital  and  visual  ethnography  and critical  discourse
analysis furthermore helped me to frame those ethnographic accounts into the
broader context of their families, communities and societies.
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1.4 Negotiating positionality in the field
Fieldwork is always “a dialogical process which is structured by the researcher
and participants” (England, 1994: 80). Whilst the respondents are placed on the
central stage in this thesis, it is simultaneously instrumental to acknowledge the
existence and the role of an embodied and situated researcher. Although, as an
ethnographer, I occupy a less conspicuous place in the final ethnographic output,
my identity and biography inevitably have a great impact on my fieldwork, as
well as on the collection and presentation of data (see Šikić-Mićanović, 2013: 47).
As affirmed by Lila Abu-Lughod (1991: 141), it is “clear that every view is a view
from somewhere and every act of speaking a speaking from somewhere.” Indeed,
my own identity, alongside that of the social groups I occupy, and the context(s)
from which I speak, plays an instrumental role in the way I have been perceived
by the community and, equally, in the way I have myself seen and engaged with
the community which I researched. Hence, reflecting on my own positionality in
the field has represented a pivotal and iterative praxis in all stages of the research
process.
As a researcher I inhabit a multitude of social categories, which encompass my
gender  (woman),  race  (white),  religion  (agnostic),  age  (late  20s),  ethnic
background (Slovenian), class (middle-class) and occupation (student), amongst
various other identities. Some of these categories might correspond to similarities
with at least some respondents and consequently assist with forging a stronger
rapport. My gender identity in particular proved to be crucial, not only in gaining
access to certain spaces and securing interviews with some women who would
not  agree  to  social  interactions  with  unrelated  men,  but  also  in  helping  to
abandon “the mystified role of researcher” (Riddell 1989: 94). It also helped me to
present myself as another woman with many similar concerns and experiences
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(ibid.,  Finch,  1984).  Similarly,  being  a  foreigner,  being  a  student  and  being
involved in various activist movements, for example, constituted further overlaps
and consequently opened new spaces of familiarity, mutual understanding and
instant empathy.
At  the  same  time,  however,  generalising  and  romanticising  the  universal
women's  experience is  a  dangerous avenue,  as  posited equality  with research
subjects  can conceal  profounder and more  damaging forms of  inequality  and
exploitation (Abu-Lughod, 1990; Stacey, 1988: 22). Acknowledging and reflecting
upon certain fragments  of  my identity,  mostly notably my race,  ethnicity and
religious  background,  was  thus  unavoidable,  for  they  undeniably  located  me
towards  the  privileged  end  of  the  spectrum of  existing  hierarchies  of  power.
Uneasy questions, both spoken and unspoken, about my ethnographic license to
conduct this particular research preoccupied my mind in the earlier stages of my
research,  and  continued  to  linger  throughout  the  writing  process.  However
uncomfortable,  the  constant  presence  and  continuous  interrogation  of  these
doubts have been crucial in informing my overall approach to this project, and
were  particularly  important  when  producing  –  what  Kim England (1994:  89)
would call – more inclusive and fluid methodologies that are observant of and
sensitive to the inherent power relations that are unavoidably present in the field.
Reflecting on her experience of seeking such inclusive methodologies,  Kaye F.
Haw  (1996)  writes  about  her  own  exploration  of  feminist  ethnography  and
positionality  in  the  field.  Acknowledging the  role  that  her  secularism  and
whiteness performed during her research on educational experiences of Muslim
girls at a private Muslim girls' school and at single-sex state schools, Haw, too,
continued to reflect on her entitlement to research and represent women who can
make themselves heard, and can do so with more authenticity and conviction
(1996:  321).  She  claims  that  her  role  as  a  feminist  ethnographer  was  not  to
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represent or speak for these women, but rather to create and map yet another
new space for the voices that have been historically marginalised in academia and
beyond.
Especially when researching the veil, as well as some other topics which are a
frequent  subject  of  controversy  within  Muslim  communities,  having  outsider
status  can  be  occasionally  advantageous,  as  it  can  elicit  different  types  of
conversation, and different types of response. As concluded by Haw (1996: 321),
her own positionality, and resultant interactions with her respondents,  offered
another perspective on those analysed by other ethnographers, differing in age,
ethnic background, religion or sexuality, for example. In that sense, this research
does not pretend to speak on behalf of the researched communities, but rather to
add another perspective into the compendium of existing perspectives,  and to
open a new anthropological space where the voices of veiled Muslim women are
listened to and heard. The actions of listening and hearing have been particularly
important in avoiding the trap of offering condescending emancipatory readings
of the hijab by non-Muslim white women. Instead, I turned to Muslim female
activists  –  either  through ethnographic  engagement,  or  through their  creative
output – such as art and literature – and listened to their feminist voices.
1.5 Ethical considerations and dilemmas
Ethnographic  inquiry  is  premised on establishing unique relationships  with a
plurality  of  people  and  often  invading  their  intimate  zones  which  inevitably
triggers a set of moral dilemmas (Haviland et al, 2008: 18).  Such dilemmas hold
the  potential  to  arise  at  any  stage  of  the  research  process  and  knowledge
production,  from planning  to  conducting  the  research,  to  analysing  the  data,
28
writing up and publishing (Candea 2007: 27; Fine, 1993) and therefore need to be
“accounted for in all research paradigms” (Fine in Deji, 2012: 316). Whilst I had
assessed  potential  complications  in  the  course  of  my  research  in  order  to
minimise  the  likelihood  that  they  would  occur  prior  to  my  fieldwork,  some
occasional  dilemmas  did  nevertheless  present  themselves.  To address  them,  I
generally followed the Ethical Guidelines for Good Research Practice proposed
by  the  Association  of  Social  Anthropologists  of  the  UK  and  Commonwealth
(2011) and sought advice from my supervisors.   
Ethnographic work is based upon a mutual rapport with the participants (Caplan
and  Silverman,  2003:  117).  As  researchers,  we  are  thus  first  and  foremost
responsible for the individuals involved in our project – not only for ensuring the
quality of the research, but also fulfilling our obligations as responsible humans.
Therefore, it is vital to establish and sustain participants’ trust by approaching
them  carefully,  with  consideration  for  their  personal  and  community  mores
(ibid.). One common way of formalising this trust is to obtain informed consent
(Fluehr-Lobban,  2003:  228;  van  Willigen,  2002:  52-54).  Before  conducting  any
research,  I  made sure to  obtain written or,  when not possible  or appropriate,
verbal  consent  from  every  individual  involved  in  the  study.  The  consent
negotiated the limits of the relationship between the respondents and myself as a
researcher,  and  ensured  that  respondents  would  benefit  from  maximum
protection, and would be free to withdraw from the project  at  any time.  One
interviewed artist, for example, withdrew her participation after I had sent her
the requested write-up.
In  terms  of  minimising  potential  disturbances  to  participants  and  their
relationships  with  society,  I  provided  anonymity  for  most  of  the  subjects
involved.  However,  securing  anonymity proved to  be  challenging  for  various
reasons. Some of the women represented in this research appear frequently in the
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media and in political debates, and it might not be difficult to trace them using an
online search engine. Also, due to copyright restrictions, I had to title artwork
with the names of real authors. Taking this into account, I decided to anonymise
the names of all respondents whom I interviewed about personal matters, whilst
keeping the real names of certain fashion designers, artists and journalists who
feature in the thesis.
Further issues regarding anonymity and consent arose whilst  pursuing digital
ethnography. Although the majority of the websites which I used in my research
are public and as such free to access and use, I acknowledged the interplay of
public/private that  is  inevitably embedded in the various online fora,  such as
social media sites and blogs. Though publicly accessible, utilising some forms of
content for the purposes of research might present an unwanted intrusion into
privacy. As posited by the ASA guidelines, “the very notion of public domain is
an  evolving,  shifting  phenomena  and  hence  so  is  cyberethnography  and  its
ethical applications” (2001). In order to move within those shifting and evolving
public spaces ethically, I sought guidance from my supervisors and other senior
anthropologists  who  kindly  agreed  to  advise  me  via  Skype  and  email
correspondence. 
Subsequently, I took a number of steps to keep my practices as ethical as possible.
I decided to delete the majority of screenshots that were originally placed into the
thesis, thus protecting users' privacy. I sought bloggers' consent for using certain
blog images, and referenced them if appropriate. When participating in online
discussions, or otherwise prompting responses from online users, I made sure I
was always upfront about my intentions. When this was not possible, I decided to
use the information I had gathered for my knowledge exclusively, and did not
include it in the write up. The process of negotiating the ethics of this research
was most challenging in an online setting, as the existing guidelines, and the lack
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of them, colour many areas of research grey.
Considering the culturally sensitive nature of my research focusing on intimate
sentiments  of  identity,  otherness,  racism  and  ethnicity,  I  made  sure  to  avoid
ethnocentric biases towards any group, either ethnic, gender or religious. Since I
was dealing with minority groups, I was extremely careful to avoid any form of
racist and discriminatory discourse or patronising behaviour that may affect the
self-perception  of,  or  negative  responses  from,  respondents.  Although  not  a
representative of the British majority myself, I however needed to question my
potentially  privileged  position  within  British  society,  and  acknowledged  this
whilst conducting my research.
When  needed,  I  materialised  cultural  sensitivity  by  appropriating  my  dress.
When attending events, interviews and other activities, I wore loose clothes and
tunics, to ensure that I did not attract unneeded attention or hostility towards not
only myself, but also my respondents. Whilst making careful decisions about my
own sartorial presentation, I was cautious about not appropriating my dress too
much. For example, apart from the aforementioned experiments of wearing the
hijab and niqab for a day, I only ever covered my hair when in mosques. In that
sense, I was careful about navigating between appropriating my dress  to foster
acceptance and positive first impressions on the one hand, and transcending my
authentic self on the other (see Mookherjee, 2001).
Finally,  I  acknowledged  the  influence  of  my  writing  for  the  perception  of
minorities in the focus of the research. I was particularly cognisant about eluding
stereotyping,  and  essentialising  and  generalising  in  written  and  visual
representations. I regularly sought feedback from respondents during the process
of writing up in order to negotiate any contentious issues. For example, I had to
follow up  to  clarify  certain  points  from the  interviews,   or  to ask  about  the
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appropriateness of certain expressions.
 
Throughout  my research  I  tried  my best  to  act  as  a  personally  engaged  and
committed anthropologist  who exercises  great  cultural  sensitivity,  and acts  in
accordance with its discipline politics  and the moral self, and is accountable for
the political and ethical consequences of her actions (Denzin, 1997: 277) in order
to  maintain  collaborative,  reciprocal,  trusting  and  friendly  relations  with
respondents and other people involved in the research process.
1.6 Structuring the thesis
In addition to an introductory section which accounts for the first chapter, this
thesis consists of six further chapters, with five of them being of ethnographic
nature. Before I offer a brief summary of the chapters, it is important to add a
note on the design of my ethnographic chapters. In order to manage a plurality of
field sites and methods, and to discuss the data in a logical and comprehensible
manner, each ethnographic chapter opens with two distinctive features, a selected
artwork  and  an  ethnographic  vignette  of  a  respondent  whose  story  takes  us
through the chapter. The decision to embrace such design comes with multiple
motivations.
The are two main reasons for  choosing to include artwork at the beginning of
each chapter. Firstly,  it  underscores  the aesthetic  element  of  the hijab and the
importance of its representations, alongside their transmission and the way they
are  perceived.  As  argued  by  Gell  in  his  seminal  work  Art  and  Agency:  An
Anthropological Theory (1998), art is not only (or not at all) about the semiotics or
what it means but is about what its effect is on those observing it, or interacting
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with it in other ways. In that sense, the artistic works which open each chapter
can be seen not only as yet another form through which women express their
intimate perceptions of and experiences with veiling but can be also seen as a
platform for dialogic engagements that travel beyond the textual. Secondly, the
chosen works situate the research into a broader global network of aesthetics,
knowledge and meanings. Whilst all respondents reside in the UK and mostly
speak about their experiences from a particular local vantage point, the artworks
remind us about the importance of transnational influences which inform how
local practices are developed and animated.
The selected works come from Yemen, France, United Kingdom, Lebanon and
Afghanistan  respectively,  but  share  a  strong  link  to  the  respondents  and  the
geographical  scope of  this  research.  For  example,  I  first  encountered Boushra
Almutawakel's artwork  True Self as part of an exhibition at the British Museum
during my fieldwork, after being pointed to it by a Facebook page I followed for
the purpose of my research. The work of Princess Hijab from the second chapter
was widely discussed in the British media and I only found out about it through
my  respondents,  and  whilst  conducting  a  media  analysis.  Lebanese  artist
Georgina Choueiri, who authored the opening image of Chapter VII, works and
lives in London. The distance from her home country and experiences which is a
result  of  her  living  in  the  UK  inform  her  artistic  practice.  Lastly,  Shamsia
Hassani's  photo of her mural is partially a consequence of her attending a guest
workshop  by  the  British  artist  CHU,  who  first  introduced  her  to  the  artistic
technique and medium of street art. The dynamism of transnational exchange,
expedited  by  migration,  media,  international  visits,  exhibitions  and
collaborations, all play an important role in respondents'  processes of creating
meanings and identities.
Juxtaposing  these  global  artistic  accounts,  I  open  each  chapter  with  an
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ethnographic vignette – a short but rich ethnographic account (see Balka et al,
2007:  238;  Hess,  2013:  162).  Each  vignette  focuses  on  one  respondent,  and
captures  her  in  a  particular  moment  of  time  which  we  shared  during  the
fieldwork.  These  insights  aim  to  offer  a  close-up  account  of  a  particular
respondent  who  is  mentioned  during  a  particular  chapter.  Having  a  single
woman manoeuvring the dominant narrative through a  specific topic  helps to
frame the fragmented stories, analyses and observations into a coherent textual
outlet,  and  assists  with  constructing  a  stronger  argument  throughout  each
chapter.
As  previously  referred  to,  each  chapter  focuses  on  one  particular  topic  and
illuminates it from various perspectives. More specifically, the central topics of
the upcoming chapter revolve around the following topics: the hijab in complex
historical, political and media discourses; the diversity of practices of veiling and
various ways of becoming a hijabi; the hijab and its complex relationship with
fashion; hijab feminism and gender identities; the otherness of the hijab and its
wearers; and the changing meanings and resistance centring on the hijab.  I shall
shortly outline each chapter and state how they approach central research aims of
this  thesis,  namely  locating  the  Islamic  veil  within  the  social  milieu  of
contemporary Britain and exploring the personal dimension of veiling in the UK. 
Playing with the title of Lila Abu-Lughod's seminal work Do Muslim women need
saving?  (2002),  the  second,  and  only  remaining  non-ethnographic  chapter,
theorises  the  disconnect  generated  by  lived  realities  and  Western  myths  by
analysing  and  deconstructing  historical,  political  and  media  discourses.  In
addition to exploring the orientalist historiographies of the veil, Chapter II pays
special attention to scrutinising media narratives in the British press over the past
decade as well as the local and global politics of Islamophobia, and observes how
they have affected Muslims women's lives and laws.
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The third chapter argues that the hijab can never be a static, determined and an
ever-present part of women’s lives, identities and societies. The chapter looks into
diversified and highly individual forms of veiling practices. It also explores the
plethora of reasons and motivations for women to take up the veil, and explores
the journey women embark on when taking this decision, alongside its inevitable
practical, emotional and social challenges.
The  fourth  chapter  explores  the  relationship  between fashion  and Islam,  and
discusses  how women negotiate  fashionable  aesthetics  and religious  ethics  in
their everyday clothing practices. The chapter looks into the notion of veiling as
being an expression of 'anti-fashion', discusses the hijab as part of a luxurious
high-fashion  industry,  analyses  the  growing  trend  of  online  blogs  and  other
digital  platforms  for  promoting  hijab  fashion,  and  documents  various  urban
fashion scenes that feature alternative ways of wearing the veil. Lastly, Chapter
IV also discusses how Islamic headscarves are utilised by various public personas
as an enigmatic costume whose colonial flashback stirs media controversies.
The following chapter focuses on subverting techniques and meanings deployed
by Muslim feminists in order to resist and rethink male hegemony and narrowly-
defined gender identities as dictated by Islamic communities,  various feminist
groups and dominant British public discourses.  Chapter V reflects  on colonial
feminist crusades against the veil and the notion that the hijab symbolises sexual
apartheid. It furthermore explores how women take up the veil to resist capitalist
beauty games and objectification. One of the sections scrutinises emerging online
Islamic feminist movements, whilst special attention is also paid to exploring the
relationship between LGBT+ communities and the hijab.
Toying with Du Bois' concept of the invisible veil, Chapter VI centres on veiling,
citizenship and otherness.  The chapter looks at how race studies can provide a
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useful  analytical  tool  for  exploring  the  otherness  experienced  by  hijabis.  The
chapter  also  explores  racialisation  of  the  veil  and  discusses  poignant
Islamophobic accounts of veiled women’s experiences in the UK. Discussions on
citizenship  and Britishness  are  theorised as  well,  and one of  the  sub-sections
focuses on discussing the strategies for making hijabs 'more British'.
The final chapter corresponds to the opening chapter on historical, political and
media discourses by exploring how hijab wearers challenge the prevailing public
perception of veiled women as oppressed victims of dangerous regimes. Chapter
VII explores different forms and motivations of resisting sentiments and acts that
are express0-ed,  and also questioned,  by British  hijabis,  whilst  avoiding over-
romanticising  and  fetishising  resistance  and  the  subjects  central  to  its
implementation. It also takes into consideration both organised and more subtle,
everyday forms of resistance, and all modalities in-between, and explores a sense
of choices, creative approaches and aspirations experienced by British hijabis.
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Chapter II: Do veiled women need saving?
‘Ban it’  (Daily Express,  2006),  ‘Make every woman wear a burkha’5 (The Express,
2010) and  ‘How to avoid airport security: Wear a burka’  (Daily Mail, 2012) are just
some of  the  populist  headlines,  appearing  in  tabloid  media  outlets  in  recent
years.  They  highlight  how  Muslim  women’s  appearance  –  alongside  their
apparent  ‘victimhood’ and,  ironically,  the  supposed  threat  they  represent  to
‘Western values’ –  continue to generate fascination and controversies  with the
Western audience (Ahmad, 2010: 245; Al-Saji, 2010; Bilge, 2010: 10). 
The controversy is far from being limited to the tabloid press,  but is similarly
contentious  in  the  broadsheet  press  and  political  arena, both  in  the  UK  and
abroad.  Both  the  wearing  of  headscarves  and  their  more  conservative
counterparts, such as the niqab or the burqa, have elicited burning polemics in
several  European  countries.  Following  national  bans  on  face  veils  in  some
western European countries and a general rise of right-wing extremism around
the continent,  a  political  hysteria has migrated across the Channel  as  well.  In
September  2013,  the  Liberal  Democrat  Home  Office  minister  Jeremy  Browne
called  for  a  national  debate  regarding  the  face  veil  in  the  UK.  Many  other
prominent  political  figures  have  joined  the  discussion,  predominantly  with
antagonistic attitudes towards headscarves, and especially face veiling.
Apart from pragmatic security reasons, the pro-ban arguments are mostly backed
by a moral reasoning. Among others,  the niqab and the burqa are believed to
convey  fundamentalist  sentiments  and  a  political  ideology  associated  with
radical Islamist regimes. They are moreover proclaimed marks of difference or
5 I use the term 'burqa' throughout the thesis. However, I will keep alternative spellings 
(e.g. burka, burkha) in direct quotes. 
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even segregation and are deemed harmful to the modernist ideas of secularism,
personal freedom and, above all, gender equality. Since the Quran is vague about
the notion of veiling and simply urges women to dress modestly, such attire is
perceived  as  a  socio-cultural  product  rather  than  a  religious  obligation.  The
headscarf, too, is subjected to similar criticism. While not as provocative as its full
face  counterpart,  many believe  that  it  has  no  space  in  public  places,  such  as
schools, universities or political institutions.
Moderate  Muslims  and  non-Muslims  alike  hence  frequently  agree  that  attire
loaded with such problematic political affiliations and a supposed anti-women
agenda has no place in liberal Western societies (e.g. Baran, 2011: 145; Koling,
2012).  Whilst these arguments might indeed be introduced through the lens of
sensibility and rationality, they are seriously flawed. Rather than reflecting lived
realities of British Muslim women, they cling to partial and often dangerously
distorted historical and political fragments and generalise them onto an entire
female Muslim population. By ignoring eclectic lives and life-styles of headscarf
and niqab wearers in the UK, women in question become compressed as exotic
and foreign victims of oppressive regimes who need to be saved. Such discourses
echo the colonial rhetoric of what Spivak (1988: 296) has described as the need of
“white men saving brown women from brown men”. 
With  a  majority  audience  having  limited  interpersonal  contact  with  veiled
Muslim  women,  historical,  political  and  media  narratives  remain  the  sole
transmitter of public knowledge regarding the topic (see Ameli et al, 2007: 8). To
understand the disconnect generated by lived realities and Western myths, it is
essential to analyse and deconstruct these discourses and observe how the legacy
of Orientalism and a politics of Islamophobia have influenced Muslim women’s
lives and policy-making.  To provide the much needed context for understanding
the complex historico-political and social genesis of the veil in British society and
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in  a  Euro-American environment  more broadly,  this  chapter  will  examine the
history of the veil, contemporary British discourses on veiling and the tone of the
political debate in the United Kingdom and abroad. 
2.1 The chronicles of the veil 
2.1.1 The genesis of the veil
A headscarf is nowadays commonly associated with Islam. However, contrary to
prevailing 'Western' equalisations of the veil and Islam, the sartorial practice of
female  head  covering  emerged  outside  the  Islamic  context.  In  ancient
Mesopotamia the veil  was imposed on female representatives of higher socio-
economical strata as a visual signifier that was delineating the borders between
classes (Hoodfar, 1993: 251). On one hand it was signifying that a woman from a
privileged background did not need to do manual work and on the other hand a
veil blocked lustful gazes from potential suitors who would not pass as suitable
heirs of the family wealth. From its initial use of marking borders between social
strata,  the veil  has been deployed ever since in a number of different cultural
contexts for establishing social boundaries, with the definition and the usage of
these boundaries  changing in different  milieux (Ahmed, 1992:  523,  El  Guindi,
1999: 13-22). 
The concept of veiling was transmitted from its Assyrian origins to the wider
Middle  Eastern and Mediterranean region and via  ancient  Roman and Greek
cultures  to  the  European  space.  Although  social  functions  of  veiling  in  pre-
modern  Europe  are  nowadays  eclipsed  by  mythologised  discourses  of  the
culturally alien Islamic veil,  headscarves indeed occupied a visible role across
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European societies.  For example,  the importance of  the veil  is  reflected in the
Bible in both Old and New Testaments (e.g. Genesis 24: 65), whereby wearing the
veil is introduced as a sign of propriety for unmarried women and the removal of
the veil is depicted as a Biblical punishment for adultery (Douglas King, 2003:
111). 
Influenced by Biblical interpretations, veiling presented a widespread element of
European  tradition  in  pre-modernity  that  was  especially  commonly  worn  by
privileged urban female population throughout Europe, including Britain (Owen-
Crocker, 2010: 148, 222). The most common female attire in Anglo-Saxon England
consisted of a headdress concealing the ears that was secured to the shoulders of
a dress. Similar to its earlier Mediterranean forms, veiling was associated with
higher social strata and a distinctive veil was regularly worn by female royalty.
The queens portrayed on the Lady Gunhild’s Cross6 and in the Stuttgart Psalter,7
for instance, wear the veil in conjunction with the crown (ibid.: 222). The veil was,
however, gradually abandoned with the rise of modernity and its novel set of
values,  which  were  aspired  to  in  order  to  maintain  distance  from  medieval
Christian morality. As will be demonstrated later on in this chapter, it is hence not
uncommon  for  contemporary  European  criticism  of  the  veil  to  feature  its
connection to the medieval past. 
Although  veiling  is  currently  not  a  commonly  practised  manifestation  of
reverence  and  purity,  the  elements  of  Biblical  imagery  can  be  identified  in
contemporary  Christian  discourses.  ‘Taking  the  veil’  is  a  commonly  used
expression for commencing a religious profession in the Roman Catholic Church.
Stemming  from  the  liturgical  rite  of  ‘consecration  of  virgins’,  it  symbolises
woman’s eternal communion with Christ as the ultimate emblem of purity. In her
6 Lady Gunhil's Cross is an ivory associated with the niece of King Cnut dating to 1075.
7 The Stuttgart Psalter is a richly illuminated 9th-century psalter, considered one of the 
most significant of the Carolingian period. 
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study  of  a  ceremony  for  taking  the  veil,  Danielle  Rives  (2005)  beautifully
describes the significance that the headscarf plays in the rite of passage in which
a novice becomes a nun. Covering the novice's head with a veil symbolises the
novice leaving behind former appearance as she leaves the secular world, with
the veiling completing the ritual of retreat from the world. The veil in that sense
is not just a uniform but an emblem of the transformation of her identity (ibid.:
473).
In contrast to taking the veil, the act of the removal of the veil remains a common
practice  at  Christian weddings.  The symbolic  act  of  removing the bride's  veil
suggests  the  endpoint  of  woman’s  purity;  the  new  status  of  a  wife  would
terminate her virginity. More distant parallels can also be recognised in hats and
other forms of headwear that are commonly worn by Christian women during
religious congregations (Celefato, 2004: 65; Hunter, 1999: 143; Radford Ruether,
2010: 149). 
A similar  practice  of  veiling,  originating  from  the  very  same  Mediterranean
cradle,  has been dispersed to different locations and consequently adopted by
numerous  cultures  and  religions,  including  Judaism,  Hinduism  and
Confucianism.  The  cross-religious  and  cross-cultural  perspective  on  veiling,
especially its comparison with Christian Europe, is essential when encountering
the  argumentation  against  the  veil  in  terms  of  being  incompatible  with
European/Christian tradition or being an Islamic invention produced exclusively
for the oppression of Muslim women. 
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2.1.2 Islamic adoption of the veil 
In the spirit of the time and corresponding fashion trends, it is thus not surprising
that the practice was adopted by some women from an early umma, despite not
presenting a sartorial standard (Stillman and Stillman, 2003: 142). Among women
who embraced the veil was also Mohamed’s wife Aisha who allegedly took up
the niqab with her marriage around the year 622 AD. It was not until almost two
centuries  later,  with  the  rise  of  Abbasid  Caliphate,  that  the  veil  became  a
prevalent  vestimentary  practice  among  Muslim  women.  With  additional
promotion from the side of the Ottoman Empire and the Safavids, the veil spread
to a wider Muslim population cross-regionally (ibid.; Hoodfar, 1997: 251). 
In Islam, the veil is a part of a significant social institution of  purdah,  literally
translating as a curtain. However, its symbolic meaning is complex, multifaceted
and  loaded.  The  central  characteristic  of  the  concept  lies  in  hampering  the
interaction between women and men outside certain social categories in order to
protect  female  modesty,  purity  and  piety  (Shehabuddin,  2008:  4).  More
pragmatically,  it  maintains  social  order  by  ensuring  that  women  –  and
consequently  the  family  wealth  that  is  transferred  through  dowry  –  are  not
distributed outside the same social class. As an omnipresent concept in the life of
a woman, purdah is expected to be respected on a symbolic as well as a physical
level. The latter is articulated through the complex set of various social norms
regulating body gesticulation and gazing, the figure of speech, silence and also
the choice of clothing (Fedorak, 2007: 167; Kent, 2004: 135; Papanek, 1973: 289).
As will be illustrated in the upcoming ethnographic chapters, such divisions are
not to be observed through a rigid Eurocentric lens. The late-nineteenth and early
twentieth-century Muslim feminist thinker Qasim Amin emphasises a radically
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different  conception  of  womanhood  in  Islam.  He  suggests  that  the  rationale
behind gender segregation is rooted in the idea of men being seen as the ones
who need protection from women rather than the other way around. Women,
then, are perceived as dominant figures in possession of power. They are able to
manipulate  men’s  reason  through  fitna or  sexual  temptation,  as  they  have  a
potential to divert men’s devotion from Allah (Armajani 2004: 30; Brydon, 1989:
26; Mernissi, 1987: 30-32). 
That  is  not  to  ignore  the  discriminatory  nature  of  purdah.  Alongside  physical
restrictions,  purdah — and veiling as the means of maintaining it — potentially
limits  female  symbolic  control  of  essential  resources  in  society  (Jacobson  in
Raheja and Gold, 1994: 168; Sunder Rajan, 2004: 66), such as having the same job
opportunities as men, establishing social relationships freely or having full social
as well as physical mobility (Wilkinson-Weber, 1999: 76). This becomes especially
problematic when the social institution of purdah, alongside its social boundaries,
becomes institutionalised in political regimes and their legal codes. The latter has
been observed in a number of recent political contexts. 
As  explained earlier,  such  impositions  have no grounding in  earlier  religious
practice;  the  described  origins  and  social  functions  of  the  veil  introduce  the
practice  as  a  cross-cultural  phenomenon  rather  than  a  strictly  Islamic  one.
Interestingly  enough for further  discussions  on veiling as a subject  of  Islamic
doctrine, it was not until the nineteenth century and the colonial representations
of the veil as the symbol of Islam that Muslims began to introduce it as an Islamic
phenomenon rather than a general Middle Eastern attire (Esposito, 2011). In that
sense it was European colonialism that strongly facilitated the embedding of the
veil into Islamic religious doctrine. 
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2.1.3 Orientalising the veil 
With  part  of  the  colonial  agenda  being  the  subjugation  of  colonised  people,
Western colonial powers generated a political discourse based upon the classic
case of ‘the Other’ (e.g. Scott, 2006: 8). The colonial construction of otherness was
premised  on  a  simplified  system  of  ontological  and  epistemological  duality
between the superior West and inferior East  – the idea that is  summarised in
Said’s  (1979)  seminal  theoretical  paradigm  of  Orientalism,  which  became  an
important  tool for  explaining  the  distribution  of  power  in  unbalanced  global
politics not only in colonial times but also in the postcolonial period. Western
supremacy  is  fabricated  in  the  opposition  to  the  ‘Orient’,  which  is  seen  as
undeveloped, irrational, static, barbaric, exotic, erotic and oppressive. The latter
represent  characteristics  with  strikingly  negative  connotations,  thus  the  West
justifies  its  superiority.  By  reinforcing  such  discourses  throughout  history,
Western  forces  have not  only  intensified  its  dominant  position  but  have  also
legitimised various foreign interventions in the times of colonialism and beyond. 
The  Orientalist  matrix  of  conceptualising  power  has  been  placed  also  –  or
particularly  –  upon  oriental  women  and  their  veiled  bodies.  As  an  obvious
physical  indicator  of  difference,  the  veil  attracted  the  attention  of  early
colonialists working in predominantly Muslims areas.  Rather than seeing it as a
social institution which secures modesty and represses sexuality, the Orientalist
colonial  vision  of  the  veil  was  ironically  the  complete  opposite;  the  veil  as  a
conspicuous  indicator  of  difference  was  embodying  exoticism,  eroticism  and
sensuality of oriental subjects (e.g. Heath, 2008: 14). 
The reasoning behind the quest to see the face of the Other could be explained in
a Levinasian light. Levinas (1969) perceives the human face as “a condition of
humanisation” (Butler, 2006: 141). Building on this notion, face-to-face encounters
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are deemed to be privileged phenomena in which the Other is revealed in her
alterity  and  exposed  in  her  vulnerability.  When  the  contact  with  the  face  is
hampered by a cloth, the face of the Other is left entirely to the imagination of the
spectator (Levinas, 1969). It is precisely this element of obscured contact with the
face  and  the  subsequent  mysticism  that  evoked  voyeuristic  inquiries  among
almost exclusively male colonialists. 
        
Images 2 and 3: Outside and inside harem: harem walls and the veil are protecting female privacy
and sexuality in colonial Orientalist imagery (‘Harem Women Feeding Pigeons in a Courtyard’
by Jean-Leon Gerome and ‘The Harem Dance’ by Giulio Rosati)
The colonial construction of veiling is often seen in connection to the counter-
image of the harem. Taking into account that the harem, the women’s quarters in
a house, was embedded in a private domain – and a female private domain for
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that  matter  –  it  was  highly  inaccessible  for  European  colonialists  and it  thus
became the object of erotic imagination. Following this vein of thought, veiling
could be seen as an “extension of the walls of the harem” (Bullock, 2002: 19; see
Image 2) which obscures the access to women, their privacy and their sexuality
(see Image 3) and is as such subjected to Western male fantasy. 
Highlighting  the  unprivileged  position  of  women  in  Islam  is  just  one  of  the
numerous strategies for creating discourses that “indirectly or openly exploit the
theme of ‘civilisation’ versus ‘barbarism’” (Kirtsoglou, 2010: 6).   Such “attacks on
morality”  (ibid.)  based  upon  the  premise  of  Western  cultures  being  superior
represent a convenient ploy for demeaning Islam and justifying Western colonial
interventions in the global ‘East’ (e.g. Ahmed, 1992: 152; Neuburger, 2004: 117).
This  matrix  was  not  deployed  exclusively  in  a  colonial  setting  but  has  been
mimicked in a number of contemporary political contexts, most notoriously by
George  W.  Bush’s  administration  for  justifying  the  US  military  invasion  of
Afghanistan (Ghosh, 2010: 74).  Launched by the White House public  relations
department, news packages promoting the image of fully-veiled Afghani women
as oppressed victims who need to be liberated circulated around the audience not
only in the USA but also beyond American borders. Ghosh believes that it was
these “racially charged” images that secured the American public’s support for
the  war  (ibid.).  Butler  (2006:  148)  goes  even  further  by  claiming  that  such
“aesthetic  dimension  to  war”8 with  overused  images  of  burqa-clad  women
presented a vital  part  of the war strategy itself.  As such,  the alleged quest  to
liberate Afghan women that has been so vocally promoted by Western pro-war
8 In  her  book  Precarious  Life:  The  Powers  of  Mourning  and  Violence (2014),  Judith  Butler
discusses the campaign of the war against Iraq as "an overwhelming visual phenomenon"
(ibid.: 148). She analyses the coverage of various media outlets and observes how they
turned  the  war  into  a  visual  spectacle,  which  numbed  the  viewers'  senses  and  thus
minimised  their  capacity  to  think.  From  CNN  to  Fox  and  New  Yorks  Times,  an
exploitation of the visual aesthetics, such as reproducing romanticised images of military
served as an important element of the war strategy.  
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propaganda  remains  the  domain  of  “gluttonous  nationalism”  (ibid.),  and
conveniently  conceals  the  fact  that  the  rise  of  the  Taliban  had  been  initially
facilitated by the U.S. as an  effort to undermine the Soviet Union.  As such, the
'liberation  rhetoric'  fails  to  pass  as  an  efficient  — and morally  acceptable  —
instrument for manifesting the humanity of the Afghan women (McLarney, 2009),
or any Muslim woman. 
This,  however,  is  not  to  deny the  fact  that  the  burqa  was  indeed  one of  the
repressive  methods  deployed  by  the  Taliban  regime  during  its  rule  in
Afghanistan and was imposed on the female population, with any infringement
being sanctioned by punitive measures. However, it is important to note that the
burqa  represented  only  one  element  of  a  continuum  of  female  oppression
sponsored  by  the  Taliban  (Smith,  2008:  245).   What  was  less  visible,  but
considerably more alarming, is that fact that Afghan women were given limited
access to schools, politics, employment and health care services. 
While Orientalist imagery has continued to portray veiled women as passive and
oppressed victims since colonial times, not all historical texts introduce the veil as
an exclusive manifestation of male oppression. The colonial rhetoric  on veiled
women ignited academic responses from postcolonial theorists. Perhaps the most
prominent  example  is  Franz Fanon (1967),  who famously  talks  about  historic
dynamisms of  the veil.  Rather  than perceiving it  as  a mere symbol of  female
oppression, he reads it as an unstable symbolic concept. He illustrates this notion
with  the  example  of  the  Algerian  revolution  during  colonialism and France's
mission to unveil Algeria. At that time, the full body veil became a “mechanism
of resistance”, as Algerian female revolutionists toyed with their expected status
of passive apolitical figures for smuggling the weapons dressed as either French
girls  or  concealing weapons underneath their  niqabs  (Ben Youssef  Zayzafoon,
2005: 68). Subsequently, an item that was supposedly repressing female freedom
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and obscuring their access to public political life became exploited for literally
gaining access to public political sphere and fighting for freedom. 
The  historical  overview of  the  development  of  veiling  practices  illustrates  an
important notion for further discussions regarding the place of the veil in Europe.
Veiling cannot be seen as an inherently and exclusively Islamic practice. Not only
did it come into existence outside Islam, it is actively practised elsewhere around
the world, including in Europe. Moreover, its meanings and manifestations have
been transforming in connection with European colonial politics. 
2.2 The politics of the veil  
2.2.1 The veil of controversy 
Political discourses featuring the veil vary between extremes: the one of choice
and  compulsion,  expression  and  repression,  reward  and  punishment  (Linh
Nguyen Ti, 2011: 192). These dichotomies resonate in equally extreme legal codes
of either banning the practice of veiling or banning the practice of not veiling.
On one side of the spectrum of political regulation of veiling, the moral concept
of  purdah has been subjected to radical and often dangerous interpretations by
specific  political  regimes.  They  are  dubbed  as  decency  laws  and  are  thus
postulated on similar principles as laws prohibiting public nudity (Sunderland,
2012: 299). As opposed to the latter, the imposition of the niqab often comes with
a  set  of  dire  forfeits.  Recently,  the  public  limelight  has  been occupied by  the
Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), which has been enforcing its own orthodox
dress  code,  with  beheadings  and  other  brutal  punishments  for  violations.
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However, such punitive measures for failing to uphold the prescribed dressing
requirements are not limited to ISIS. The cases of imprisonment, executions or
physical punishments for not covering according to the laws are reported from
Saudi Arabia, Chechnya and Iran to Somalia and Afghanistan among others (e.g.
Amer, 2014: 113; Ghanim, 2009: 62). 
The  matter  of  forced  veiling,  and  chastisements  corresponding  to  it,  should
definitely be treated as a serious offence against women and a severe violation of
human rights in general. The problem with such laws is not limited to the issue of
hampering women’s  physical  integrity  and movement.  Above all,  they hold a
strong moral dimension linked to the lack of opportunities and rights for women
more  broadly.  Redirecting  the  gaze  back  to  an  earlier  discussion  on  Afghan
women, it is clear that forced veiling cannot be observed in a social vacuum but
should  be  contemplated  in  the  wider  context  of  female  oppression.  This
argument could be pushed further towards the idea of forced veiling being a
consequence of female oppression rather than its cause. In other words, women
do  not  have  limited  economic,  political  and social  opportunities  due  to  their
attire. Instead, their dress code is a reflection of their repressed position in certain
political systems. 
This thought is essential when addressing legal interdictions of Islamic headgear
in the context of Europe. Whilst attention should indeed be focused on combating
the  oppression  of  women  by  certain  political  regimes  and  the  workings  of
patriarchy in general, legal and political discourses are often based upon flawed
epistemological  premises.  They  are  not  addressing  the  problem  of  female
oppression  analytically  but  deploy  the  practice  of  veiling  to  promote
Islamophobic  sentiments  and  racist  stereotypes  through  a  highly  essentialist
vision of religion, culture and gender roles (Fernandez, 2013: 63). The fact that
media reporting on mandated veiling focuses on countries that are in military
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conflict  with  Western  countries,  and  ignores  equally  problematic  cases  in
Western-allied states is yet another illustration of this notion. 
Such narratives do not address the problem effectively, let alone contribute to its
resolution.  Instead,  they  broaden  and  deepen  the  abyss  between  the  Muslim
minority  and the  non-Muslim majority  population.  Above all,  they  efficiently
demonise  an essentialised category  of  Muslim men,  and victimise  a  similarly
generalised  category  of  Muslim  women.  Subsequently,  they  reproduce
aforementioned Orientalist agendas that are justified by less civilised and more
barbaric Muslim culture (Crosby,  2014:  46).  Such simplified way of  perceiving
Islam  and  Muslims  is  equally  recognisable  in   political  discourses  on  halal
slaughtering, Islamic schools or building minarets, for example. The issues are
represented in an exaggerated manner with a focus on reinforcing the image of
Islamic danger. 
Nevertheless,  no  issue  from  the  pool  of  Islamic  polemics  has  created  more
controversy  than the  Islamic  veil.  Whilst  the  dress  affects  women’s  lives  in  a
significantly  less  powerful  manner  than,  for  instance,  genital  mutilation  or
stoning, public attention allocated to it is far greater than to other related matters.
2.2.2 The never-ending affaire du foulard  
The hijab is a particularly controversial visual identifier since it materialises the
Muslim presence in Europe in the most evident manner: it is regularly worn by a
large proportion of believers and is present in the public sphere. Aykaç (2012: 94-
95) sees the reason for that in its visual dimension. He argues that Islamophobic
discourses are especially likely to emerge when Islamic aesthetic and symbolic
forms begin to transform the European public sphere. The veil is explicitly visual;
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as it is worn by a relatively large proportion of Muslim women, it visibly shapes
and alters public landscapes. Hence, it is not surprising that the hijab and other
forms of Islamic coverings provoke vocal responses by those who currently hold
power over the public sphere. 
In the context of Western Europe,  the polemics surrounding the Islamic dress
emerged in late 1980s in France. An almost two-decade-long  l’affaire du foulard9
was eventually  addressed at  a  juridical  level  in  2004 with the  French law on
secularity  and  conspicuous  religious  symbols  that  prohibited  the  wearing  of
religious insignia in public schools with the purpose of reinforcing the principle
of  laïcité  (secularism)10 in practice.  Although the bill did not specify a particular
religious visual identifier, it was largely believed that it was targeted at Muslims
and at the hijab in particular (Eller, 2009: 22; Elver, 2012: 121; Wolny, 2009: 33). A
hotly  disputed issue  crossed national  borders  and ignited similarly  polemical
discussions  elsewhere  in  (Western)  Europe.  The  controversy  was  particularly
virulent in Germany, Belgium, Turkey and the Netherlands (Silvestri, 2009: 6). As
a result, four German states prohibited the wearing of the hijab for teachers and,
in some states, civil servants in general. The Netherlands, too, proposed a French-
style law but it eventually failed to pass in the parliament. 
The polemics  surrounding Islamic veiling practices  have been  in  recent  years
expanded onto  the  topic  of  the  face  veil.  Such  attire  is  far  from prevalent  in
Europe  and  is  embraced  by  an  almost  statistically  insignificant  proportion  of
European Muslims. Data continues to be largely missing. However, it is believed
9 L'affaire du foulard, translating as the scarf affair, is a common expression for the ongoing 
Islamic scarf controversy that arose in 1989, when the ban on the hijab in French public 
school was initially discussed. The French expression is commonly reproduced in the 
British media. 
10  Laïcité is France's principle of secularism in public affairs, aimed at fostering a post-
religious society. It is a core concept in the French constitution, Article 1 of which formally 
states that France is a secular republic.
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that there are no more than 2000 fully-veiled Muslim women in France (Elver,
2012: 108) and only a few dozen in Belgium and the Netherlands respectively
(Shirazi, 2013: 165; Thompson, 2012: 218). 
Despite these diminutive numbers, the face veil has become the ultimate signifier
representing all negative aspects of Islam in Europe — female oppression, the
threat to security, the fail of integration and the increasing Islamisation of Europe
(Aykaç, 2012: 95; Jones, 2011: 166) – and as such legitimised for legal interdiction.
This  notion  was  seized  upon  by  French  president  Nicholas  Sarkozy  in  the
summer of 2009. He stated that the burqa was not welcome in France. According
to  Mr.  Sarkozy,  in  a  democratic  European country it  cannot  be allowed “that
women are prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all
identity”  (Sarkozy  cited  in  Schattle,  2012:  111).  He  called  for  legislation  that
would prohibit the wearing of the burqa in public. 
In a span of only seven months, a freshly-assembled Parliamentary Commission
to  Study  the  Wearing  of  the  Full  Veil  in  France  produced  a  report  for  the
President  of  the  National  Assembly.  The  report  continuously  emphasises  the
elements of enforcement and conformation, for example:  
“[I]n  a  good number  of  cases  [the  wearing of  the  niqab  is]  the  result  of  the  
influence of Salafist groups working in France and abroad for the re-Islamization 
of the populations of Muslim origin and the recognition” (Library of Congress, 
2014) 
Although the length of the 658-page report gives an impression of thoroughness,
its findings are dubious. In fact, the findings have been contradicted by several
follow-up studies carried out independently from the state, with Open Society’s
report Unveiling the Truth (2011) being a prime example of that. Nevertheless, the
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French Parliamentary Commission study was used as  the  grounding for  new
legislation that was eventually passed and enacted in France in April 2011.
Apart  from a fine of  up to  €150 for  a  woman who violates  the  ban,  the  law
specifies an additional and substantially harsher punishment for men who force
their wives or daughters to wear the niqab or the burqa. In addition, violators of
the law may be asked to attend a citizenship course. These penalties raise various
issues. Apart from criminalising women’s dress, they additionally presuppose the
veil  as  almost  necessarily  a  result  of  male  coercion.  Moreover,  by  proposing
citizenship education for the violators of the law, the legislation suggests that the
concept of veiling is incompatible with French citizenship. Whilst the law has
motivated and forced some women to migrate abroad, some other women have
decided to consciously and repeatedly violate it. The law that was supposedly
introduced to promote “equal rights” and female “dignity” has left many women
with little dignity and with questionable rights. 
The polemics surrounding the contentious ban have still not settled. In July 2014,
the  issue  of  legal  interdiction  of  the  face  veil  came under  close  scrutiny.  An
anonymous French niqabi  appealed to  the  European Court  of  Human Rights
(ECHR),  arguing  that  the  outlawing  of  the  full-face  veil  was  contrary  to  six
articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. She stated that the law is
"inhumane and degrading, against the right of respect for family and private life,
freedom  of  thought,  conscience  and  religion,  freedom  of  speech  and
discriminatory"  (quoted  in  Hoffman  and  Graham,  2015).  Despite  these
arguments, the court upheld France’s ban, claiming that it encourages citizens to
“live together.” One can suggest that the language of the decision is once again
highly problematic. Forcing women to choose between staying at home or going
outside  without  the  veil  hardly  facilitates  the  concept  of  living  together.
Moreover,  the  idea  of  integration  proposed  in  this  judgement  postulates  that
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there is only one correct way of being a French citizen and that in order to ‘live
together’ everyone should conform to it. 
Five years after the niqab ban, the country saw further hijab-related controversies
with the series of burkini bans in resorts across France, including Cannes and
Corsica.  Rehashing  well-rehearsed  arguments  from  the  previous  anti-veiling
campaigns, supporters of the burkini ban have backed the decision by calling the
garment  a  symbol  of  threatening  fundamentalist  sentiments.  Valérie  Boyer,  a
member  of  the  National  Assembly  of  France,  who  was  among  those  who
welcomed the ban, proclaimed the burkini a “gender prison” (Willsher,  2016).
The  socialist  government’s  minister  for  women’s  rights,  Laurence  Rossignol,
echoed these sentiments by claiming that the burkini “is the beach version of the
burqa and it has the same logic: hide women’s bodies in order to better control
them” (De Clercq, 2016). Both politicians enunciate that all wearers are adherents
of  radical  Islamist  ideas.  They  also  suppose  that  burkini-clad  women  are
necessarily  the  victims  of  these  political  systems,  which  force  them  into
complying with their patriarchal laws. 
Analogous  to the hijab debate six years earlier, the burqa and burkini bans in
France provoked considerable public  discussion within Europe.  Subsequent to
the  rising  moral  panic  about  the  Islamic  threat,  similar  bills  were  passed  in
Belgium  (2011),  the  Netherlands  (2013),  Italy  (2015),  Switzerland  (2016)  and
Bulgaria (2016). Although Spain has not introduced a national ban, the city of
Barcelona and two smaller municipalities in Catalonia imposed a ban on the full
Islamic  veil  in  public  spaces.  Germany,  too,  passed  the  burqa  ban  in  certain
cantons (Joppke,  2009).  In  the  light  of  the  ongoing refugee  crisis,  some other
European countries have discussed banning the veil in the future, for example
Slovenia  (2015)  and  Germany  (2016).  German  Chancellor  Angela  Markel,  for
example, infamously claimed that banning the face veil would be for the good of
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Germany (Smale, 2016).
2.2.3 Political tensions in the UK
On the other side of the Channel, Britain remained initially reserved about the
headscarf controversies. Representing itself as an archetypical multicultural state,
it  has long responded to the headscarf debates by emphasising the notions of
cultural diversity, equal opportunities, mutual tolerance and anti-racism. Islamic
headscarves have been hence fully accepted in public spaces and are worn by
pupils in teaching institutions (bin Ahmad, 2011: 166), and also as part of official
school uniforms. When issues have occasionally occurred, accommodations have
been generally found without extensive public controversy or the involvement of
the courts (ibid.). It was the face veil that initiated wider public controversies.
The initial British veiling affair that required legal intervention emerged in 2002
with the case of a 16-year old pupil who sued her school for not allowing her to
wear a jilbab instead of a prescribed school uniform. The appeal went all the way
to the House of Lords but was eventually dismissed. Similarly, two other cases
with wide public attention — the one of a teaching assistant wearing the niqab in
the classroom and a 12-year old school girl covering her face when in school —
were lost at the court as well. Another legal case was moreover produced in the
court setting itself with a judge asking a Muslim lawyer to remove her face veil
during  a  hearing.  The  case  ended  with  new  rulings  for  British  judges  and
magistrates proposing a negotiated balance between the interests of justice and
the  rights  of  Muslim women who  wish  to  be  veiled  in  the  presence  of  men
(Nachmani,  2010:  74).  Placing  justice  and  the  rights  of  Muslim  women  onto
opposite poles is a problematic notion, as it suggests that they are two contrasting
and mutually excluding entities. 
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Its questionable message is further demonstrated in yet another contentious case
in September 2013 with a media-flamed affair at Blackfriars Crown Court. The
burning issue started with Judge Peter Murphy deciding that a defendant could
not appear in the dock wearing the niqab. Whilst the judge in question claimed
he respected the right to dress in any way people wish while outside the court, he
affirmed  that  “the  interests  of  justice  are  paramount”  (Bowcott,  2012).  Such
rhetoric  has  once  again  reinforced  the  juxtaposition  between  the  interests  of
justice on one hand and Muslim women on the other. When persistently talking
about  Muslim  women  versus  the  legal  system,  these  two  entities  appear  as
incompatible. In its essence, justice represents a universal concept that should be
equally applicable and accessible for all  citizens. In language exhibited by the
judge and aforementioned guidelines, Muslim women were not presented as part
of a supposedly universal concept of justice but were instead introduced as a
potential threat to it. 
These cases travelled beyond the courtroom and expanded into the parliament.
Initial political debates commenced with the comments by politician Jack Straw.
He publicly disagreed with women wearing the full Islamic veil, as this type of
attire is  “a visible statement of separation and difference” (quoted in Krieger,
2008: 99). Tony Blair, the then Prime Minister, agreed with Straw, commenting
infamously that the niqab is “a mark of separation” that makes “other people
from outside the community feel uncomfortable” (quoted in Beaman, 2012: 77).
Several other political  figures,  such as David Cameron, Nick Clegg and Nigel
Farage,  joined  the  debate  with  similar  comments.  Meanwhile,  the  women in
question have been conspicuously absent from this discussion.
However,  on  rare  occasions  the  voices  of  Muslim  women  do  attract  public
attention.  An illustrative example is  offered by the 2013 affair  at  Birmingham
Metropolitan College.  The institution banned students  from wearing religious
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veils  in  order  to  ensure  security  on  campus.  The  decision  from  the  college
administration was contested by the female Muslim population and supported
vocally by their fellow students and a number of organisations. These included
the National Union of Students (NUS) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP), with
the latter known for the progressive feminist stand of its members. After a Twitter
outcry, over 8,000 people signed a petition against the ban in less than a day and
local students assembled for an impromptu protest on the college ground. The
decision of the college administration was eventually reversed. 
Despite an extensive and ongoing public debate, legal interdiction of the hijab or
niqab in the UK has not been seriously considered. The Conservative MP Philip
Hollobone however expressed sympathy with those calling for the burqa ban and
in June 2010 proposed a similar bill himself. The Private Members’ Bill entitled
Face Coverings (Regulation) Bill aimed to restrict Islamic facial covering in public.
The bill lacked government's support and did not come to force. The debate on
the veil in Britain has therefore so far remained rather speculative and without an
(institutionalised) epilogue (Silvestri, 2013). 
However, the Islamic female dress continues to be embedded in British politics
and  policies,  even  though  it  is  often  less  conspicuous  than  its  continental
neighbours. One of the most controversial examples is the government's counter-
terrorism strategy, such as 'Section 44' and 'Schedule 7', which was described by
Liberty (2016) as “a breathtakingly broad and intrusive power to stop, search and
hold individuals at ports, airports and international rail stations.” Both 'Section
44', which which refers to stop and search in public spaces, and 'Schedule 7' can
be used against anyone without any reasonable grounds of suspecting the person
to  be  involved  in  terrorism  (Choudhury  and  Fenwick,  2011).  In  the  light  of
terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere, it is often claimed that such counter-
terrorism strategies are aimed at Muslims, with visible Muslims being targeted
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most  frequently  (ibid;  O'Toole,  DeHanas  and  Modood  2012:  5).  In  the
ethnographic part  of this thesis,  I  will  describe how various counter-terrorism
strategies have been deployed in a discriminatory fashion against veiled Muslim
women. 
Equally  contentious  is  the  Prevent  strategy  which  refers  to  the  government's
flagship programme for preventing violent extremism at its root. This strategy is
grounded  in  the  ambition  of  preventing  vulnerable  individuals  from  being
radicalised into  violent  extremist.  Prevent  takes  a  softer  approach to  counter-
terrorism;  rather  than  relying  on  repressive  forces,  it  recruits  community
representatives and trains them to identify and report  potential  radicalisation.
Although the strategy covers all strands of terrorism, Muslim communities tend
to be the main 'suspect community' (Kundnani 2009). As such, both training and
practice  focus  massively  on  monitoring  “religious  interaction  and  Islamic
symbolism to assess radicalisation” (Verkeik, 2015), with veiling playing a visible
role in this. 
The contentious, opposing and extreme cases of political regulation of Islamic
headgear  pose  a  question  about  the  extent  to  which  the  state  can  or  should
interfere in religious and cultural practices. Whilst the state indeed has the power
to impose limitations and regulations in order to ensure public safety and order,
it is simultaneously also obliged to protect personal rights, including the freedom
to  choose  what  to  wear  (Sunderland,  2012:  302).  With  veiling  debates  being
placed at the intersection of these two areas, the role of the state is not clear-cut,
and is easily manipulated. 
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2. 3 Exotic beauties, victims and terrorists
The  aforementioned  cases  regarding  the  Islamic  veil  have  been  permanently
dominating the headlines of mainstream media outlets in the UK. They incited
expansive  media  reporting  by  all  major  British  mainstream  media,  with  the
coverage extending far beyond plain journalistic reports about the events. As it
will be observed in this section, a large proportion of media articles focused on
applying  the  veil  cases  onto  broader  discussions  of  a  failed  multiculturalism
project, questionable Islamic gender equality, the rise of fundamentalism and the
supposed  Islamisation  of  Britain,  and  introduced  the  veiled  women as  either
exotic beauties, voiceless victims or dangerous terrorists. 
2.3.1 Behind the burqa of otherness 
Especially in the case of tabloid newspapers – such as The Sun, The Daily Mirror
or The Daily Express – the discourses on the variety of distinct Islamic veils and
other  Islamic  dresses,  such  as  an  abaya,  are  erroneously  and  negligently
summarised  with  a  general  term  burqa,  burkha or  burka.  The  media  is  thus
reducing different degrees of covering as well  as the plurality of Islamic veils
with different historical,  geographical  and political  traditions into one general
category  –  a  veiled  woman.  This  is  establishing a  rigid opposition  with  non-
veiled, non-Muslim and White Britons. 
The absence of acknowledging the multiplicity of differences between and within
different groups of veiled women is especially evident in British tabloid papers
that often prioritise the accentuation of difference over journalistic accuracy. An
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example from the tabloid newspaper The Sun features the story of Keeley Hazell,
“Britain’s favourite Page 3 girl” (Hazell, 2007) deciding to wear the  niqab for a
day.  She is excited to experience “such a different way of life” (ibid.)  and her
‘investigative’ story does not disappoint her ambitions.  She discovers that  she
cannot drive in loose clothes, she cannot smile to strangers and be polite, she feels
thirsty and hungry throughout the day and cannot shop freely with the presence
of judgemental looks and uncomfortable garments. The story, published in the
news  section  of  the  digital  version  of  the  newspaper,  does  not  possess  any
palpable news value whatsoever; the sole purpose of the article seems to be to
sensationalise the difference the veil brings into the life, or rather the lifestyle, of a
woman. 
As argued Derrida (2011: 41), such language of difference usually generates and
maintains existing asymmetric relations of power. Commonly, one of the binary
pairs is perceived as dominant, pushing its diametrical pole into its own area of
operation (ibid.; Hall, 1997: 235; Youdell, 2006: 98). Table 2 provides some further
examples  to  support  this  claim,  pointing  out  the  positive/negative  interplay,
which is often utilised in the British press.
60
Article (newspaper) Positive Negative
‘Euro rule we need’ (Daily
Star)
modern backwards
‘The burkha is an affront to
women and a free society’
(Daily Express)
basic liberties theocratic totalitarianism












Table 2: Examples of positive and negative dichotomies appearing in the published articles
The  element  of  such  emphasised  difference,  an  inevitable  component  of
Orientalist imagery, is highly evident in visual representations as well. Not only
the tabloid media but also established broadsheets and the national broadcaster
cling to the reproduction of  close-up images depicting a woman in the niqab
whose headgear exposes nothing but beautiful eyes with carefully-applied make
up.  Such  pattern  is  for  example  replicated  in  the  article  ‘Sarkozy  U-turn  on
French burka ban over fears  of  terrorist  reprisals’ (Allen,  2010).  Although the
article talks about banning the veil in public spaces and on public transportation
in France, the only image portrays a woman who is captured standing next to a
bookshelf  filled  with  books with  golden inscriptions  in  Arabic (see  Image 4).
Rather than modern France, the picture suggests a traditional Orientalist setting
with highly accentuated exotic semiotics. Such archaic exoticism reaffirms hijabis
and  niqabis  as  Others,  thus  serving  as  the  basis  for  social  segregation.  By
reproducing Orientalist modes of representation, the ideological abyss between
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'us' and 'them' widens further.
Image 4: Orientalist imagery in The Daily Mail (Allen, 2010)
The discourse of dichotomies between the West and Islam is not only erroneous
but it compresses diverse identities of veiled women into one single monolithic
category and labels it as different, exotic and negative. As such, veiled women are
not  only  marginalised  but  often  naturalised  in  the  field  of  abnormality  and
unnatural  (see Youdell,  2006:  39).  “Covering your face  is  NOT11 normal,”  the
Sun’s  article  ‘Ban  veils  the  real  issue—of  freedom’ (Baig,  2009)  confirms  this
theory. The article, analogous to numerous other media reports in British press,
establishes narrow Western normativity as the universal standard and classifies
any deviances as unacceptable. 
Often, the polarisation between barbaric Islam and civilised Britain is more direct.
11 The graphic emphasis was made by The Sun. 
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Capitalising on the image of oppressed Muslim victims, the media reinforce the
prevailing  notion  about  the  veil  being  dangerous  for  women.  Paternalistic
reporting following this notion can be monitored in the narrations of The Daily
Telegraph,  a  daily  broadsheet  conservative-leaning  newspaper.  The  columnist
Toby Young (2010) criticises the supposedly liberal position of British people who
are against the burqa ban in the country, saying that “the burka is both a symbol
and a source of the oppression of Muslim women.” He concludes stating that he
agrees that women should wear what they want but adds that “for most Muslim
women it is not a free choice but something they're forced to do by their fathers
or brothers or husbands – and the consequences of disobeying can be a beating or
worse” (ibid). 
Media manipulation can be further on illuminated by the selection of topics. The
tabloid  press  specifically  tends  to  report  on  the  issue  of  veiling  when
encountering sensational examples of extreme victim-oppressor situations. The
Daily Mirror (2007) for example, reports about a Muslim father getting a legal aid
for fighting the school which has banned his 12-year-old daughter wearing the
niqab, commenting that “another young girl is being used as a political pawn” by
“Islamic  fundamentalists”  (ibid.).  The  Daily  Express,  The Daily  Mail  and The
Sunday Telegraph – among others – utilise child subjects as well  by extensive
reporting on British girls  being forced to wear full  Islamic veil  as  part  of  the
official school uniform in three independent educational institutions in London,
Lancaster and Leicester (see Barrett, 2010; Clark, 2010; Dixon, 2010). 
The  aforementioned  strategies  of  media  reporting  implement  what  critical
discourse analyst Van Dijk describes as “ideological square” (Van Dijk, 1998). The
ideological square is based upon the idea of a discursive group polarisation that
emphasises ‘our’ good characteristics and deeds whilst suppressing ‘our’ flaws.
On the other side of the square, repetitive ideological matrixes for portraying the
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Other de-emphasise ‘their’ good features and refocus the attention onto negative
dimensions of ‘their’ practices (ibid.: 267). The ideological square is often applied
to  post-September  11  representation  of  Muslims  (Nnabugwu,  2011:  14;
Richardson,  2004: 161) and can be as well deployed in the case of reporting on
Islamic headgear. 
2.3.2 The terror of black widows
The media-fuelled image of Islamic oppression is additionally reinforced by the
discourse of  terrorism which presents a nascent reporting trend over the past
decade in the British press. As already noted earlier in this chapter, the media
promotes  the  image  of  the  hijab,  as  well  as  the  niqab  and  the  burqa,  as
conspicuous symbols of terrorist regimes.
In the article ‘Islamic extremism creating ‘no-go’ areas for non-Muslims in Britain,
says  Bishop  of  Rochester’  (Doughty,  2008),  there  is  no  mention  of  the  veil;
however, the article, focusing on the danger of increasing Islamic extremism in
Britain is accompanied with two graphic elements:  a photograph of Bishop of
Rochester standing next to the Queen and an image of four women in niqabs. The
latter one is entitled: “Bishop of Rochester warns there are now 'no-go areas' in
Britain for non-Muslims because of Islamic extremists” (ibid.). The women hereby
denote  Islamic  extremists  who  jeopardise  the  British  population’s  safety.  By
juxtaposing the image of the  niqab wearers with the religious senior portrayed
with the Queen, “the strategic placement of images furthermore conjures binary
representations of […] England versus extremism” (Bhimji, 2012: 47). 
Following a similar vein of negative reporting, the press is repeatedly exploiting
sensational cases of male terrorists camouflaging in the niqab in order to execute
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a criminal act,  with tabloids being especially keen on such stories.  The much-
feted cases featured a murderer of a British policewoman supposedly fleeing the
country wearing the niqab, a suspect of terrorist crimes being believed to escape
the police hiding behind the veil and a male terrorist responsible for 2005 London
bombings exiting the country disguised in the niqab. Even though two of these
cases  have  not  been  confirmed and remain  only  alleged,  all  the  events  were
reported  on  extensively,  thus  triggering  the  fear  among  Brits  about  terrorists
hiding behind the niqab frequently. 
The Daily Star additionally expressed the concern about the burgeoning number
of female terrorists with an article ‘World exclusive: Spooks unmask burka death
squads’ (Sherwood, 2011).  The only photograph accompanying the news story
depicts a woman in the niqab casually checking her phone. Her face is blurred,
making  the  portrayed  person  appear  more  suspicious.  “BRIT  spooks  have
stopped SIXTY terror plots involving Black Widow bombers. Many of the Muslim
women who were  pulled in  were  carrying  explosives,  we  can  reveal,”  (ibid.)
claims the writer, who goes on to explain that the intelligence agencies believe
that the actual number of female terrorists being recruited by their male relatives
is much higher.  
2.3.3 Moral panic about the Islamisation of Britain
Apart from concerns regarding the ‘physical’ safety of the British nation, the full
Islamic  veil  furthermore  triggers  media  discussions  regarding  the  perceived
threat it constitutes to the British national identity. Especially with France’s burqa
ban  and  corresponding  discussions  on  national  identity,  similar  debates  are
facilitated in Britain by expansive media reporting on the matter (Shorne, 2011:
158).  Although the national  identity of  Britain is indeed constructed upon the
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notion of multiculturalism and a subsequent coexistence of multiple faiths, the
increasingly multicultural population of Britain leverages moral panic about the
Islamisation of the Island. Moral panic can be hereby perceived as the condition
created by public concern about ideologically imagined threat to societal values
and interests,  generated  by  sensational  reporting  of  the  mass  media.  Entities
threatening  the  social  equilibrium  become  established  as  folk  devils  (Cohen,
1972),12 with veiled women fitting into this role in the context of contemporary
moral panic on Islamisation of Britain. 
The seeds of veil-related moral panic can be observed in an investigative story
‘Why banning the veil would only cover up the real problems of British Muslims’
published in the Sunday Telegraph (Gilligan, 2011). The journalist conducts vox
pops with niqab wearers on the streets of the London borough of Tower Hamlets.
He reports that all the interviewees claimed that “nobody had forced them to
wear the veil” (ibid.). However, the author interprets his discoveries by saying
that  Tower  Hamlets  is  “the  headquarters  to  a  particularly  pernicious  form of
Islamic radicalism” (ibid.) and is “controlled by the hardline Islamic Forum of
Europe, accused by the local Labour MP of infiltrating his party to further its
declared goal of a Sharia state in Europe” (ibid.). Although the author believes his
interviewees indeed decided to wear the niqab by themselves, he claims that the
Islamised area puts “strong pressure to conform" (ibid.). 
Considerably more exaggerated reporting on the issue can be observed in the
satirical social commentary ‘A very British Royal Wedding… and the bride wore a
burka’ published in Daily Mail (Littlejohn, 2010). The commentator describes the
12 Sociologist Stanley Cohen initially coined the term 'folk devil' in his work Folk Devils and
Morals Panics, in which he observes and analyses media controversies surrounding British
Mods and Rockers in the 1960s. Cohen notes a reappearing pattern of reporting on the
subject,  which frames the mentioned subcultures  as violent  and deviant  by deploying
simplistic and negative depictions based on continuous exaggeration.
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anticipated royal wedding through – what he believes to be – the social climate of
the time. Hence, the imaginary wedding is completely Islamised and saturated
with Islamist and terroristic elements. The cartoon published alongside the article
depicts the princess wearing the niqab. The article reinforces the negative image
of  Islam,  visually  manifested  through  the  Islamic  veil,  which  is  threatening
Britishness  –  expressed  through  the  metaphor  of  monarchy.  Humour  is  a
convenient tool for justifying the use of dangerously racist language and imagery.
Apart from threatening British values, niqab wearers moreover appear as a threat
to the survival of the British nation.  This notion can be analysed in the Daily
Express’ cover story ‘One in 5 Britons will be ethnics’ (Hall, 2010). The article that
is describing immigration trends, demographic changes and Britain becoming too
populous is comes with the picture of two fully veiled Muslim women walking
with a stroller. Although Muslims, let alone veils, are not mentioned in the article,
this  imagery augments negative connotations associated with the veil  and the
Muslim population in the United Kingdom — the ones of changing demographic
landscape leading to Islamisation of Britain and consequently to the extinction of
the ‘pure’ British nation. 
2.3.4 Semiotic resistance
However,  the media does not only  follow the hegemonic  portrayals  of  veiled
women as a monolithic, oppressed and threatening social group but occasionally
opens  the  field  “for  semiotic  resistance  that  not  only  refuses  the  dominant
meanings  but  constructs  oppositional  ones  that  serve  the  interests  of  the
subordinate” (Fiske, 2010: 8). In recent years, the media has begun to increasingly
communicate the perspectives of Muslim women themselves. 
67
One of  the  earliest  reports  humanising  a  niqab-wearer  was  published in  The
Guardian with a personal story of Rahmanara Chowdhury (2006), a sports and
education development  worker  from Loughborough University.  In  her  article,
Chowdhury describes her decisions for wearing the niqab and mostly positive
responses  she  has  received  from  British  society.  She  claims  her  decision  for
wearing the veil  is  a  religious and a personal  one,  “not coerced by any other
factor” (ibid.). The story of a successful British woman with sophisticated English
articulation, respected employment and a higher education degree does not only
give the voice to the subaltern but also generates an alternative image of a niqab
wearer.  She  is  not  seen  as  an  exclusively  religious  figure  alienated  from
mainstream society but is portrayed as a social actor who actively engaged in the
British public sphere. 
This article is not an isolated example of, what seems to be a slowly increasing
reporting trend that concentrates on the perspective of Muslim women. Some
other  media,  such  as  Huffington  Post  (Elgot,  2013),  the  Guardian  and  Vice
(Shahid and Ali, 2013), have given voices to veiled women as well, either in a
form of columns or interviews. They have acknowledged that “by-and-large, it's
white, secular, middle-aged politicians and journalists doing the talking, not the
so-called 'niqabis'” (Elgot, 2013) and that the burqa-ban polemics come in a form
of “a debate that hasn't had a lot of input from the women who actually wear the
veil” (Shahid and Ali, 2013). 
Counter-hegemonic discourses are not limited to giving voices to Muslim women
but can also come in a form of alternative visual representations. An example of
this is The Guardian article ‘Copying French ban on burqa would be un-British,
says  minister’ (Stratton,  2010).  The  article,  focused  on  Immigration  minister
Damian Green’s criticism on the burqa ban, is accompanied with the image of a
woman in the niqab who is strolling hand-in-hand with a man next to the Eiffel
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tower. The pose she is captured in does not anyhow suggest that she is a victim of
a  male  oppressor  or  that  she does  not  have an opportunity  to  enjoy life;  the
photograph  embeds  her  into  a  casual  context  of  leisure  time  activities  and
portrays  her  in  a  romantic  situation  with  her  male  partner.  Such  resistance
towards grand narrative of monolithic Muslim women empowers the readership
with alternative voices and thus encourages society to move closer “towards a
heterogeneous social order in which a wide range of forms of consent are given to
its people” (Fiske in Laughey, 2007: 173).
Despite these positive examples, the Huntington’s problematic notion of clash of
civilisations (1993) still represents the prevailing Western rhetoric deployed for
media  narrations  about  the  veiled  Muslim women.  As  observed  by  Modood
(2006: 107), many in the West believe that the underlying issue is not terrorism or
even  Islamic  fundamentalism  but  Islam  as  a  rival  and  inferior  civilisation.
According to such understanding, Islam is culturally too different from European
culture;  hence  these  two  civilisations  cannot  coexist  peacefully  in  a  shared
geographical  space  (Huntington,  1993:  22).  Such  approaches  to  handling  the
cultural  difference  continue  to  emphasise  the  negative  dimensions  of  this
difference  for  justifying  British  superiority  and  its  (neo-imperialist  sounding)
“need” for keeping “the external Other out and culturally colonising the Other
within” (Sunier & van Ginkel, 2006: 118). 
Rare semiotic resistances towards such postcolonial discourses, initiated mostly
by the left-wing and alternative press, however, voice the alternative meanings
that reflect the plurality of identities, voices and meanings surrounding the topic.
At the same time, they champion the break of the clash of civilisations theory.
They  acknowledge  that  there  is  no  such  concept  as  a  distinctively  different
Muslim  civilisation,  but  point  out  that  the  Muslim  civilisation  per  se  is  not
incompatible with the West – until the hegemonic ideology, expressed through
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the mass media, signifies it as such. 
2.4 Conclusion 
An overwhelming proportion of  recent  political  and media  discussions  about
Islamic headgear promote and reinforce the Orientalist concept of oppressed and
voiceless Muslim women. Burdened with colonial legacies, such discourses are
further  reinforced with perpetually emerging stories  about  forced veiling and
related atrocities against women in Muslim countries. They only rarely discuss
the coerced veil in the wider context of female oppression and radical Islamist
politics but instead introduce it as a pivotal problem of Muslim women. This is
politically convenient, especially in times of political crisis. The veil can easily be
transformed into a powerful propaganda visual. And the simple act of removing
it  is  seen  as  a  visible  liberation  of  women. According  to  such  problematic
conceptions  of  female  oppression,  helping  women  to  unveil  thus  equates  to
rescuing them.
Whether talking about beheading women in war-torn Syria, a limited access to
education experienced by girls in rural Pakistan or voluntary veiling in urban
France,  the  narratives  of  female  liberation  appear  to  be  curiously  static  and
uniform. Experiences of Muslim women are generalised and compressed into a
monolithic identity of a ‘Muslimwoman’. Miriam Cooke (2009: 91) invents this
neologism  following  Sherman  Jackson’s  and  Joan  Martin’s  use  of  the  term
Blackamerican and blackwoman respectively. She wants to accentuate the omni-
importance  of  this  “new  singular  and  gendered  identification”  (ibid.)  that
prevails over ethnic, generational, cultural, social and historical differences. As
demonstrated in analysing the legal, political and media language earlier in this
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chapter, this distinct character of a ‘Muslimwoman’ inserts a strong polarisation
between us and her. Her identity is introduced not only as an inherently different
but also subordinated, what justifies the moral crusades of liberating her. 
Such narratives fail to address a title question: do veiled women need liberating
at all? The question is a variation of Lila Abu-Lughod’s monograph (2013) and an
earlier paper (2002) entitled  Do Muslim women need saving? Her question is an
especially  important  one  and  requires  further  reflections.  As  stressed  by  the
author herself (2013: 47), the very idea of saving implies that women are being
saved from something or someone, or alternatively, saved to something. When it
comes to the question of veiling, the answers remain often ignored, assumed or
postulated upon simplistic Eurocentric myths presented earlier in this section. 
The real answers, however, are never straightforward and simple, neither with
the mandated nor with the voluntary veil. Apart from the aforementioned idea of
its entrenchment into a complex set of socio-political meanings, the concept of
freedom is not materialised in the same type of dress cross-culturally. It exists
outside the Euro-American paradigm and cannot be generalised either globally,
or  within  the  eclectic  category  of  Muslim women.  As  emphasised  by  Crosby
(2014: 46), a Eurocentric view of the veil as “a rhetorically universal symbol of
oppression” misses the opportunity to acknowledge the diversity of female and
feminist agency that comes in various shapes and forms. Headscarves,  abayas
and niqabs are commonly part of them. 
This  idea  is  especially  apparent  in  the  case  of  European  political  and  legal
discourses.  Burqa  bans,  burkini  bans  and  related  interdictions  fail  to
acknowledge a woman’s autonomy in deciding about her dress, and modelling its
meanings.  Instead,  they  limit  her  agency  by  demanding  that  she  conform to
narrowly-defined Western norms and values. Such generalisations nonchalantly
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dismiss  the  importance  of  the  title  question  and ignore  the  fact  that  without
addressing it, the aim of improving women’s lives cannot be fulfilled successfully.
The following chapter will expand on the notion of veiling being a voluntary and
diverse practice, and will illustrate this theme using ethnographic examples of
various British Muslims explaining their multiple motivations for taking on the
hijab, and different ways of practising it.
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Chapter III: Becoming a hijabi 
Image 5: Boushra Almutawakel: True Self (2010)
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It  is  early  in  the  afternoon  when  Reema  returns  from  running  her  errands  in
Birmingham city centre. Fellow passengers, adults and children alike, turn their heads as
she boards the bus. But she is accustomed to constant attention on the streets of her home
city. Whilst she is normally subjected to curious glances, she has occasionally received
some  harsher  and  more  hurtful  remarks.  She  appreciates  that  the  curiosity  is  just  a
reaction to her attire, which is far from a common sight. Though Birmingham is one of
Britain's most multicultural cities, the city centre only rarely witnesses women wearing
the full face veil. 
The bus turns onto a roundabout and follows the green sign indicating city’s well known
Muslim area. The setting changes progressively with every bus stop. A bus window now
frames signs of halal restaurants, Islamic centres and shops with Arabic names. The bus
stops again and Reema alights, turning towards an empty shopping window right next to
the bus stop. The banner above the window suggests that the building is a home to a
Muslim community centre. It is owned and run by Reema herself and is a result of her
hard work over the past two years, and extreme life experiences of over four decades.
Her faith, too, is the result of the struggles, challenges and experiences she has undergone
throughout her life – as a young singer trying to succeed in the entertainment industry,
as a single and unemployed mother and as a victim of domestic abuse. Before devoting
herself to Islam, she experimented with numerous religions but eventually realised that
her parents’ religion was closest to her heart and intellect. Her spirituality is a journey
and her clothes are its material reflection, she summarises.
Reema donned the niqab five years ago, only a couple of months after fully embracing the
Islamic faith. The niqab is not an obligatory item of clothing, she asserts, but brings her
closer to her God. According to Reema, wearing it is a deeply spiritual experience and one
that cannot be translated into words. She compares the experience to the taste of an apple;
it is easy to acknowledge the taste when biting into a fruit, but challenging to describe to
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someone who has never eaten it before.
Although the face veil is an important part of her religious devotion, she doesn't wear it
at all times. She mostly puts it on in public but occasionally decides to leave the house
without it. Sometimes she decides to remove it for purely practical reasons, such as the
weather,  but  mostly  she  would  go  out  without  it  in  order  to  protect  herself  and her
religion.  In some parts of  Britain people would not understand it  and it  would only
generate  unnecessary  problems,  she  claims.  She  also  takes  it  off  when  working  with
children. Not only it is not necessary to veil in front of youngsters; years of experience in
early childhood education and a corresponding degree have taught her the importance of
one's facial communication as a didactical tool.
Fast forward a couple of hours, I sit with Reema in her spacious and tastefully decorated
office. She is sitting straight at a robust L-shaped desk on a leather office chair and is
wearing a long skirt, a jacket and a light brown headscarf. Her male assistant brings her
coffee in a small cup, and Reema starts sipping it slowly while getting on with her daily
tasks. She has recently launched a new blog for Muslim female role models, which is yet
another  project  in  a  series  of  her  activities,  which  encompass  coordinating numerous
campaigns, engaging in public speaking and school outreach and recording her own radio
show.
We are occasionally interrupted by her youngest daughter Fatima who curiously checks
on her mum during her play breaks.  Being only five,  she wears her short hair  loose.
Reema would be pleased to see Fatima embrace the niqab, but only should she herself
decide so. Free will is crucial, she states. Reema admits to having practised a lot of things
in her life which she now deems negative – from smoking to harmful relationships – but
veiling,  she  affirms,  is  not  one  of  them.  On the  contrary,  Reema finds  it  liberating,
claiming that it prevents people from judging you on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity
and  age.  You  can  impress  someone  with  your  personality.  But  the  religious  aspect
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remains the most significant one, she emphasises; if it was not for pleasing her god, she
would not wear it.
By being frequently reproduced in public discourses over the past decade, the
Islamic veil, and the words niqab, burqa and hijab, have established themselves
as part of the English vocabulary. These words not only come with a whole set of
assumptions  and  connotations  attached  to  them,  but  are  at  their  most
fundamental  level  almost  unquestionably  associated  with  a  simple  definition:
they stand for a piece of fabric worn by a Muslim woman for religious purposes.
When a discussion involves one or more of the aforementioned words, the mental
canvas  of  the  vast  majority  of  Western  non-Muslims  becomes  filled  with
reproductions  of  images,  as  portrayed  by  the  media.  These  suggest  that  the
person in question is a Muslim woman who wears some sort  of headgear for
religious purposes.
However  similar  the  definitions  might  appear  from  an  everyday  linguistic
perspective,  the  signifier  of  an  Islamic veil  is  in  reality  far  more  dynamic,
antagonised and contested. Strolling on the streets of Birmingham with Reema, a
single  Muslim  woman  from  the  West  Midlands,  demonstrates  the  numerous
forms, contexts and nuances, in which the Islamic veil enters and exits the lives of
Muslim women, not only throughout the span of their lifetime, but also on a daily
basis. A brief snapshot of Reema suggests that the veil, just as any other piece of
clothing or accessory, is not something that is an organic part of a person’s body
or is present in her (or even his) life at all times. It is, instead, an item that is
donned to fulfil a specific purpose, and inevitably comes with a set of conscious
decisions that inform who, when, where, how and why the woman will wear it,
or not wear it.
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The  answers  to  these  questions  are  far  from  uniform,  but  are  the  result  of
numerous historical,  social,  political,  geographical  and personal  contingencies.
Each of the estimated 800 million Muslim women in the world – not to mention
non-Muslim hijabis13 – will have a different set of answers, with many of them
contesting  the  common  conceptualisations  of  the  Islamic  veil.  Revisiting  the
aforementioned folk definition, the previous chapter demonstrated that the hijab
was  not  necessarily  always  worn  by  Muslims,  it  was  not  always  embraced
exclusively by women, and it did not unavoidably reflect religious sentiments. It
is not even ineludibly connected to the headgear or an item of material culture.
Thus, many hijabis do not talk about wearing the hijab, but rather practising it,
highlighting that the concept of the hijab is grander than a simple act of wrapping
a scarf around one’s head (Bennoune, 2011: 24; Ruby, 2006). 
It is to illustrate this idea of the hijab not just equating a headscarf  that I chose
Boushra Almutawakel’s photographic experiment  True Self as the title image of
this chapter (see Image 5). The exhibition of photographs, which was on display
at  the  British  Museum  at  the  beginning  of  my  fieldwork  offered  a  lucid
introduction  into  my  research  and  opened  up  various  engaging  streams  of
thinking, which will be leading us through this chapter. Dress indeed reflects the
Self, and its growth, development and changes. However, no matter the outfit,
the  “true  Self”,  as  the author  puts  it,  cannot  be  hidden or  altered simply by
adopting a  certain  type of  dress.  Clothing can change in a  matter  of  seconds
without changing the true Self. Reema puts on and takes off her face veil and
adapts her clothing to different social contexts without challenging her religious
devotion and her Self. 
Following up on these ideas, this chapter will argue that the hijab can never be a
13  I expand on non-Muslim hijabis in Chapter IV, section 6, where I observe the phenomenon 
of   non-Muslim women deciding to don the hijab to protect their modesty or attract media
attention.
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static, determined and ever-present part of women’s lives and identities. Echoing
the words of Reema, it is a constant journey. Sometimes, this journey might be as
short as the distance from a bed to a mirror and no longer than approximately
three minutes – the minimum time the morning routine of wrapping the hijab
might  take.  More  significantly,  though,  the  journey  alludes  to  the  decisions,
changes and consequences that women undergo by putting on or taking off the
hijab at some point in their lives. 
3.1 A plurality of veils 
Returning to the house in central Birmingham, Reema talks about the criticism
she commonly receives for her dressing habits. Non-Muslims and fellow niqabis
alike question her decision to wear a face veil only sporadically. Although she
would normally put it on when outside her home, she does not have a problem
with showing her face in public or posting face-revealing photographs on her
social media channels. She dismisses calumnious commentators: “I wear it for my
lord  and  not  for  them.  I’m no  less  of  a  Muslim when  I  don’t  have  my  face
covered.”
Her face veil brings her closer to her god, therefore she wears it whenever she
can. However, she is aware that veiling is an additional deed that she performs
for  advancing  her  spirituality,  rather  than  an  obligation  in  Islam  that  every
woman has to comply with. “Having hair covered is the only obligation,” she
sums up her beliefs and claims her own right to choose her garment according to
her interpretation of Quranic verses.
The  Quran  remain  the  basis  for  believers’ understanding  of  Islamic  religion,
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including the matter of veiling. The latter – and the controversies surrounding the
interpretations – is directly evoked only in two verses, Sura XXXIII: 59 and Sura
XXIV: 31.
“O prophet, tell your wives, your daughters, and the womenfolk of the Believers to draw 
their ‘jalabib’ close about them. That is most appropriate so that they can be recognised 
and not be molested. God is forgiving and merciful” (Sura XXXIII: 59).
“Tell the female Believers that they should lower their gaze, guard their chastity, to reveal 
of their adornments only that which is apparent, and to cast their veils over their bosom” 
(Sura XXIV: 31).
Due to the ever-evolving Arabic language and a poetic style prone to multiple
interpretations, it is impossible to have a single and functional reading of these
verses  (El  Guindi,  1999:  xiii;  Hussain,  1984:  149).  Subsequently,  some  people
decode the words as a requirement to wear the veil, while some perceive them to
be a mere recommendation to dress modestly in order to avoid harassment or
potentially lascivious gazes, and to protect their modesty. 
Whereas  the  Quran  remains  brief  and  vague  about  female  attire,  the  hadith
literature gives more substantial accounts on female veiling. The hadith, a post-
Quranic collection of sayings and customs of the prophets and the early Islamic
community, features a record of his daily practices which some Muslims believe
should be mimicked consistently. Since Mohamed’s wives  purportedly  wore the
niqab  –  arguably  due  to  the  prevailing  fashion  trends  of  the  time  –  and  the
behaviour of the wives is to be emulated, it is rationalised that Muslim women
should adhere to the same dress code (Hoodfar, 1997: 6). The hadith literature
moreover includes several indications as to what is an appropriate form and age
for women’s veiling. However, even in the hadith there is no universal consensus
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on veiling, and with different Islamic denominations following different sets of
hadiths,  the  outlooks  on female  attire  vary  accordingly  (Roald,  2003:  264-267;
Vakulenko, 2012: 4). It can be argued that different interpretations of the Quranic
verses and its consequent texts are to a certain extent responsible for an eclectic
plurality of Islamic head dresses and Muslim female attire more generally. 
Moreover, different veiling trends also vary culturally, as Islamic dressing codes
merge with traditional attire of certain cultural spaces. I find a good illustration of
this varied breadth of Islamic fashion cross-culturally as I attend a fashion show
organised by a Newcastle-based Muslim organisation and a local university on a
late winter afternoon. The women walking on an improvised runway in front of
us  exhibit  a  diverse  array  of  traditional  Islamic  garments  from  different
geographical regions. A Malaysian entrant features a silk headscarf in a pale pink
colour, wrapped tightly around the model’s head. It is combined with a matching
baju  kurung,  a  traditional,  enclosed  dress.  The  first  outing  is  succeeded  by  a
Sudanese model  who exhibits  a  traditional  tob,  a  15-foot long,  multi-coloured
piece of cloth, loosely wrapped around the whole body, including the head. A
Gulf outfit which dominates the catwalk next, comes in the form of a black abaya
with golden decoration combined with a headscarf and a face veil of same colour
and  the  same  material.  These  examples  evidently  show  not  only  different
approaches to the interpretation of the Quran, but the role of cultural influence
on the appearance of Islamic dress. On its journey through time and space, the
Islamic  veil  has  undergone  tremendous  modifications  and  ‘crossbreeding’.
Conforming to local taste and the spirit of the time, it has adopted various forms,
patterns, materials and shapes (see Demovic, 2009: 111; Jaschok and Jingjun Shui,
2013: 219; Osella and Osella, 2007).
However, although British Muslim women come from various different cultural
traditions  and  religious  denominations,  their  headgear  is  not  a  mere  sum  of
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different traditional garments from the countries of their ancestors' origin, but
rather a dynamic fusion of different styles and cultural elements. An example of
eclectic  headgear  fashion  in  the  UK  is  encapsulated  in  an  ongoing  project
‘London Veil’ implemented by visual artist Sara Shamsavari. Born in  Tehran  in
the midst of the Iranian revolution, Sara was raised in London. Just like Boushra
Almutawakel, who authored the title image, Sara is interested in exploring the
complex dialogues between dressing, and veiling in particular, and identity. 
Initiated in 2014, Shamsavari's project – an ongoing photographic experiment that
up to today features over 100 hijabis – aims to document the vibrancy and beauty
of the Islamic community in Britain's capital. The portraits depict women with
violet  leopard patterns,  big  colourful  flowers,  matching earrings and complex
knots that all emphasise women’s individuality and highlight the diverse options
for wearing head coverings (see Image 6). Whilst the objective of the project lies
in highlighting the individuality of the hijab wearers, the artist cannot ignore the
repeating patterns in fashion landscapes of the metropolis: “In Marble Arch, there
is this fashion for looking as expensive as you can, whereas in Whitechapel it was
all  about creativity – the young women may not have been wearing designer
clothes but they had an attitude of 'we know how to put it together'” (Khaleeli,
2013).
A photographic lens of Sara Shamsavari captures an important notion: the type of
headgear adopted by an individual is never simply the result of her environment
or her personality, but is always a result of interactions between both. Whilst a
woman’s attire might be influenced by her ethnic background, place of residence,
or by trends in her immediate social circle, it simultaneously also reflects her own
individual traits and preferences.
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Image 6: A  photograph featured in Sara Shamsavari’s photogrpahic project London veil
(2014) 
Nevertheless,  not  all  Muslim  women  join  Shamsavari  in  her  celebration  of
individuality. Instead, some believe that the Islamic veil is in its essence designed
to  mask  differences  among  individuals.  Among  them  is  Hawa,  a  second-
generation Somali student who currently resides in West London. Hawa wears a
long black abaya – a loose robe-like garment that is especially prevalent in North
Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. She combines it with a headscarf in black or
dark blue colours and always ensures that her clothes are concealing everything
but her face and her hands. Whilst she is avoiding any make up, she wears a
small  piercing  in  her  nose  — an  accessory  that  was  criticised  by  her  family
members  caustically  –  and plastic  colourful  bracelets  with  political  messages,
such as calling for peace in Syria. 
Although Hawa is quick to criticise individual alterations of a modest Islamic
outfit,  her  accessories  contradict  her  words.  She,  too,  deploys  her  dress  for
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manifesting  parts  of  her  persona  that  are  not  necessarily  linked  to  religious
sentiments. Although the messages she conveys with her dress are not the ones of
beauty  and  attraction,  her  dress  shows  the  resistance  towards  her  family’s
restrictions and her strong and passionate fight against the wars in the Islamic
world, for example.
Moving to the other side of London, to the North Eastern side of the city, we meet
Khadija, an 18-year old student, who wears similar attire to Hawa but combines
her abaya with a  black headscarf, black gloves and a black face veil. Although
nobody in her family follows a similar dress code, she feels a strong connection
with such attire. With her parents being born in Algeria, the niqab – she believes –
can be indirectly seen as part  of  her tradition.  As a self-proclaimed Orthodox
Muslim  she  tries  to  keep  her  clothing  free  of  any  decorative  or  fashionable
additions. She also refuses to wear make-up or jewellery when outside her house.
Inevitably,  she  combines  her  outfit  with  a  purse  and  a  pair  of  shoes  that
demonstrate her own individual style and personal preferences.
Even among niqabis, there is no shared ‘uniform’ or a common view on how the
niqab  should  be  worn.  Despite  the  prevailing  belief  about  the  niqab  being
disassociated  from  fashion,  an  idea  that  is  supported  by  Khadija,  numerous
women continue to challenge this view.  Sumaiyah, a niqabi from the South of
England, embodies her excess of energy by wearing bright colours and dynamic
patterns  instead  of  combining  her  niqab  with  a  classic  abaya  and  a  single-
coloured scarf in dark shades. “I live in the UK not in a desert somewhere in the
Gulf or in I don’t know what century,” she states in a determined voice and with
a discrete smile. “I choose to dress modestly and to cover my beauty and that’s
not  anyhow connected  to  wearing  clothes  that  are  part  of  a  distant  culture’s
tradition.” She normally chooses a loose sweater and a long skirt and occasionally
adds a long jacket that also camouflages the shape of her body. Whilst her face
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veil is black, her scarves vary in colours and patterns but are always carefully
coordinated with the rest of her attire.
Hawa,  Khadija,  Sumaiyah and  the  anonymous  Londoners  from  Shamsavari’s
visuals would all fall into the category of a ‘veiled woman’. They would also all
claim that they wear the hijab in an appropriate,  halal  manner. However, their
approaches to veiling vary greatly and can often be conflicting. 
3.2 Halal hijab 
Many  illuminating  examples  of  the  aforementioned  idea  of  diverse
interpretations and legacies of the hijab do not appear only on British streets but
expand into the digital world. From Twitter to Facebook to Instagram, heated
discussions around 'proper' or  halal hijabs continue to engage individuals who
utilise  social  media  channels  to  voice  their  strong  opinions  on  the  often
controversial and divisive subject. While I will explore and expand on some of
these cases in the subsequent chapters in connection to fashion and feminism, one
case  study is  particularly  interesting  for  highlighting the  existing  plurality  of
hijabs.  In  the  last  months  of  2013,  thousands  of  social  media  users  posted,
tweeted, pinned and shared an illustration depicting 28 different ways of wearing
the hijab (see Image 7). A picture combined some traditional styles of veiling with
contemporary  variations,  for  instance wearing a  colourful  headscarf  under an
urban,  hip-hop  style  cap.  Accompanied  with  titles  and  hashtags  that  were
celebrating Islamic diversity, “hijab chic” and the beauty of Islam, the photograph
quickly started evoking critiques within the Muslim community. Many Muslim
users, both male and female, felt that not all 28 heuristics could pass as the hijab.
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Image 7: 28 ways of wearing the hijab?
When discussing this  image with British Muslim women following the online
backlash, many of them, too, agreed that some of the examples featured on the
illustration were erroneous. In fact, a majority of women who wear headgear of
some sort  dismissed at  least  some versions,  with urban attire  featuring a  cap
being the most commonly singled out. Hawa, for instance,  mentioned as few as
six, emphasising the importance of modest colour and the amount of body that is
covered by a cloth.
If I showed the same image to Mahfana, a middle-aged British woman of Iranian
origin,  she  would probably  point  out  yet  another  version  of  the  hijab  that  is
missing on the photograph: practising hijab without the hijab. Months earlier, our
conversation  on  the  hijab  started  with  her  angry  monologue  on  the  very
definition of the term that –  according to her belief – should be based on the
interior expressions of a woman’s faith rather than its external manifestations.
“This is modesty for me, this is my hijab,” she stated whilst pointing her hand to
her face without any make up and then guided my gaze to her loose sweater and
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dark trousers with a simple cut. She believes she is a good Muslim and is a firm
believer that a simple act  of  covering her head would not bring her closer to
Allah.
Many women who do not veil echo her words, claiming that the concept of hijab
is relational and up to individual to define. Quoting the Quran, they state that
veiling is prone to contestations, as the holy book does not offer any direct advice
other than a recommendation to dress modestly. A college girl from London who
participates in an online discussion on the subject comments: 
“The hijab was meant to be worn by women to respect their privacy, where I live, if you 
wear a hijab, everyone's eyes will be on you and you get comments and stares. If I go out 
in normal, loose fitting, modest clothing without the hijab no one notices. […] When I  
went to Saudi Arabia, I was fully covered and wearing a burqa and the men over there 
would keep staring at us girls anyway. But in the UK, the men on the streets can see  
women wearing a lot worse than me on a daily basis and they really don't care what I'm 
wearing and people don't notice me.” 
The testimony of an anonymous girl emphasises an important paradox of veiling.
As already discussed, observing the hijab corresponds to the concept of purdah,
which centres on the idea of seclusion for the purpose of protecting one's privacy
and modesty. What the girl in question emphasises is how donning certain type
of clothes that are meant to protect individual's modesty and privacy can result in
the reverse happening. In certain parts of Britain, where the hijab or the niqab is
not a common sight, wearing them might attract more unwanted attention than
not wearing them at all. 
Similar views have been additionally promoted by some British Muslim public
personalities. In a piece for The Financial Times (2013), BBC Radio 4 Today’s first
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Asian  and  second  ever  female  presenter  Mishal  Husain  writes  about  her
decisions for not wearing the headscarf. Her choice was formulated on the basis
of the rigid Saudi policies on female attire that she had experienced whilst living
there as a child. Quoting the Quran’s verse 7:26 (“O children of Adam, we have
provided you with garments to cover your bodies, as well as for luxury. But the
best  garment is the garment of  righteousness.”),  she emphasises that the holy
book places “emphasis on actions over appearances” (ibid.). Taking this verse as
her  principal  mantra,  she  is  saddened to  see  how the vision of  Islamic  dress
varies to the extent that “one part of the Muslim world’s concept of Islamic dress
may be unacceptable in another” (ibid.).
As is evident in the case of British Muslim women, these Muslim worlds do not
necessarily  refer  to  distant countries  with radically  different  political  regimes.
They are ultimately symbolic spaces that are shaped by person-specific status and
group conformity as well as by collective cultural aesthetics that are reflecting
norms, values and standards within a certain cultural circle, age group or a social
setting (see Barthes, 1990 [1967]; Delaney, 2011; Svensson, 1992: 62). They are sets
of  values,  traditions,  norms and  sentiments  that  are  dependent  upon various
factors which women accumulate on their ‘journey’.  
The monolithic signifier of a ‘veiled woman’ is hence a flawed one. It is rather a
category that contains endless subcategories, or more correctly: individuals with
different  headgear  which  varies  in  design,  pattern,  colour,  length,  material,
wrapping style and trend, and perhaps more importantly: motive, intention and
practice. Every one of the approximately 1.4 million Muslim women in the UK
would thus embrace slightly or radically different attire that will reflect all of the
aforementioned factors.
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3.3 “I wasn’t born with the hijab”
The veil does not only come in a variety of physical materialisations; the choice of
wearing certain  attire  reflects  a  compendium of  decisions,  considerations  and
sentimentalities  that  are in  a  continuous process  of  evolution and change.  To
return to Reema, the simple, sartorial act of covering her head was a life-changing
one: it was a physical manifestation of a fresh start that left behind struggles of
domestic  abuse,  of  superficial  music industry  and what  she calls  a  damaging
lifestyle. “My decision to finally free myself from the oppression of others meant I
would revisit the way I talk, walk, act and dress caring little for the consequences
previously instilled in me,” Reema once wrote in her online diary. The decision to
don the hijab, and a few months later the niqab, was significant in Reema's quest
to commence working on herself internally. In her case,  the veil was part of a
continuum of change that came with her decision to replace a negative past with
what she hoped would be a brighter future guided by her lord.
A similar idea of the hijab being the result  of an ongoing spiritual journey is
additionally  entertained by Roshan.  Whilst  she is  a  born Muslim,  she  started
wearing  the  hijab  only  in  her  late  college  years.  Before  delving  into  Islam
independently and “properly” at the age of seventeen, she was uneasy with the
idea of wearing a headscarf, even when trying it on in a group of girlfriends. The
more she learnt about Islam, the more she wanted to practise everything: from
praying salah to eventually also wearing the hijab. She recalls her beginnings as
shy and experimental. As a very first step, she would simply wear a pashmina
around her neck.
“In that summer I had the scarf covering my hair with my neck still showing, but then 
after that I started practising the scarf the way you see now, and now the abaya awaits, 
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Inshallah.”
Roshan believes that even though one may be born into a Muslim family, the
process  of  becoming  a  Muslim  inevitably  starts  from  zero  and  progresses
gradually, in different forms and at a different pace for each individual. The hijab
can be perceived as an external documentation of this journey.
The two women demonstrate different approaches towards utilising the veil in
their respective religious journeys. For Reema, on the one hand, the decision to
return  to  Islam  and  subsequently  adopt  the  veil  was  sudden  and  all-
encompassing. It materialised as a fresh beginning and the altered lifestyle that
came with it. Taking on the veil for Roshan, on the other hand was a shy, cautious
and  gradual  exploration  at  a  slower  pace.  Her  progressive  development  of
religious sentiments was reflected externally with a changing dressing style. The
cases  of  Reema and Roshan demonstrate  the  importance  of  faith  that  should
definitely not be diminished. However, the veil cannot be observed in a social
vacuum,  isolated  from  various  influences  that  inevitably  inform  the  ways  in
which people choose their attire.  Its physical location on the border between an
intimate body (the self) and an environment (culture) introduces the veil, just like
any other form of dress, as a particularly informative social institution. While it is
indeed motivated religiously, the decision to wear certain headgear is constituted
by and constitutive of various other (cultural) categories as well as of one’s very
intimate  identity  (Cordwell  and  Schwarz,  1973;  Hansel,  2004;  Polhemus  and
Procter, 1978; Tarlo: 1996, 2010).
For  a  better  comprehension  of  this  notion,  I  should  reconstruct  the  dinner
conversations  that  took  place  after  a  seminar  with  Muslim  scholars  which  I
attended during my fieldwork. The scene features a big round table, generously
loaded with halal food, and a group of about ten women, including myself. After
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making small talk about the event, Nadeem, a Yemeni lady of about 40 years,
turns to the only niqabi at the table and asks whether her female relatives wear
such attire as well. “I’m the only one, my family’s not very happy about it. They
keep poking me about it, trying to change my mind,” is the answer that comes
from across the table from Zainab, a young niqabi from Wales. She furthermore
explains how the hijab simply didn’t feel enough for her and she found the niqab
effective in facilitating the spiritual progression she was hoping for. Her answer is
not a surprising one. Most of the British niqabis I spoke to responded to similar
questions with an answer akin to Zainab's.
“What about others, why did you start wearing the hijab?”, Nadeem asks the
ladies assembled at the table, and apologises for her nosiness about such a private
matter  by  jokingly  adding  that  she  is  assisting  me  in  organising  a  little
impromptu  focus  group.  Almost  all  women  respond  to  her  question  with
curiously different replies.
Nouran, who was born into a first-generation Egyptian Muslim family, recalls:
“Some of the girls in my class wore it already and I couldn’t wait to get it myself.
I was so excited when I eventually got it, I felt like an adult.” In families, where
the majority of older female relatives practise the hijab themselves, taking up the
hijab might be expected with the arrival of puberty. Despite taking the hijab as an
obligation,  she  acknowledges  the  importance  of  following  her  god’s
commandments.  Submitting  to  them  is  in  itself  worship  which  assists  an
individual to develop religiously.
“For me, I started wearing it only later, it was purely political and it happened
after 9/11,” it is now Nassra’s turn. With the nascent demonisation of Muslims in
the media, the Oman-born sociologist felt a strong need to identify herself as a
Muslim at a visible level and combat the prevailing negative stereotyping that
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was suddenly coming from all directions. She was working for the government
then and was travelling a lot, therefore the need to confront prejudice was even
stronger. Now, when she lives in the United Kingdom, her mission continues. As
observed by Lazreg (2009: 54), “experimenting” with the hijab in Nassra’s fashion
emerged as an increasingly attractive method for Muslim women in Europe and
North America for demonstrating pride in their culture as a reaction to the war
on terror.  The hijab in that sense became a platform for announcing that they
were  not  “afraid  of  diffuse  hostility  towards  Muslims”  and  that  they  would
oppose it head on by proudly exhibiting their identity (ibid.). As will be observed
in  greater  detail  later  in  this  thesis,  such  ‘hijab  activism’  (Tarlo,  201)  now
constitutes  an  established  practice  of  political  campaigning  in  contemporary
Britain that is not only linked to combating Islamophobia, but is also deployed for
peace actions, resisting racist policies or even for environmental causes.
Returning to the dinner table,  we now turn our heads towards Shanaya, who
shares her story. Living in a predominantly white neighbourhood, and growing
up  in  a  moderate  Muslim  family,  she  did  not  wear  the  hijab  at  first.  She
remembers:
“People in the neighbourhood were so racist, you’d get a lot of negative comments just for
being a bit darker, when going to the shops or walking in the street for instance. I thought:
why not take up the hijab, it won’t make any difference. I get all that negative attention 
anyway, so why not embrace my religion and practise it the way I want.”
For Shanaya, identifying with Islam visibly could be seen almost as a defence
mechanism. Rather than being ostracised from the community, she announced
her belonging to a different group. She made herself visibly Muslim and visibly
Other. As argued by Pnina Werbner (2012: 113), the veil can become a medium for
an  individual’s  articulation  of  her  participation  in  “a  deterritorialised  global
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movement of Islamic culture and religion” (ibid.), especially when it is worn in a
country  that  is  not  predominantly  Muslim.  As  such,  the  veil  is  not  only  an
expression  of  religious  beliefs  but  also  a  visual  statement  of  belonging  –  not
ineludibly solely to Islam but to, for instance, Middle Eastern, Arabic culture, or
to a specific country or ethnicity based upon Islamic values.
Whilst the hijab can be a symbol of belonging, it can simultaneously also build
social  barriers,  as  demonstrated  by  Laila,  the  youngest  girl  at  the  table.  A
university student from London, she recalls how she waited impatiently to finally
become old enough to wear the hijab. She would wrap random cloths around her
head and observe herself in the mirror, admiring the adult-looking image that
was reflected back to her. Attending a mixed sixth form college, she experienced
that the way she saw herself in the mirror did not necessarily coincide with the
ways in which she was seen by her classmates.
“All hijabis always sat together and hung out with each other. I didn’t want to be only 
with them. I am Muslim and I’m proud of it but I want to mix. I want to have friends 
who are not Muslim, I don’t want to limit my social life to one group only.”
Social conventions in her interfaith school motivated Laila to take off her hijab in
order to create more space for social flexibility and mobility. According to her,
this decision did not diminish other aspects of practising religion. She would still
wear  modest  clothes  covering  most  of  the  body  and hiding  the  body  shape.
Rather than buying only high street clothes, she is loyal to what she calls, “desi
fashion.” She is normally seen in a salwar kameez, a dress that is common in her
parents’ native Pakistan,  but would occasionally replace the bottom part  with
skinny jeans to create a more contemporary look.
The dinner conversations introduce just some of the numerous scenarios in which
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the veil enters – or in the case of Laila leaves – the lives of Muslim women. Each
of these Muslim women, gathered at a shared dinner table, has her own set of
reasons that motivated her to put on or take off a certain type of head covering at
one stage of her life. Whilst their reasons are above all spiritual, their decisions
were  informed  by  various  other  factors:  their  life  experiences,  families,
neighbourhoods, schools or global politics. 
As seen throughout this section, these dynamics are pivotal in determining the
degree to which a woman will veil. It is especially interesting to observe how the
same type of a headgear is perceived differently by different Muslim women. For
Roshan, wearing a scarf on her head was a major advancement on her spiritual
journey, informed by years of studying religion and months of contemplating the
decision. For Reema, on the other head, a headscarf was the first step in her quest
of getting closer to her god in hope to escape the turmoil in her life. The veil, in a
sense, served as a reminder of a new beginning for herself and for  society more
broadly. 
What needs to be highlighted when discussing socio-cultural factors in regards to
a  woman’s  dress  is  to  not  seek  ways  for  constant  rationalisation  of  Islamic
practices and fall into the trap of the Eurocentric obsession with identity politics.
The reason for veiling is, with some exceptions, first and foremost religious. It is
important to acknowledge the significance that attire performs in the process of
enhancing women's spirituality and establishing stronger relations and trust with
their god. 
The experiences of British Muslim women thus resonate with the findings of Saba
Mahmood’s ethnographic research among Muslims in Cairo (2005).  Mahmood
describes how her female respondents refused to acknowledge the possibility of
their  dresses  representing  parts  of  their  identities,  and  insisted  on  a  solely
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religious  dimension  to  their  attire.  In  her  academic  discussion,  Mahmood
accommodates  these  different  perspectives  by  concluding  that  dressing  in  a
certain way is definitely a practice that creates and reflects the self, but is always
guided and in line with commandments of their god. The divine dimensions of
the hijab therefore need to be highlighted when speaking about the motivations
for donning the veil, be it in the context of Egypt of Great Britain. 
3.4 Learning to live with the hijab
Reema recalls the abrupt changes her life and her lifestyle went through when
taking up the hijab. Smoking, drinking, friendships with unmarried men – they
all needed to go. What she misses the most out of all things is singing. Before she
became a devoted Muslim, singing was not only her career but also her biggest
passion.  As  she  was  seeking  to  transform her  lifestyle  radically  and immerse
herself fully into Islam, she believed the change needed to be drastic and sudden,
otherwise she would have not achieved the desired result. The headscarf, and
later  the  niqab,  was  only  one  of  the  elements  in  the  mosaic  of  changes  that
constituted her full submission to god.
Other  women report  similarly  dramatic  changes  that  came with  donning  the
hijab. These changes are especially evident in the case of converts, whereby the
hijab is often perceived as an official announcement of their new religion. Whilst
wearing the hijab for the first time is an important moment in a woman’s spiritual
journey, it is almost equally significant for her relatives and other people who
form their social environment. When a woman starts wearing the hijab, religion
transcends  the  field  of  the  private  and  becomes  displayed  publicly.  Parents,
siblings, neighbours, colleagues and classmates are now fully aware of a convert’s
94
new religious identity.
Not only converts but also ‘born Muslims’ acknowledge the change in their social
interactions. Whereas in the case of converts, the transformed relations might be
more visible in their immediate social circle, other Muslim women often perceive
it more strongly outside their close kin and friends. Apart from receiving negative
comments from strangers, they would simultaneously get warmer attitudes from
unknown Muslims. They often describe experiences of being randomly greeted
on the street  with ‘as salamu alaykum’ by fellow Muslims, and being offered
support  and  help  when  outside  in  public,  for  instance  when  encountering
difficulties in school or when needing help carrying bags at a shop. Their religion
is not only more visible; it consequently becomes a more significant part of their
daily lives outside of the spiritual realm.
This notion accentuates an important point: the adoption of the veil inevitably
alters parts of one’s identity. Not only will a woman advance her spirituality. The
way in which she is perceived by her surroundings – by her family or strangers –
will in return unavoidably require her to reflect on her own identity. Although
the veil might often be donned in order to ensure a woman’s modesty or even
invisibility in public, the effect of veiling is to a certain extent paradoxically the
opposite. In the United Kingdom where the hijab is not common attire, veiling is
a socially visible fact that shapes a woman’s interactions especially prominently.
Recalling the anecdotes from the dinner table, the memories of Shanaya and Laila
additionally  illustrate  this  notion.  While  Shanaya  found  the  veil  helpful  for
disappearing from racism into a safe zone of a new social category, Laila found
her new visibility in class problematic for establishing and maintaining the social
relationships she was seeking.
This paradox of visibility and invisibility that is strongly experienced by British
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Muslim  women  is  a  reappearing  motif  not  only  in  the  testimonies  of  my
respondents, but also in literary accounts of veiling by English Muslim writers.
The  discussed  paradox  is  beautifully  documented  in  Leila  Aboulela’s  novel
Minaret (2005). The book narrates the fictional story of Sudanese-born Najwa who
seeks political exile in London. The hijab is an omnipresent leitmotif of the story
and  is  employed  as  a  clever  metaphor  for  encapsulating  Najwa’s  dynamic
interplay  of  social  exclusion  and  inclusion.  Having  immigrated  not  only  to
another continent but also to a lower social class, Najwa is struggling to fit into
her new environment. Her headscarf both assists her in becoming invisible and
“undetectable” from London culture,  and simultaneously helps her to become
visibly  Muslim,  thus  embracing  a  new  identity  and  self-determined  persona
(Santesso, 2013: 95).
“When I went home, I walked smiling, self-conscious of the new material around my face.
I passed the window of a shop, winced at my reflection, but then thought ‘not bad,  not so
bad’.  Around  me  was  a  new gentleness.  The  builders  who  had  leered  down  at  me  
from  scaffoldings  couldn’t  see  me  anymore.  I  was  invisible  and  they  were  quiet.  
(Aboulela, 2005: 247).
The passage focuses on Najwa’s feeling of liberation as her hijab assisted her to
establish a new social order, where she was content with her own image as well
as with the reactions – or the lack of reactions, in this case – from the people in
her proximity. However,  a few pages earlier Najwa is not so pleased with the
image of herself in the mirror. She describes the inability to curb her resisting and
springing curls and push them into a scarf.  Her struggles with wrapping the
scarf around her  hair are deployed as an allegory for manifesting the difficulties
Najwa is experiencing when she tries to embrace and accept her new identity.
Both passages evoke yet another important metaphor that is consistently brought
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forth  when  discussing  the  first  memories  of  veiling  among  British  Muslim
women – the reflection in the mirror. Recalling the first instance of seeing their
own head covered with a scarf is mentioned and described by numerous women
who found this moment to be an important mark of the change. It is not the act of
buying the hijab, pinning the headscarf or even leaving the house for the first
time.  Observing  their  own  image  in  the  mirror  seems  to  be  remembered  as
particularly momentous by many. 
Noora, a Qatari graduate student residing in the North East of England, whom
we will meet more closely in the next chapter, recalls this moment very clearly.
She comments: “I felt so proud at that moment. I felt like 'I'm a big girl now', it
[the hijab] felt like a crown.” This notion seems to be an obvious re-enactment of
Lacanian mirror stage (1949) that is referring to the recognition of children in a
mirror for the first time. Analogous to an infant’s recognition of their reflection,
the first sight of oneself in the hijab, too, functions as the interface between image
identity and identification (see Brancfroft,  2012: 24;  Hook, 2009: 269).  Just like
Lacan’s  infant,  a  woman  recognises  not  only  that  her  image  now  appears
different,  but instantaneously grasps that this new image has an important, in
fact transformative, implication.
However,  the process of making oneself accustomed to the veil does not only
occur at a psychological level, but is necessarily bound in the series of practical
initiation challenges. All respondents report an initial nervousness which is not
necessarily  linked  to  existential  questions,  but  is  often  triggered  by  the  most
trivial things, for instance struggling with the pins which fasten the garment. The
notion that you are not a true hijabi until you have inflicted injury upon yourself
with a hijab pin can be heard frequently.
Many new hijabis take their anxieties to Reddit, currently one of the largest and
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most popular online messaging boards. In addition to exploring their spirituality,
hijabi users turn to the forum in the hope of finding practical advice for their
worries. One discussion threat, entitled 'Started wearing hijab now, [m]y hairline
is receding' brings together new hijabis who continue to find gobs of hair when
untying  their  headscarves  after  a  long  day.   In  response,  experienced  hijab-
wearers provide reassurance and inform them about the commonality of such
concerns; they explain that humans normally shed up to a hundred individual
hairs per day and when wearing a scarf, these hairs would not fall off but remain
compressed  into  a  headscarf,  thus  creating  an  illusion  of  a  receding  hairline.
Another discussion centres on the question of preventing headaches which might
be accelerated by the wrong choice of materials and tying the hair underneath the
hijab too tightly. Yet another lively online message exchange has evolved around
defined  facial  tan  lines  which  teach  new  hijabis  about  the  importance  of
appropriate sun protection, whilst another discussion centres on advice for new
hijabis when it comes to surviving their first summer wearing headscarves and
modest outfits.
In the case of the niqab, too, there are several minor challenges which women
mention repeatedly. For instance, women speak about the question of appropriate
clothes  that  can  be  worn  together  with  the  niqab,  or  getting  accustomed  to
breathing under the cloth... and learning the hard way the importance of buying a
cotton  niqab  as  opposed  to  a  polyester  one.  Niqabis  who  wear  glasses
furthermore  complain  about  endless  difficulties  with  eyewear  constantly
steaming up as it is tightly framed behind the fabric. These examples illustrate
just some of the initiation rites – from observing her reflection in the mirror to
getting stabbed with a pin – that a woman is exposed to on her path towards
becoming a hijabi.
The  process  of  adjusting  to  the  headgear  is  indeed  an  ongoing  one.  Varied
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lifestyles  and  specific  situations  demand  constant  negotiations  and  practical
readjustments to and of the veil. The latter once again underscores that the veil is
not  fixed  and  determined  in  either  its  meaning  or  in  its  form.  Just  as  every
woman is changing, her veil is similarly exposed to continuous alterations. Whilst
she might decide to take on another form of a headgear altogether, she can just as
well adjust her existing veil to fit the needs of her daily life. 
Creative  responses  to  everyday  challenges  posed  by  living  with  the  hijab  in
contemporary Britain can be observed both in a work and a school setting. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the place of the hijab in educational and work
spheres has been under intense scrutiny in Britain (Neumann Nathan, 2006)  as
well as the subject of similar discussions in other European countries (Craig, 2012;
Siim, 2013). As the polemics regarding the headscarf at work and in the classroom
continue  to  enter  political  and  media  discussions  and subsequently  influence
corresponding policies, British women need to seek solutions for accommodating
their headgear to their work conditions. 
For some working women, especially for those who reside in bigger cities, the
hijab is an accepted part of the corporate dress code, or even part of a uniform.
For instance, Hawa was pleased to get a part-time job at a major British chain-
store,  where  she  received  a  company  uniform  that  adhered  to  her  preferred
Islamic dressing conventions. Although she was asked to replace her usual abaya
with  loose  trousers  and  a  jacket,  she  was  allowed  to  wear  a  headscarf.  “It’s
important for me to stay modest at work. But also, I want to feel I’m part of a
team,” she comments. Similarly, many other bigger employers offer an optional
Islamic variation of the prescribed uniform, as do various educational institutions
around the country.  One of the most famous and widely-covered examples is the
uniform of the Metropolitan Police. Its official policy has allowed the wearing of
the  hijab  as  part  of  the  uniform  since  2001.  Although  no  official  statistic  is
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available, allowing women to veil on duty holds symbolic significance. With the
hijab being incorporated into a prescribed uniform, such attire then becomes not
only  standardised  but  subsequently  also  normalised  in  the  context  of  British
society as a whole (Lewis, 2013; Mirza and Meetoo, 2013: 134).
However, in most cases Muslim women need to manoeuvre creatively around
policies and regulations in order to find a solution for their work outfit. Emma, a
White British convert from London, is training to become a chef and works as a
part-time assistant cook in a restaurant in east London. When applying for the
position,  she  was  chosen  without  an  interview,  as  her  CV  demonstrated  her
experience and the needed skills for undertaking the required tasks. “When I got
in with my hijab, the boss seemed quite surprised, clearly not expecting a Muslim
lady,” she recalls her first day.
“The boss immediately brought up the hijab. She asked if I’d be willing to remove it and 
replace it with a hat, you know the kind of a chef’s hat, like the rest of the staff. I said that  
I won’t take it  off and she agreed with that, not too happily, but asked me to keep it  
within ‘health and safety’.”
In order to follow health and safety requirements of the restaurant adequately,
Emma needed to get hold of a fire-proof headscarf. With the help of the Internet,
she  found a  laminated  non-flammable  headscarf.  It  allowed her  to  achieve  a
compromise between the strict  health  and safety  policy  of  the restaurant  and
Emma’s need to veil whilst at work.
Outside work, the hijab requires analogous negotiations. Although leisure time
activities tend to be less harshly defined and limited by rigid legislation, hijabis
are required to seek practical solutions to make their free time activities easier.
For example, the issue of an Islamic dress code is among the main reasons for the
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low participation rate of Muslim women in sport, according to the Women Sports
Foundation UK’s short report ‘Fact file: Muslim Women in Sport – A Minority
within a Minority’ (2007). Although modest dress presents an obstacle for many
Muslim  women,  numerous  hijabis  practise  an  active  lifestyle  and  partake  in
various  sports  activities.  Most  commonly,  Muslim  women  seek  gender-
segregated  gyms  or  attend  special  classes  that  are  exclusive  for  women.
Especially in larger cities, there are various different forms of sport activities for
female Muslims, ranging from martial arts to Zumba classes. In smaller cities or
non-Muslim areas, there are perceptibly fewer opportunities for gender-exclusive
recreational  activities.  In these cases,  women try to find alternative attire  that
replaces their  usual  outfit.  Nowadays,  Internet  shops offer  a range of  modest
sports clothing that comes in stretching and breathable materials. The head cover
is often attached to the shirt in a hood style and is occasionally accompanied with
a sports  hat,  thus ensuring that it  is  not falling down and not disturbing the
wearer.
In  the  sports  clothes  department,  one attire  has  been especially  popular  with
British Muslim women –  the burkini,  an Islamic version of  a  swimming suit.
Aisha, a college student from East London, shares her enthusiasm: “My aunt who
is a niqabi told me about it. I immediately ordered it online. It is very convenient
as I can now use public swimming pools whenever I wish.” Before owning the
burkini, she was limited to swimming recreationally during 'sisters  only'  time
slots, which were hard to find in the area of Manchester where she lived as a
child.  Many  women  point  out  that  an  Islamic  clothing  solution  such  as  the
burkini might be good in theory, but is not always financially accessible. As they
are often not available in high street sports shops, the prices tend to be much
higher than in the case of other sports clothes.
The problem of availability is  especially linked to places outside major  urban
101
areas in the UK, not only in the case of sport but also when it comes to various
other  activities.  Apart  from  better  opportunities  for  clothes  shopping,  larger
cities,  in  particular  London,  offer  more  events,  activities  and  places  catered
especially  for  hijab-wearing  women.  One  such  service  is  hairdressing  salons
designed for hijabis. As typical hairdressing salons tend to have a large shopping
window and mixed-gender staff members, veiled women are often unable to find
an appropriate place where they can unveil comfortably. In such cases, women
would need to hire a hairdresser to come to their homes, whereas in areas with a
more substantial Muslim population, there are numerous beauty parlours and
hairdressing salons that have a special back room reserved for veiled women.
Similarly, Muslim districts of bigger cities offer a wide range of restaurants with
so-called family places that are especially convenient for women with the niqab.
These family areas usually come with a special curtain around the tables that can
be screened in order to ensure privacy. A woman can remove her face veil and
enjoy the meal even when sitting in a busy restaurant.
These examples demonstrate the dynamic process of learning to live with the
hijab. Rather than simply donning the headscarf, adopting the hijab requires a
long and often challenging initiation period. As described above, these adjusting
processes necessarily revolve around three major areas. Firstly and probably most
importantly, women need to get accustomed to their hijab – not only as a new
item of clothing but as a whole new identity. Secondly, they have to adapt to a
new  set  of  relations  that  are  forged  by  their  headgear,  both  within  their
immediate social circle as well as in public. On a more practical level, they need
to  negotiate  the  hijab  and  their  lifestyle  by  seeking  inventive  solutions  for
accommodating their work and hobbies as well as their Islamic dress code and its
corresponding values.  These processes of adjusting to the veil and adjusting the
veil  itself  once  again highlight  how the hijab  is  not  merely  an item which is
donned  at  one  point  in  a  woman’s  life,  but  is  indeed,  to  draw  on  Reema’s
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metaphor, a life-long journey.
At the same time, these examples also remind us that hijabs cannot be perceived
as  simple  material  objects  which  exist  merely  as  an  outward  expression  of
immaterial inner thoughts (see Keane, 1997). Ethnographic illustrations of women
appropriating, adapting, altering and adorning their headscarves crystallise the
notion  that  the  hijab  cannot  be  reduced  only  to  its  prescribed  role  of
communicating and embodying religious morals and meanings. Instead, they can
be  seen  as,  what  Webb  Keanne  (2008:  124)  calls,  “objects  of  experience.”  As
objects of experience they are inevitably “enmeshed in causality, registered in and
induced by their form,” they “persist across contexts and beyond any particular
intentions and projects,” and are,  as material things, “prone to enter into next
contexts” (ibid.). Women respond to and interact with these objects in different
ways, which transcend their bare moral dimensions. They incorporate their hijabs
into their lifestyles, appropriate them according to specific fashion trends or alter
them in order to respond to weather conditions and various health factors,  to
mention just a few examples. As objects of experience, the hijabs cannot be seen
merely as a material extension of the immaterial, but must be viewed as material
objects with a social life of their own.
3.5 Conclusion
The veil is shortly defined as “a length of cloth worn by women as a covering for
the head and shoulder and often especially in Eastern countries  for  the face”
(Loue, Sajatovic and Armitage, 2004: 675). As shown in the previous chapter, such
lexicographical descriptions of a veil are loyally reinforced and disseminated by
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the mainstream media that persistently introduce it as a monolithic category with
a determined form and a fixed set of cultural meanings. Experiences of British
Muslim women, however, show how these entrenched conceptions of the veil fail
to  reflect  the  plurality  of  forms  and  meanings  that  stretch  far  beyond  the
pragmatic equation of the veil with a simple piece of cloth. As observed by Moors
and Tarlo (2013: 1), such conceptions of the veil are completely “out of tune with
actual developments in Muslim dress practices which have, over the past decade,
been undergoing rapid transformation.”
As a result of these metamorphoses, this particular cloth does not only come in a
variety  of  lengths,  forms,  materials,  colours  and patterns  in  different  cultural,
geographical,  social,  political  and historical  contexts,  but  is  moreover  imbued
with nuanced semiotic  meanings.  It  transmits  various and often contradictory
cultural messages – messages of modesty, fashion, political beliefs, gender roles,
anti-racism,  revolt,  tradition or  conformity.  Various women introduced in  this
chapter all demonstrate their own sub-reasons for donning, or not donning, a
certain type of hijab. Whilst for Nassra, for instance, the decision was fuelled by
global political events, Shanaya deployed it to find shelter from everyday racism.
Such varied understandings emphasise an important notion: just like in the case
of any other symbol, the connection between the veil and its meaning is in the
causal sense always arbitrary”  (Parsons, 1968: 484; Pierce, 1998: 5), an idea that
will be reappearing throughout this thesis. It is hence impossible to insist on a
single  interpretation  of  the  hijab  according  to  the  dominant  definitions  and
expectations. Instead, it is essential to acknowledge the subjective nature of the
hijab that continues to leave it open for social manipulations by individuals and
different socio-cultural contexts (see Firth, 1973: 75). Thus, the veil is constantly
reflecting  norms  and  values  within  a  certain  cultural  circle,  including  their
omnipresent transformations, and is simultaneously giving space for a woman’s
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own individual expressions. As observed in a discussion at the dinner table, the
women sharing a meal did not share either their reasons for veiling, or the forms
of headgear they chose. Similarly, their set of decisions did not necessarily mimic
those of their immediate social circle, entailing family members and friends.
The  latter  point  should  be  emphasised  further.  With  dominant  media  and
political  discourses  underscoring  the  significance  of  social  pressure  when  it
comes  to  the  matter  of  veiling,  experiences  suggest  differently.  The  cases  of
Reema, Zainab and Laila, to mention just a few, all support the idea that British
Muslim  women’s  decisions  connected  to  veiling  are  commonly  based  on  an
individual choice, and reflect women’s varied life experiences and preferences. 
Especially in the case of the niqab, this finding holds a particular significance.
Contrary to public assumptions about women covering their face as a result of a
commandment  issued  by  their  male  relative  or  a  partner,  the  testimonies  of
British women reveal that such assumptions are a result of semantic wars rather
than real practices. In the case of Britain, the adoption of the niqab is usually a
result  of  an  adherent’s  connection  with  her  god,  and  an  expression  of  her
personal religious devotion. Perhaps surprising is also the fact that the majority of
women are the first members of their immediate social circle to don the niqab,
with their decision not always supported by the family. All three niqabis from
this  chapter  confirm these claims.  This  debunks several  stereotypes  about  the
social pressure in Islamic families as well as about the effect of various Orthodox
organisations influencing or even limiting the decision of individuals.
The often overlooked factor of individuality is hence incredibly important. The
105
sartorial manifestations of ‘veiled sentiments’,14 to use the term coined by Lila
Abu-Lughod (1986),  are not only expressing women’s individual  decisions for
adopting  the  hijab.  They  moreover  narrate  profound  sentimentality,  emotions
and passion that are often hidden from the eye of an observer, and not always
easily  recognised by adherents  themselves.  Although many perceive the hijab
almost  as  a  uniform in terms of  hiding social,  racial,  class  or  age  differences
among  women,  the  outfits  necessarily  express  a  woman’s  individuality.  The
selection of shoes or a bag, at the very least, conveys a woman’s preferences and
taste, whereas various accessories, patterns, cuts and combinations support the
fact that every outfit is inevitably a result of choices that are informative about a
woman’s identity.
What is perhaps equally significant is the fact that these sentiments not only vary
from individual to individual, but also within an individual herself. This notion is
illustratively epitomised in the title image (see Image 5). Six photographs explore
various different outfits that the same woman, in this case photographer Boushra
Almutawakel,  takes on during her artistic  quest  to find her true self.  In most
cases,  explorations  will  not  be  as  drastic  and  as  quick,  but  the  central  idea
remains the same: one never adopts only one type of clothing. Her outfits will
vary  in  different  eras  of  her  life  as  well  as  at  different  times  of  day.  These
variations are not uniformed but are largely dependent upon each individual. As
demonstrated earlier, the same type of headgear can mark different meanings for
different  women.  While  for  some women wearing  the  hijab  might  appear  as
‘veiling more’ than normally, for others wearing the same type of headdress can
mean that they are ‘veiling less’ than usual. 
14 The mentioned term is the title of Lila Abu-Lughod's seminal ethnographic work (1986). In
the  book,  based  on her  fieldwork among the  Bedouins  in  Egypt,  Abu-Lughod studies
gender relations  through analysis  of  their  oral  lyric  poetry. In her poetic  accounts,  she
details  how  certain  emotions  were  concealed,  veiled  in  public  but  were  expressed
indirectly, for example though poetry.
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In  the  opening  ethnographic  passage,  Reema  neatly  describes  this  personal
exploration as a journey. The motif of a journey has been following us through
the chapter from the beginning onwards, and for a good reason. The metaphor of
a journey emphasises transformations that are unavoidable for an individual as
well as for the headgear itself. Just like any other item of clothing, the hijabs do
not exist in social isolation, but are prone to influences of time and space. Sports
hijabs, or women from the photographic project ‘London Veil’,  exemplify how
Islamic  veils  are  consistently  subjected  to  dynamic  alternations.  This
comprehension once again highlights the fluidity of the veil, and the vast field of
its semiotic operation that “may be held to indicate virtually anything informants
and the analysts want,” as claimed by Lindisfarne and Ingham (1997: 16) in their
discussion of the languages of dress in the Middle East and the importance of
contextualising the veil in a myriad of nuanced interpretations.
There is no single style of dress, nor any single woman who chooses to dress as
she does for any single reason, and “generalisations about the veil and a category
of women or men partake of the absurd” (ibid.). The idea of a dress reflecting
various parts of one's identity and one's individuality will extend into the next
chapter, which will expand on – what Lindisfarne and Ingham (ibid.) would call –
the languages of the dress. 
107
Chapter IV: Styling religion
Image 8: Princess Hijab’s anti-fashion in the Paris metro (Photo: unknown)
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It is Sunday morning, the busiest day on Brick Lane. As always, the iconic weekly flea
market  in  east  London  attracts  hordes  of  curious  visitors.  Among  carefully  dressed
regulars, enthusiastic tourists and entrepreneurial restaurant owners who are inviting
passers-by to taste their curries is Hannah. She is wearing baggy dark trousers, the latest
Nike trainers, a sporty jacket, a black-and-white scarf around her neck and a fluorescent
woollen hat. Not many could tell that she is Muslim, and even fewer would guess she is
one of the leading Islamic fashion designers in the UK.
Hannah enters one of the red brick buildings, following a sign that advertises a vintage
market. Manoeuvring among numerous stalls adorned with clothes and accessories, she is
browsing the designs on display. Her gaze becomes fixated onto a stall with colourful
hats. “I have too many already,” she sighs but decides to buy an additional one anyway.
“Eight  pounds,  not  too  bad,” she  assesses,  with her  hands testing the  quality  of  the
material  and stitching.  Choosing between a hat  in a  dark green colour and a  strong
orange one, she finally selects the latter. She likes fashion pieces that stand out, with her
hijab no exception. 
On a different day she would replace a striking hat with a more ‘conventional’ hijab – a
headscarf accompanied with an undercap covering her hair. “I decide depending on my
outfit,” explains Hannah whose fashion is never on the safe side. “I’ve got a lot of T-shirts
with nice graphics, and if I wear the hijab, the image gets all covered up.” As long as her
clothes  remain  modest  and  not  haram,  forbidden,  her  styling  has  no  limits.  Intense
colours, unusual cuts, strong patterns and funky prints all find their place in her outfits.
She is, however, only rarely donning – what she considers – traditional Islamic dress.
More often she chooses and designs pieces that  could be worn by any modern urban
British woman, Muslim or not. 
With her new hat in a bag, Hannah heads back onto the bustling street and continues her
Sunday walk in side alleys sprayed with graffiti.  Those, alongside Nike Town and the
109
Victoria and Albert Museum, are some of her strongest sources of inspiration. “Did you
see the one with a niqabi girl,  it’s  amazing!” she enthusiastically recommends one of
numerous graffiti murals that encourage her to make Brick Lane a destination for her
inspirational weekend strolls. 
Accompanying Hannah on her Sunday walk creates an illustrative preface for a
discussion surrounding the dynamic arena of Islamic fashion in Britain, which
will  be  a  focus  of  this  chapter.  Hannah  is  daring  and  fresh  in  her  stylistic
expressions,  situated  at  the  intersection  of  Islamic  dressing  guidelines  and
contemporary  British  trends.  Her  creative  approaches  towards  combining  the
religious  ethics  of  Islam  and  the  aesthetics  of  contemporary  fashion  trends
formulate various appealing departure points for observing the hijab in the realm
of fashion. 
Hannah is loyal to the art of ‘layering’, an approach that is commonly spoken
about and practised by the majority of British hijabis. By combining different high
street  sports  clothes,  for  example  a  neon hat  from the  opening  vignette,  into
Islamically acceptable outfits, for instance covering her head, she is following the
concept of bricolage (Levi-Strauss, 1996; Hebdige, 1979).15 She is appropriating
existing commodities by placing them in a symbolic ensemble which serves to
alter their original straight meanings (ibid.: 104). The example of Hannah builds
upon  some  of  the  ideas  presented  in  the  previous  chapter,  especially  those
focusing on the diversity and eclectic nature of Islamic fashion. Islamic fashion is
not limited to the presumed traditional Middle Eastern or Gulf attire in the form
15  Anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (1996) introduced the term bricolage for describing
the processes of combining symbolic elements into a new cultural form. Drawing from
Levi-Strauss, Dick Hebdige (1979) adapted the term to describe how subcultural styles are
constructed. In that sense, bricolage refers to people thinking about the world in their own
way by improvising and appropriating different material objects (ibid.)
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of simple black abayas and accompanying headgears that may commonly find
representation in the British media. Instead, it is equally inspired by urban youth
culture  and  contemporary  fashion  trends.  By  collecting,  combining  and
assembling  different  clothing  items  from  the  high  street,  international  sports
brands and second hand shops, Hannah creates outfits that are deemed halal or
Islamically acceptable. 
  
Hannah also defines further veins for conceptualising the fashionable hijab. As
she  is  an  Islamic  clothing  designer  herself,  she  is  not  simply  borrowing and
combining clothes to create outfits that comply with Islamic notions of modesty.
She also creates clothes which transcend both conservative Islamic garments and
popular Western attires by proposing a hybrid style. It can be claimed that her
creations  are  an  example  of,  what  Homi  Bhabha  would  call,  a  third  space
(Bhabha, 1994; Chow, 1995), as they exist inbetween or outside the established
(and  superficial)  binaries  of  Islam  vs.  the  West,  traditional  vs.  modern  or
institutional and individuals. This creative space enables Hannah to “experiment
and combine these different elements and create a new Islamic aesthetic style”
(Peterson,  2013),  which  defies  myths  about  the  Islamic  dress  as  a  monolithic
category.  
Building upon the ideas and concepts evoked by Hannah – from bricolage to
third  spaces  –  this  chapters  aims  to  explore  various  semiotic  tensions,
intersections and, above all,  unavoidable dialogues between fashion and Islam
and dressing as a British Muslim woman. More precisely, this section will address
various strategies for materialising something as abstract and intangible as faith
while situating oneself in the context of contemporary British consumer society. 
Offering ethnographic peeks into closets  and catwalks,  I  will  examine various
degrees of balancing faith and fashion as expressed in a personal style. On one
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side of the spectrum, I  will  look at  a view that completely denies fashionable
dimensions of the hijab, whilst, at the other extreme, I will engage the position of
those who prioritise the fashionable aspect of their style over adhering to Islamic
sartorial codes. Most of the discussions, however, will be situated in a vibrant
middle-ground  between  the  two  that  has  been  outlined  in  the  opening
ethnographic vignette. I will hence place a special emphasis on the hybridisation
of style that “engenders the opportunity to create new style formations that are
British and Muslim at the same time” (Suterwalla, 2013: 167). 
Expanding  on  the  ideas  of  individuality,  transformation  and  negotiation
introduced  in  the  previous  chapter,  this  chapter  will  develop  this  discussion
further by placing an additional emphasis on nonconforming subjectivities that
are  contesting  the  normative  discourses  surrounding  fashion,  Islam  and
Britishness.  In  other  words,  I  will  explore  the  potentials  of  fashion  to  resist,
reform  and  revolutionise  the  ways  in  which  identities  are  produced  and
consumed. It is precisely this idea that has motivated the selection of the opening
image of this chapter (see Image 8): a work of street art by Princess Hijab, a Paris-
based  street  artist  whom  I  got  to  know  through  Muslim  blogs,  and  later
interviewed for a conference paper on the hijab in street art. Just like other art
works  in this  thesis,  her  creative  outputs  travels  from her  native  France  and
resonates globally.  Her artistic method, commonly dubbed ‘hijabising’, offers an
effective illustration of Islamic fashion’s resisting potentials. It replaces dominant
Eurocentric  beauty  conventions  with  alternative  ‘body  images’  which  are
covered, modest, non-sexualised, non-white and not for sale. 
Hannah and Princess Hijab will  sew a metaphorical  –  and sometimes even a
literal  –  red thread through the  chapter  on  veiling  and fashion,  whilst  being
juxtaposed with numerous British Muslim women with diverse attitudes towards
styling religion.  
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4.1 Between fashion to anti-fashion
We are still strolling around the streets of east London and discussing clothes. Do
you use word fashion when talking about your work, I ask Hannah? She shakes
her head and justifies her response: 
“The  fashion  industry  is  fascist.  It  is  body fascism,  it  is  race  fascism,  it  is  fashion  
imposing  an  idealised  version  of  women.  It  is  telling  girls  to  conform  to  Western  
standards of idealism, to have light skin, blond hair, be tall. There are so many races and 
ethnicities that stay completely unrepresented and not celebrated! 
So yeah, fashion industry is fascist. I said it!” says Hannah, with visible irritation.
After getting to know the fashion industry from the inside over the past decade,
Hannah  holds  a  highly  negative  vision  of  mainstream  fashion  in  the
contemporary world – and rightly so. In her monograph Stitched Up! The Anti-
Capitalist Book of Fashion (2014), Tansy E. Hoskins echoes Hannah’s sentiments by
dedicating  an  entire  ethnographic  study  to  offences  the  fashion  industry  is
complicit in. Sexism, racism, ageism, sizeism,  exacerbating climate change and
poverty, exploitation and unbalanced power relations are just some examples on
the endless list of what Hannah would call fashion’s fascist politics. 
Not  only  does  this  fashion  fascism  contradict  certain  core  values  Islam
traditionally  stands  for,  such  as  guarding  one's  modesty,  moreover,  Hoskins
reveals  how  fashion  has  historically  been  far  from accommodating  towards
Muslims, in particular towards visibly Muslim women who wish to cover their
heads  and  bodies  (ibid.,  154-155).  For  example,  the  fashion  industry's  strong
emphasis on the sexualisation of female bodies commonly prohibits women who
wish to protect their modesty from entering mainstream fashion avenues, be it
through advertisements,  the catwalk,  or general  high street  trends.  Until  very
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recently, British mainstream brands have been consistently failing women who
wanted their style to comply with Islamic morals. It is only in the last few years
that various high street  brands,  such as H&M16 and Debenhams, have started
featuring hijabi models, selling burkinis and introducing modest clothing lines.
It is precisely for that reason that Hannah is conscious about using the very term
fashion  and  prefers  to  use  alternatives  that  are  not  heavily  burdened  with
offensive Western legacies – for example clothes, dressing and clothing. Hannah
is not alone in avoiding fashion in connection to the Islamic dress.  Numerous
Muslim women are equally aware of the legacy that is embedded into this seven-
letter  word,  and  consequently  follow  Hannah’s  decision  to  rethink  the  very
terminology they use on a daily basis. 
During my fieldwork, an interesting project took place in the Museum of London.
A group  of  young  Muslim  Londoners  decided  to  challenge  and  change  an
outdated  display  featuring  Muslim dress  in  the  museum’s  fashion  collection.
They  were  shocked  after  seeing  that  the  only  representation  of  Muslim
Londoners was compressed into a single display: a black abaya and a black niqab
covering a faceless plastic mannequin. The idea behind the project was to rethink
what  Islamic  dress  means  to  Muslim  Londoners  and  update  the  display
accordingly. 
The group of activists approached the project thoroughly and holistically through
various workshops and studies. When attending an interim presentation of their
outcomes in the summer of 2014, I was interested to engage in further discussions
on the problematic lexis  surrounding Islamic dress that  was brought forth by
Halima, the curator of the project. During their workshops, she reported, young
16 In 2015, a H&M campaign featured its first Muslim model with the hijab. Mariah Idrissi,
who is of  Pakistani and Maroccoan heritage and lives in London, appears in the high
street brand's videos and photos wearing stylish hijab, loose clothes and sunglasses.
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Muslims were united in agreeing that fashion did not sit comfortably with them.
As a result, the organisers of the exhibition completely avoided using the term
and, similarly to Hannah, replaced it with a less loaded term ‘dress’. Therefore,
there was not  a  single  mention  of  the  word ‘fashion’ in  either  the  exhibition
booklet or in any other material produced in connection with the exhibition.
These  polemics  are  further  addressed  by  anthropologists  Emma  Tarlo  and
Annelies Moors who theorise the concept of anti-fashion. Drawing on Polhemus
and Proctor (1978), they introduce the term in relation to “all styles of adornment
which fall outside the organised system […] of fashion change” (ibid.:16). The
concept of anti-fashion has been since its first introduction commonly deployed
in anthropological writings on dress. Whilst it has been commonly utilised as a
general  signifier  for  labelling  “all  types  of  dress  assumed  to  be  outside  the
Western fashion system” (Tarlo and Moors,  2013:  14),  the term anti-fashion is
frequently  adopted  for  describing  clothing  styles  and  forms  that  are  simply
deemed  “unfashionable”  or  “outside  of  fashion”  (ibid.). Tarlo and  Moors
understand the term in the broadest sense, with their definition of anti-fashion
including everything from critiquing the fashion industry to refusing the idea of
fashion and styling altogether.
The latter extreme on the spectrum of perceiving fashion requires some further
attention. As already discussed in the previous chapter when introducing Hawa
and Khadija, numerous British Muslim women manifest the notion of Islam and
fashion not being compatible by donning black, untailored clothes without any
adornments. They perceive their outfit as a tool for diminishing the importance of
one’s  appearance,  physical  bodies  and  external  beauty.  One  of  these  women
tweets: “[It’s] not hard to stick on an abaya and scarf/jilbab. We don’t need these
fancy folds and layers etc.” She adds: “You really don’t need ‘hijab tutorials’ to
learn how to cover yourself, seriously.” For her and like-minded women, the only
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aim of the outfit is to cover the body, with any additional intervention into the
dress being deemed unwanted or even forbidden.
This idea is also promoted by some conservative Islamic groups. In their essay
The Attack on the Veil, the Egyptian religious group Hizb ut-Tahrir claims veiling is
“in complete contradiction with the desire to attain a specific appearance based
on trends set by the fashion industry” (quoted in Bucar, 2012: 129). This tension is
not an uncommon one. Some respondents,  too, mention the oxymoron that is
brought  forth  by  two  symbolic  systems  that  can  be  observed  as  discordant.
Veiling, on the one hand, can be seen as traditional, sacred, static and modest,
whilst fashion commonly manifests the ideas of change, consumerism, pomposity
and modernity (see ibid., Niessen, 2008: 7).
This idea is both captured and contested by  the aforementioned French  street
artist  Princess  Hijab  (see  Image  8). Princess  Hijab,  whose  identity  remains
carefully concealed, works alone and during the night, wearing a fake wig and a
hoodie which cover her face. On the one hand, Princess Hijab illustrates the idea
of anti-fashion quite literally. By daubing black veils onto the bodies of fashion
models,  she  covers  the  outfits  that  they  are  modelling  with  uniformed black
attire. Her veils are not carefully drawn. Instead, they appear to be made without
special attention to the stylistic outcome. Her interventions not only work against
the  designs  themselves,  but  also  against  what  the  billboards  represent:
consumerism,  racism,  sexualisation and sexism, amongst  others. On the other
hand, Princess Hijab is an artist whose work is largely based upon the visual.
Although she is strongly refusing a certain set of visual aesthetics,  her artistic
interventions emphasise the power and the unavoidability of the visual. 
This lucubrates an important point. Even if and when women decide to adopt
certain  attire  as  an  anti-fashion  statement,  they  inescapably  propose  an
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alternative style and a different set of aesthetics. Nayanika Mookherjee (2011: 3-4)
expands on the Greek origin of the word (aisthetikos – of sense perception) to
propose a working definition of aesthetics as any visual and auditory experiences
and imaginations  which  are  not  necessarily  pleasant  and enjoyable.  Thus,  all
attire,  which  inescapably  forms  a  visual  experience,  possesses  an  aesthetic
dimension.  Linking  this  notion  to  the  ideas  from  the  previous  chapter  (see
Chapter II), all attire is essentially styled. It is about the style of dress a person
chooses,  its  fabrics  and  inevitable  accessories  that  supplement  the  attire.
Furthermore, even though many women refuse to focus on the aesthetic aspect of
dress  and emphasise  its  ethical  implications,  the  complete  isolation of  one  of
them is  not  possible.  By wearing a  certain  outfit  in  the  public  space,  women
inexorably exhibit certain styles and – consciously or unconsciously, intentionally
or unintentionally – propose fashion alternatives.
What  Moookherjee  further  maintains  is  that  any  aesthetics  are  intrinsically
connected to particular ideologies and as such “generate politics by all means
(ibid.:  4).  As  observed  in  my  ethnographic  examples,  aesthetics  of  attire
necessarily communicate and animate certain political ideas. As seen in the cases
of Princess Hijab and Hannah, or even an anonymous Twitter user quoted earlier
in  this  chapter,  any  clothed  body  unavoidably  turns  into  a  semiotic  field  of
political contestation. It is a place were values are performed, power wielded and
myths challenged.  This  is  equally  true for  a  simple  black abaya or  a  creative
urban exploration of Islamic fashion.
4.2 Hijab couture
Although many Muslim women feel uncomfortable with the idea of co-creating
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the  industry  that  has  been  consistently  antagonistic  towards  them,  others
negotiate  a  complex  relationship  with  the  fashion  industry  more  freely.  The
following two sections will focus on women who incorporate Islamic values into
the very core of the fashion industry, be it in the form of everyday high street
fashion or by embracing exclusive high fashion.  
From London Fashion Week to Vogue, recent decades have witnessed the visible
presence of the hijab in high fashion. Following numerous portrayals in popular
media outlets – with the Sex and the City 2 film set in Abu Dhabi being a prime
example – the image of an Arab woman in high couture dresses with high heels,
all  concealed with black abayas has  become a  common stereotype of  Muslim
women.  Whilst  Orientalist  media  portrayals  of  wealthy  Muslim women  who
aspire to be fashionable but are oppressed by a highly patriarchal culture are
extremely problematic, they contain some seeds of truth. The affluent strata of
Muslim women is indeed increasing and their fashion style often reflects their
privileged socio-economic status.
A graduate student Noora, who was briefly introduced in the previous chapter, is
a UK-based Qatari woman in her late thirties who wears, lives and breathes high
fashion.  She  comes  from an affluent  and conservative  family,  where  dressing
modestly  was  encouraged  throughout  her  childhood.  When  in  Doha,  she
normally wears an abaya and shayla, a black robe and a scarf, which are common
among Qatari women. The abaya is as much a religious practice as it a part of
customary social practice and culture in Qatar, and socially it would be noticed if
a Qatari woman chose not to wear such attire (Guillotte, 2011; Hajar, 2011: 51). 
When I ask about her reasons for veiling and wearing the abaya, Noora tells me
that she sees the role of an Islamic dress as “keeping Muslim women far away
from being seductive.” She understands both opponents and supporters of novel
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transformations  of  Islamic  clothing.  While  she  appreciates  how fashionising
Islamic dress could “contradict the main goal of not making the outfit appealing
to men” and thus ensuring the protection of women, she also understands how
encouraging  fashionable  Islamic  outfits  can  convince  some women,  especially
youngsters, “to adopt and follow the trend and still cover their head.” Noora tells
me that she always veils when in Muslim countries but not when she is “in the
West,” as she puts it. When she moved to the US with her daughter in order to
study shortly after 9/11, she opted for a Western style of clothes in the hope of
protecting both herself and her daughter. Amidst omnipresent Islamophobia, she
felt  that  wearing  clothes  that  are  explicitly  Islamic  would  attract  unneeded
attention  and  potential  confrontation.  With  her  husband  being  much  more
relaxed about her clothing than her slightly more conservative brothers, who had
“watched over her before the marriage”, she decided to carry on going around
unveiled when eventually moving into the United Kingdom.  
Veiled or not, Noora personifies high fashion from head to toe and beyond. She
purchases  her  abayas  from a  well-known  store  in  Dubai,  famous  for  quality
custom-tailored  Islamic  dresses  with  prices  which  reflect  its  prestigious
reputation. A simple abaya can be bought from roughly £1400 onwards, but there
is  practically  no  monetary  limit.  In  addition  to  one  of  these  high-class  black
abayas with carefully stitched and rich embroilments,  Noora complements her
outfit with designer handbags and, inevitably, with heavily applied make-up and
the scent of one her numerous expensive perfumes. Although she does not wear
either the hijab or the abaya when in England, she dresses modestly and respects
the etiquette of hijab in a looser sense. She usually wears either long skirts or
trousers and long-sleeved blouses or sweaters that do not expose her cleavage,
and which obscure her body shape. 
Her collection of clothes is almost infinite. During one of my visits to her house,
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she shows me her walk-in closet, placed in a spacious bedroom with two king-
size beds, a private bathroom and a separate make-up room. The interior of the
closet reveals dozens of shoes, all high heels. “I keep other shoes elsewhere,” she
clarifies. Manolo Blahnik,  Jimmy Choo  and  Christian  Dior  read  beautifully
crafted labels on the inside of the shoes. She points out a couple of pairs that she
is particularly proud of. Dior’s limited edition red pair with a golden sole is one
of them. “When I’m in Qatar, this is my normal everyday footwear,” she explains,
adding  that  her  outfits  in  England are  in  general  “more  toned  down.”  As  a
graduate student, she does not feel appropriate walking around the university
halls in designer high heels, just as she does not feel comfortable with her veil on.
The  example  of  Noora  evokes  numerous  interesting  ideas  relevant  to  the
discussion of the hijab and fashion. Firstly, it shows that fashion and the veil can
go  hand in  hand.  Secondly,  it  illuminates  the  ever-transforming and  context-
dependent  nature of  fashion.  Clothes cannot  exist  in a geographical,  political,
social or historical  vacuum. Moving around the world,  experiencing historical
events (such as 9/11), studying for a postgraduate degree and living a financially
privileged life all influence the ways in which Noora embodies her subjectivity.
Although these forms change dramatically when she migrates between different
social categories, for example between being a graduate student in the north-east
of England or being a wife of an influential real estate entrepreneur in Qatar, both
Islamic ethics and high fashion aesthetics travel and stay with her at all times. 
Returning to the connection between high fashion and the veil, another intriguing
perspective  is  offered by  Barjis  Chohan,  the  creative  mind behind the  luxury
modest fashion brand Barjis. Formely working for Vivienne Westwood and other
high couture brands, the designer now specialises in, what her website calls, “the
fusion of Eastern values with Western cuts.” This fusion has been popular with
consumers and fashion professionals alike, and Barjis has been one of the Islamic
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fashion brands that has made it to London Fashion Week. When I ask her about
the compatibility of the hijab and high fashion via an email interview, she replies:
“Yes, hijab can be considered for high fashion because there are a lot of women
who love high fashion and happen to be hijabis.” She has been asked the same
question far too many times. The large volumes of articles, documentaries and
public talks she has participated in offer an inaudible reply. Even though high
fashion  has  been  accommodating  the  veil  for  decades,  Western  public  still
struggles to comprehend their connection and continues to nurture fascination
towards this little explored union.
For Barjis, the reason for the low participation of British Muslim women in high
fashion is not at all an ideological one, but is determined almost exclusively by
socio-economic restrictions.  Since Muslim women are disproportionately worse-
off socio-economically in the UK, for many, high fashion is only available through
magazines and social media.  “They follow   me but do not buy because of the
price point,” explains the designer who says that many of her fans attempt to
imitate her original designs. “The British Muslim market are used to the high
street  and  imitating  trends  from  the  catwalk  and  then  taking  it  to  the  local
tailors,” she adds.
Her clothes are, however, not dedicated solely to Muslim women by any means.
Barjis’  client  list  includes  women  from  various  religious  and  non-religious
backgrounds  who  wish  to  dress  fashionably  but  modestly  at  the  same  time.
Hannah reports a similarly diverse compendium of customers, with half of her
buyers being non-Muslims. The diverse profile of Islamic fashion consumers once
again explicates the notion that modest clothing is not – in Barjis’ words – “as
niche as [she] thought it would be.” Rather, it is merely seeking a creative balance
between  modesty  and  an  aesthetic  appeal,  with  this  combination  not  being
exclusive for Muslim women. 
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This idea is reflected in comparative ethnographic studies of dress in interfaith
settings. Caroline and Filippo Osella (2007), for example, note that despite the fact
that popular and academic discussions on dress and decency tend to focus on
Muslim women, the sense of performing modesty is equally important for many
south Indian women from non-Muslim backgrounds. Their research, based on
two years of fieldwork carried out in Kozhikode in northern Kerala, shows how
different communities, Muslim and Hindu alike, display similar anxieties about
decency, with their sartorial presentations of modesty relating to different idioms
of this. Osella and Osella thus conclude that “[i]t is certainly not the case that only
Muslim women are constrained in their choice of clothing or preoccupied by the
issues of modesty and femininity” (Osella and Osella, 2007: 249).
Emma Tarlo (2013), takes this notion further and explores the category of modest
dress  as  a  vehicle  for  interfaith  engagements  between  women  from  diverse
religious backgrounds, ranging from Islam to Judaism and Christianity. In her
anthropological reflections on the discussions on dress which are taking place in
online fora,  Tarlo claims that a mutually-shared quest  to  find an aesthetically
appealing and religiously-appropriate dress opens a new space where the values,
preoccupations  and  concerns  of  women from different  religious  backgrounds
converge.  Although  Tarlo  acknowledges  the  limitations  of  brief  online
encounters, which are unlikely to extend into real life situations, she highlights
the potential of modest fashion to forge dialogues across faiths and encourage
mutual empathy and recognition (Tarlo, 2013: 87).
In  addition  to  emphasising  the  existence  of  modest  fashion  as  an  interfaith
category  that  is  not  exclusively  reserved  for  Muslim women,  the  example  of
Hannah’s outfit from the introductory vignette, shows that the hijab is far from
restricted to traditional Arabic/Middle Eastern attire, and can be assembled from
pieces that could be worn by any woman, Muslim or not. Equally, respecting the
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hijab does not automatically render its adherents incompatible with high fashion
trends. As shown by Noora and Barjis in this section, a love of high fashion does
not need to be secular.
4.3 Everyday hijab: the art of layering
As pointed out by Barjis, high couture items with three – or more – zeros are
outside the financial reach of the majority of the British population, including
Muslim women. However,  fashion does not necessarily have to come with an
outrageous price tag. An emerging trend of Muslim fashion blogs, tutorials and
social media channels are further evidence of everyday Islamic youth fashion that
appropriates  mainstream high street  fashion  trends  to  make  them Islamically
acceptable. 
In the previous chapter, we were briefly introduced to  Sumaiyah, a fashionable
niqabi woman from the South West of England who emphasised that dressing
modestly does not equal “dressing like you live in a desert.” When we discuss
fashion in an interview at Cardiff University, she explains her fashion philosophy
further: 
“I know the stereotype or cultural misconception is that niqabi women would only wear 
black – but because I have chosen to wear the niqab it's up to me how I implement it – so 
if I wear fashionable clothing or jewellery with it that's entirely up to me – it's not for 
anyone else to say. It's just for myself really.”
Sumaiyah lives up to her fashion motto. Her outfits epitomise youthfulness and
quirkiness, and possess a strong contemporary appeal. One day I see her with a
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long,  bright  blue  skirt,  combined with  a  stylish  black  pullover  and a  flower-
patterned  black  and  blue  scarf.  On  another  day,  she  wears  a  striking  purple
cardigan  and  a  multi-coloured  headscarf  with  peculiar  small  tassels  that  are
emerging from her head like tiny tentacles.   She accessorises  extensively  and
uniquely. Statement necklaces, oversize rings and colourful handbags regularly
accompany  her  everyday  attire.  “People  are  always  telling  me  that  I'm  very
colour coordinated or they love my accessories – even my students say ‘awww,
Miss, we love your jewellery’ or ‘where did you get this’! So, I do get a lot of
comments about my fashion.”
She  does  not  shop  in  places  which  cater  specifically  for  Muslim women  but
instead  frequents  well-known  high  street  franchises  popular  mostly  with
working class and middle class young British girls.  Instead of going for tight-
fitting  tops  and  jeans,  she  selects  skirts  and  sweaters  in  larger  sizes.  When
carefully curated together in multiple layers, they create unique looks that are in
sync with the latest  trends but  could not  be  found on any fashion billboard.
Several other young Muslim women in Britain follow Sumaiyah’s example and
prefer the high street to Islamic clothing stores. Whilst high street fashion is in
line with the popular culture that they share with their Muslim and non-Muslim
peers – ranging from movies to pop music and popular blogs and magazines –
Islamic  clothing  stores  are  often  considered  old-fashioned;  the  type  of  places
which typically cater to their mothers and aunties. 
Returning  to  the  Museum  of  London  and  the  project  What  Muslims  Wear
introduced at the beginning of this chapter, the importance of the high street in
contemporary Islamic fashion can be explored further. Following workshops and
several interviews, young Muslim Londoners selected five outfits they felt best
reflected their eclectic fashion identities. Out of these five, four were female attire,
with all the items in these outfits belonging to real Muslim girls from London.
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Interestingly enough, all four of the outfits were premised on the principle of
layering  and  were  assembled  from  mainstream  pieces  that  would  not
traditionally be perceived as Islamic. 
    Image 9: Hiba’s fashionable outfit based on the principle of layering high street items
For example, one of the outfits belongs to Hiba, a fashion student at the London
College  of  Fashion  (see  Image  9).  Struggling  to  fit  in  with  her  fashionable
coursemates and synchronically express her Muslim identity, she practises – what
she calls – the urban hijabi look, consisting of sparkling, high ankle boots, a long
black  dress,  a  cardigan,  a  sweater  and  a  high  street  scarf  in  light  grey  –  all
carefully layered to create an edgy look. Another interesting outfit is put together
by Fiona, a young white convert, in an attempt to combine “items that existed in
the wardrobe, and newer items that reflect the journey to dress more modestly as
she came into the fold of Islam” (What Muslims Wear, 2014). Similarly to Hiba,
her  outfit,  too,  combines  several  everyday high street  pieces,  such  as  a  beige
trench coat, skinny jeans, a summer dress, a woollen cardigan, some accessories
and a scarf that used to protect her from the wind but now serves as headgear.
Muneera,  a  Black Caribbean convert  and a hip hop artist,  similarly assembles
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items that represent different periods of her life:  a dress and a headscarf that
reflect her Jamaican roots, statement earrings, a hoodie and Nike trainers that
reinforce  her  hip  hop  identity  and  accessories  that  remind  her  of  numerous
journeys around the world. 
The  examples  of  Sumaiyah  and  the  What  Muslims  Wear team  evoke  several
intriguing notions for the discussion of Muslim dress and identity. In particular,
they assert the idea that the Islamic veil cannot be observed in a geographical and
historical void. British Muslim fashion is not an extension of Islamic fashion from
other countries, and equally, it  does not  conform to high street fashion trends
uncreatively  and  uncritically.  Instead,  contemporary  British  Islamic  fashion
generates a third space – a space that is reserved for a creative fashion solution
that reflects current fashion guidelines, but simultaneously promotes distinctively
Islamic elements of dressing. The hijab, in particular, plays an important role in
female fashion, as it stands out as visibly Muslim. Through the art of layering and
transforming  originally  non-Muslim  objects  into  an  Islamic  dress,  women
embody a dissident subjectivity,  “a disruptive performance that challenges the
normative or stable structures of the fashion system” (Suterwalla, 2013: 167). 
The hijab,  moreover,  captures  metamorphoses  that  are  taking  place  in  British
Islamic  communities.  Especially  in  the  context  of  urban  centres,  such  as
Birmingham and London as well  as  British universities,  these transformations
outline an interesting trend that transcends the field of fashion. Islamic fashion, in
particular  the  hijab,  becomes  a  tool  for  expressing  belonging  to  a  broader
transnational movement of Islamic culture and religion (Bubalo and Fealy, 2005:
viii; Gellner, 2013: 14; Robinson, 2015: 112; Werbner, 2012).
Rather than following outdated conventions of Islamic clothing dictated by ethnic
identity, Muslim women instead opt for hybrid Muslim identities that are visibly
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located in a particular city in a particular time. For example, their outfits are less
comparable to the attire of their older relatives from the same ethnic group, and
resemble their  peer group from the same city,  the same borough or the same
subculture.  The hijab,  in that  regard,  plays an important  part  in forming and
performing this collective identification. 
In  his  musings  on  postmodernism,  reason  and  religion,  the  phenomena  of
embracing  the  hijab  among  educated  and  urban  women is  elaborated  on  by
Ernest Gellner. When speaking about modern veiled women, enlightened with
Islamic values, he comments that “contrary to what outsiders generally suppose,
the  typical  Muslim  women  in  a  […]  city  doesn’t  wear  the  veil  because  her
grandmother  did  so,  but  because  her  grandmother  did  not”  (2013:  16).  Her
grandmother, he maintains, would be too busy working in the fields, and would
frequent shrines with her head unveiled. However, her “betters” who are better
educated and town-dwellers now have the privilege of experimenting with their
dress, and deploying it in order to communicate their spirituality and ratifying
their social ascension. 
As we have already observed in the previous chapter, British Muslim women do
not necessarily embrace the hijab or the niqab due to such attire being normalised
and recommended within their ethnic,  national or family circles. For example,
Sumaiyah  and  Aysha,  who  we  met  earlier  in  this  chapter,  are  both  the  first
members  of  their  families  to  choose  to  don  the  niqab.  Their  style  is  a
manifestation of their own explorations of religion at a particular time and in a
particular space, namely in 21st century Britain.
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4.4 Hijab fashion 2.0
Nowhere is  this  global  outlook more apparent  and flourishing than in  online
spaces.   As  mentioned  by  a  high  proportion  of  young respondents  –  and as
implied  by  an  earlier  ‘anti-fashion’  tweet  –  fashion  blogs  and  tutorials  are
changing the ways in which the hijab is perceived and worn by Muslim women
in Britain.  There are almost countless hijab fashion blogs available in the United
Kingdom  and  internationally,  for  example  in  the  USA,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,
Sweden and Germany. 
Jana Kossaibati, whose blog Hijab Style claims to be the UK's first style guide for
Muslim women, started her site because there wasn't another like it in the UK,
"but since it began [in 2007] a lot of others have appeared," she explains in The
Guardian  (Khaleeli,  2008). Nowadays,  British  Muslim  fashion  bloggers  write
about a number of fashion-related topics. They post pictures of their own attire
and paste links to the online shops selling it; they offer reviews of fashion shows
as well as TV series and magazines that feature Muslim women; they give advice
on  combining  and  layering  specific  high  street  items;  they  react  to  political
discussions and bans on Islamic fashion; they propose make-up styles and outfits
for specific occasions and seasons; they share their struggles with self confidence,
body image and racism, and search for fashion trends from around the world,
both in  Muslim and non-Muslim contexts  (see also  Kaiser,  2012;  Lewis,  2013;
Tarlo, 2010). 
One of the popular blogs Muslim women commonly refer to is Hijablicious run by
two  London-based  sisters.  One  of  the  co-founders,  Samia,  comments  on  the
evolution of the site: “In 2010, we did it as a hobby and so we worked on it as and
when we could but now it's updated 3-4 times a week with regular features on
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fashion, food, lifestyle and inspiration” (Chic Muslimah, 2015). She remembers
experimenting with hijab styles very early on and says that they “tended to go
outside the norm at a time when wearing a hijab was still a very conservative
concept” (ibid.).  This generated an opportunity to  document their  journey for
others.  Although both sisters  have active careers outside the fashion industry,
their fashion involvement does not stop with the blog. They have been engaged
in  numerous  partnerships  with  established  magazines  interested  in  exploring
Muslim fashion. When I met Adviya, one of the two sisters, during my fieldwork
in 2014, she was just establishing her own clothing brand carrying her forename
that is now gaining popularity among Muslim and non-Muslim fashionistas alike.
Just like many other similar sites,  Hijablicious exists as a multi-platform project.
Apart  from  a  regularly  updated  blog/website,  the  Khan  sisters  are  actively
present  in  various  social  media  sites,  ranging  from Pinterest  to  Instagram  to
Twitter.  Their posts vary from ‘Monday Musings’ on various different topics –
from sisterhood to body image – to interviews with inspirational Muslim women
and articles on fashion, dining, travelling and health advice. Rather than being
solely  focused  on  fashion  and  beauty,  Hijablicious is  a  platform  aiming  to
“influence and inspire women” (ibid.) more broadly. It is as much about lifestyle
as it is about Islamic fashion per se.  Although the blog comes from Britain and
commonly  includes  location-specific  advice  and  general  interest  articles,  it  is
inspired by global fashion trends. The reader of  the blog becomes acquainted
with modest fashion trends from the far East to the far West, with many posts
inspired  by  the  bloggers’  numerous  travels  abroad.  Equally,  the  fashion
suggestions stretch far beyond Muslim designers, and build upon trends from the
high street and high fashion alike. 
This  idea  that  mainstream  fashion  can  be  and  is  Islamic  is  illustratively
demonstrated by the start-up Evermodest. Its creator Hannah was frustrated with
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time-consuming  online  shopping  and  having  to  seek  modest  items  amongst
numerous other products. She thus created a website that functions as a ‘modesty
filter’:  it  selects  modest  products  from  various  retailers,  from  well-known
mainstream brands to emerging boutiques. 
Hijablicious,  Evermodest  and  other  Muslim  fashion  sites  exemplify  some
common trends in British Muslim fashion. As already discussed in the previous
section, Islamic fashion is becoming increasingly fluid and is thus transcending
both religious and geographical boundaries. Subsequently, it locates itself within
the mainstream fashion industry inspired by global brands, contemporary trends
and Internet culture. 
Another prominent online phenomenon connected to Islamic fashion comes in
the  form of  online  hijab  tutorials.  A majority  of  respondents  admit  watching
online guides on how to wrap the hijab in inventive and creative ways. Even
those  women  who  do  not  consider  themselves  fashion-oriented,  tend  to
occasionally  experiment  with  different  techniques  of  tying  their  headscarves.
Among them is Aisha, a college schoolgirl from east London. As she is financially
dependent on her parents, her wardrobe is limited to clothes that are bought by
her mother and other relatives. She is not complaining as she firmly believes that
Muslim girls  should  not  be  fashionable,  and  should  dress  as  plainly  and  as
modestly as possible. She avoids wearing striking colours, unusual cuts or any
other pieces that would draw unwanted attention. However, she often consults
YouTube videos in order to find ways of refreshing her hijab look and combining
items that she already owns, particularly for special occasions. 
Aisha is not alone in embracing advice from YouTube fashion vloggers. The latter
category are by no means marginal personalities, but are establishing themselves
as  popular  and  prominent  Muslim  figures.  For  example,  self-proclaimed
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‘YouTube  guru’ NabiilaBee,  21,  from Birmingham has  250  thousand YouTube
subscribers and 450k Facebook fans.  Leicester-based Amena from Pearl Daisy,
with nearly 380k Youtube subscribers, is the creator of the most popular Britain-
produced hijab tutorial ‘How to wear a Headscarf (Hijaab/ Hijab Tutorial): Pink
Waterfall’ with an impressive 2.7 million views. A 24-year old Dina Toki-O, real
name Dina Torkia,  has  60  thousand followers  on Twitter,  and almost  600,000
YouTube subscribers,17 and was in 2014 placed third among the top 30 young
people in digital media by The Guardian.
Despite  (or  due  to)  their  popularity,  hijab  tutorials  continue  to  generate
controversy in Muslim communities. Dina Toki-O’s tutorials, for example, are the
subject of continuous criticism by Muslim women and men who deem her way of
wrapping the hijab haram. Some of her designs have been accused of falling into
the category of ‘camel hump’, a headscarf style with an artificially created bun
that sits high on the head. This style is forbidden by the hadith, and thus vocally
criticised  by  many  Muslims.  Moreover,  Dina’s  tutorials  have  popularised  the
turban hijab. A chic wrap that has been adopted by thousands of young Muslim
women across the UK and abroad thanks to the vlogger,  it  has also attracted
harsh  critiques.  As  it  leaves  the  woman’s  neck  uncovered,  it  is  considered
inappropriate by many (see Muslimbuzz, 2012). 
It is not only specific hijab styles which draw criticism online. The very idea of
online  Muslim fashion  is  a  highly  controversial  concept  in  its  own right.  As
pointed out by Prodanovic (2014), there is an obvious irony: “Posting imagery for
the sole purpose of fashion could indicate that these women are exploiting their
bodies for materialistic appeal.” By publishing snaps of their styled bodies and
close-up videos of  their  faces,  women call  into question the very ideas of  the
hijab. In such images, “the veil serves to entice and intrigue and not necessarily to
17 All figures were updated in February 2017.
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hide”  (ibid.).  This  idea  brings  us  back  to  earlier  discussions  surrounding  the
aesthetics of Princess Hijab's art and the notion of anti-fashion; by spraying black
veils onto the bodies of fashion models, the artist does not hide them but rather
attracts more public attention.
4.5 From mipsters to hip hop hijabis
Muslim  mash-ups  with  globalised  fashion  trends,  facilitated  by  the  Internet,
result in yet another fascinating trend – the emergence of various subcultures and
scenes.  From Mipsters,  also  known as  Muslim hipsters,  to  hip  hop  hijabis,  a
personal style of British Muslim youth actively negotiates their religious identity
and various global subcultures. Such syntheses of different styles fulfil a crucial
role in defining identities that are authentically and uniquely both British and
Muslim at the same time. 
A famous example of such fusion identities emerged in the United States in 2013.
Triggered by the release of a video entitled ‘Somewhere in America #MIPSTERZ’,
the  so-called  Mipster  culture  began  to  gain  traction  within  the  global  media
space. A portmanteau of the words Muslim and hipster, the concept of Mipster
refers to young Muslims – in particular women – who embrace their religious
identity, but at the same time follow the latest hipster trends of urban aesthetics
(see  Shaikh  and  Sharma,  2015:  110;  Uddin,  2015:  239).  The  phenomenon  has
spread from its  American cradle  around the globe,  and has  also  been visibly
present in the United Kingdom. This chapter's leading protagonist Hannah is just
one  of  the  representatives  of  a  younger  generation  actively  engaged  with
contemporary London hipster culture. Not only is she adjusting her outfit to fit
the  trends  –  for  example  by  wearing  a  hat  instead  of  a  headscarf;  she  is
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simultaneously co-creating the trends and thus changing hipster culture to fit her
subjective forms of expression. 
Similar  creative  interactions  with hipster  cultures  are  displayed by  Wahida,  a
young poet and performer from Birmingham, who will lead us through the last
chapter on activism and social change (see Chapter VII). “I’m not perfect, only
Allah is. My job is to find a balanced middle way,” says the spoken word poet
when we discuss the negotiation between hipster fashion and Islam. Moreover,
she thinks that the hijab is not necessarily an expression of good faith, but that it
is  her expression of faith. In her own words, she doesn’t care if Muslim women
wear the hijab or not, nor does she care about the ways in which they wrap it
around their heads. Hers is definitely among the most inventive styles, and her
turbans, wraps and hats are often considered unacceptable by older generations,
and even by her peers. 
Just like Hannah, Wahida, too, actively shapes the youth subculture scene in her
city with her poems, activism, and with her fashion. Her signature garment is the
bow tie,  and she can rarely be seen without one around her neck. An item of
clothing that is explicitly masculine, upper class and British is subverted in an
inventive  manner.  Combined  with  the  hijab  and  funky  hipster  clothes,  and
exhibited on a non-white female body, Wahida dislocates the bow tie from its
original symbolic context and rearranges it into a novel stylistic assemblage. Her
semiotic subversion has a strong message: being a British Muslim is a unique
identity that  can only  exist  in  the synergy of  different  influences,  rather  than
capitalising solely on one.
Subversions exhibited by Wahida and Hannah echo Dick Hebdige. In his seminal
work Subculture: The Meaning of Style (1979), Hebdige analyses Britain’s post-war
working-class  youth  cultures,  and  the  ways  in  which  they  subvert  and resist
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hegemonic  power  through  their  choice  of  style.  Taking  into  account  various
subcultures,  from  mods  to  skinheads  and  punks,  the  meanings  of  youth
subcultures  are  “always  in  dispute,  and  style  is  arena  in  which  opposing
definitions clash with the most dramatic force” (Hedbige, 1979: 3). 
Hebdige writes extensively about the struggle between different discourses and
different  definitions and meanings within ideology,  that  is  always “a struggle
within a signification: a struggle for possession of the sign which extends to even
the  most  mundane  areas  of  life”  (ibid:  17).  As  an  example  of  these  “humble
objects”,  he  mentions  safety  pins  utilised  by  punks  that  are  “magically
appropriated; ‘stolen’ by subordinate groups and made to carry ‘secret’ meaning”
(ibid: 18). Safety pins could easily be replaced by bow ties – as exemplified by
Wahida  –  or  by  the  hijab.  The  subordinated  reclaim  an  item  of  clothing,
disassociate it from its traditional meanings and contextualise it through the lens
of a particular subculture – with dramatic force. 
A similar example can be found in the aforementioned example of  Muneera’s
outfit,  which was presented as part  of  the Museum of London’s project  What
Muslims Wear. A well-known British rapper’s outfits incorporate strong elements
of hip hop subculture,  from the choice of  hoodies to  accessories  and trainers.
Whilst  being  a  visible  rapper,  she  equally  emphasises  her  adopted  Islamic
identity.  These  two  social  categories  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  but  create  a
unique style that proclaims a subculture within a subculture. Just like her music,
Muneera's  clothing  embodies  the  importance  of  faith,  and  embeds  it  in  the
context  of  rap music:  channelling under-represented voices of  Black working-
class people and their struggles for justice and equality. 
Just like subcultures subvert meanings at a connotative level, Muslim subcultures
within subcultures adopt similar semiotic devices and simultaneously perform
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them  at  different  levels:  they  subvert  dominant  symbols  of  power,  Islamic
signifiers as well as objects and practices from their subculture of choice.
4.6 The enigmatic costume
Thus far, the discussion has been centred on external influences which affect the
ways  in  which  Muslim  women  interact  with  fashion.  As  already  witnessed,
Muslim fashion  is  not  a  bare  receiver  of  mainstream  trends  but  can  equally
function as a trend-setter that inspires mainstream culture. For example, Barjis
and  Hannah  have  told  us  about  how  their  creations,  designed  with  Muslim
women in mind, have been popular among non-Muslim customers. “I can’t know
for sure how many non-Muslim women buy my clothes because I only see the
names and countries of the people who order my clothes, but judging by that, I
would  say  that  it’s  50  –  50,”  says  Hannah  about  the  demographics  of  her
costumers. Barjis reports about similar trends. As she is showcasing her work at
the leading global fashion events such as London Fashion Week, she is visibly
establishing  herself  as  a  popular  luxury  brand  across  and  beyond  religious
fashion markets. Apart from catering to non-Muslim women who wish to dress
modestly, the nascent trend of Islamic fashion, moreover, popularises the hijab
itself. A headscarf is thus donned purely for fashion or practical reasons, even by
women who were not  raised as  Muslims,  and are not  planning to convert  to
Islam. 
Whilst British non-Muslim women who would regularly wear a headscarf  for
purely fashionable reasons are rare, some cases can be found on the other side of
the Atlantic. For example, a  Non-Muslim Hijab Network  unites American women
who decide to wear the veil  for reasons other than religion, whilst numerous
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young girls have come forward to share their stories of taking up the veil because
they “found the hijab to be beautiful” (Haute Hijab, 2013). What is more common,
though, not only in the US but also in Britain,  are various short-term fashion
experiments conducted by celebrities and other public personalities. 
An especially prominent example that has dominated British headlines is offered
by  the  popular  television  chef  Nigella  Lawson,  a  white  non-Muslim  English
woman. Whilst on holiday in Australia,  Lawson was photographed wearing a
burkini, a full head-to-toe black swimsuit with a hoodie. Commenting for The
Guardian (Bunting, 2011), Kausar Sacranie who designed the all-encompassing
swimsuit claimed that she was not surprised about the chef's choice of attire. Her
company has been doing brisk business among non-Muslims,  selling  around
15%  of  their  products  to  non-Muslims  unwilling  to  strip  off  at  the  beach.
Commenting on the celebrity's reasons to wear the burkini, Sacranie stated:  "I
knew they would be the same as many of my other customers – sun protection,
modesty and freedom to wear whatever garment they choose” (ibid.)
While Nigella Lawson might have opted to wear the burkini for purely practical
reasons,  the  majority  of  non-Muslim celebrities  and other  public  personalities
usually  do  not  share  this  motivation.  Corresponding  to  the  hijab’s  increasing
presence in the media, there has been a strong torrent of publicly exposed women
taking up either the headscarf or the face veil. For instance, The Sun (Hazell, 2006:
16) published a story featuring Keeley Hazell – known for her work as a Page 3
topless model –  wearing the niqab for a day (see Chapter II). Similarly, fashion
editor  Annette  Lamothe-Ramos  went  about  New  York  with  a  niqab  taking
numerous snaps and summarising her accounts as:  “I thought I looked like a
Batman”  (Lamothe-Ramos,  2012).  With  the  media  deciding  to  publish  stories
about the niqab written by either fashion models or fashion editors, they have
reduced  a  religious  symbol  with  a  plethora  of  implications  to  a  simple
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clothing/fashion  item.  Moreover,  by  accompanying  such  articles  with  highly
beautified photographs of women who would be typically seen in significantly
more revealing clothes, the hijab becomes reinforced as a mystical, fetishised and
erotic garment.  
A similar function is also fulfilled by the hijab on the heads and faces of various
performers. During my fieldwork in 2013 and 2014, a series of cases was triggered
by the popular singer Lady Gaga. After she dressed in a furry niqab, and walked
on the runway in a transparent pink burqa at London Fashion Week in 2012, the
artist  released a song entitled Burqa/Aura,  which leaked in  August  2013.  The
explicitly  sexual  lyrics,  in  essence,  invites  her  lover  “to  peak  underneath  the
cover” and see her naked. In two lines of the song, Lady Gaga also sums up her
attitude towards Islamic attire:  “Enigma popstar is  fun /  She wears  burqa for
fashion.” 
Lady Gaga’s fascination with a supposedly enigmatic fashion object has spread
amongst her fans. Shortly after the leak, thousands of her followers, especially
teenagers, started posting online pictures of themselves wrapped in towels, table
clothes and other textiles under the Twitter/Facebook hashtag #burqaswag.18 
Although Lady Gaga’s utilisation of the veil evoked some positive responses from
veiled  Muslim  women  who  considered  it  empowering  (see  Francois  Cerrah,
2013), most of my respondents were outraged. When I discuss those pictures with
Reema, a niqabi from Birmingham, who was leading us through the previous
chapter, she comments as follows: “It is appalling. The niqab is an expression of
religion, it is not a costume or a fashion statement for making millions.” Salma, a
niqabi from east London, agrees adding that her outfit clearly isn’t Islamic. “This
18 Hereby, swag refers to a popular slang word for a type of style or presence that exudes
confidence.
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would classify as haram by all means,” she says with a reference to a transparent
outfit in strong fluorescent colours. According to her, Islamic dress cannot be see-
through and seductive in its cut and selection of material, and it cannot come in
any bright colour, especially not in neon shades. Both the lyrics of the song and
Lady Gaga’s embodiment of Islamic dress reinforce neo-colonial notions of the
fetishised veil; the veil is represented as a provoking costume, while its wearer is
reduced to the exotic object of the male gaze. 
The case of Lady Gaga is not an isolated one, with numerous other celebrities
similarly  appropriating  niqabs  and  burqas.  For  example,  in  2013  pop-star
Rihanna staged a photoshoot in the hijab at the Sheik Zayed Grand Mosque in
Abu Dhabi, and consequently flooded her social media with sexualised images of
herself wearing the Muslim-inspired outfit and striking seductive poses. In the
same year, reality television star Kim Kardashian followed Rihanna's example of
deploying Instagram for experimenting with the hijab and sharing a beautified
image of herself wearing it.  
This above-described trend has a number of implications. On the one hand, it
shows  how  Islamic  headgear  is  still  strongly  embedded  into  an  Orientalist
phantasm;  when  adopted  and  appropriated  by  non-Muslim  women,  the  veil
radiates mysticism and inviting sexuality. On the other hand, it also displays how
Muslim  fashion  is  reinforcing  its  place  in  a  mainstream  pop  culture.  When
adopted by celebrities, either for practical reasons such as in the case of Nigella
Lawson,  or  to  exhibit  difference and otherness as  with the examples  of  Lady
Gaga and Rhianna, they ultimately popularise the garment in the public imagery,
although not necessarily in a positive way. 
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4.7 Conclusion
Princess Hijab’s image, displayed on the cover of this chapter (see Image 8), raises
a vital  point about  inescapable intersectionality between ethics  and aesthetics.
The artist's black veils, sprayed onto the beautified bodies, may resist mainstream
representational  modes,  but  ultimately  turn  into  a  new aesthetic  form that  is
equally – or sometimes even more – visible in the public  space.  For instance,
Princess Hijab’s artistic experiment, which began in the Paris metro, has turned
into  a  widespread  trend,  with  many  other  artists  adopting  the  method  of
‘hijabising’ and busting billboards across the world.
Princess Hijab’s artistic message is an important one to consider when discussing
the relationship between fashion and Islam, between an industry that is explicitly
aesthetic and religion based upon intangible ethical guidelines. Any discussion
about their incompatibility appears almost to be an irrelevant one, for ethics and
aesthetics are forms that not only intersect but exist in synergy. Even the niqabis
who persistently refuse fashion on the merit  of Islamic ethics,  propose a new
clothing alternative that follows specific aesthetic codes – through their choice of
cuts,  colours,  fabrics  and accessories.  Every dress,  without  a  single exception,
thus incorporates both dimensions, and reflects personal and social ethics and
aesthetics, whatever these may be. 
For some women, like Hannah, Barjis or Noora, the aesthetic dimension to their
dresses is equally as important as the ethical one. They fully embrace fashion and
seek dressing solutions that are both Islamically acceptable and fashionable. They
do  not  perceive  the  two  as  mutually  exclusive,  but  locate  their  styles  at  the
intersection of the two. Other women, such as Wahida, acknowledge that their
fashion styles might not be completely in accordance with Islamic teaching, but
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believe they need to walk on the middle path, thus seeking balance between the
various identities a British Muslim woman unavoidably possesses: being British,
being Muslim, being a poet, being a hipster – amongst others.
Such negotiations once again suggest that clothing is an extension of the Self, as
discussed in the previous chapter. It is a language that communicates identities,
beliefs and values, and it mediates – quite literary – between the inner, private
Self  and  an  external,  public  persona.  The  Self  of  British  Muslim  subjects  is
necessarily eclectic  and incorporates numerous, equally important dimensions.
As observed throughout the chapter, most women – from Sumaiyah to Hannah –
find it important to express their belonging to their country, their city and their
youth culture.  They are not hijabis  from Egypt or Oman, but are hijabis  from
London or Birmingham. 
Just  like  youth  cultures  in  Britain  more  generally,  urban  hijab  fashion,  too,
adheres to highly globalised and cosmopolitan trends embedded in neoliberal
frames  of  production  and  consumption.  Women from this  chapter  have  only
rarely decided to adopt the outfit of their parents or grandparents but have rather
embraced the attires without an explicit ethnic label. Noora buys her abayas from
Dubai  and  her  shoes  from  New  York;  Sumaiyah  and  Wahida  buy  their
headscarves in high street shops; Aisha wraps her hijab following the instructions
of a distant US-based vlogger, whilst Muneera collects and combines her pieces
anywhere  from her  native  Jamaica  to  South  Africa,  where  she  has  travelled.
Picking and mixing is hence a common strategy of British Muslim women and
their fluid stylistic expressions. 
When talking about British Muslim fashion it is thus impossible to avoid British
non-Muslim fashion.  On the one hand,  British  Muslim fashion is  much more
about  non-Muslim  items  sourced  from  high  street  retailers  or  high  fashion
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designers than it is about clothing objects traditionally seen as Islamic. On the
other  hand,  the  exchange  between  the  two  is  not  a  one-way  street.  Just  as
mainstream fashion has had a considerable influence on Muslim styles, Islamic
fashion,  in  return,  shapes  mainstream fashion  in  its  own ways.  The  growing
market  of  Muslim  consumers  affects  the  kind  of  products  even  the  biggest
retailers  decide  to  stock  in  their  stores.  Moreover,  increasingly  visible  and
popular designers – including Hannah and Barjis – motivate non-Muslim women
to don attire traditionally designed for Muslims. Even a step further, non-Muslim
women  –  especially  those  who  are  actively  seeking  the  media  spotlight  –
incorporate traditionally Islamic fashion objects, such as the hijab, into their styles
in pursuit of reinforcing their enigmatic sexuality and stirring controversy. 
Islamic dress is hence not as much about particular items as it is about the context
in which these items are deployed.  For example,  just like the face veil  can be
utilised purely as a fashion statement by Lady Gaga, a mass-produced high street
scarf  can  be  turned  into  a  personal  signifier  of  faith  by  Sumaiyah.  What  is
considered haram or acceptable, fashionable or non-fashionable varies, depending
on the context in which fashion objects are used, and on the person who adopts it.
The  hijab,  thus,  “creates  a  double  discourse,  one  that  seems  to  resist  the
mainstream but at the same time is part of it” (Suterwalla, 2013: 167). Women like
Hannah, Wahida, Sumaiyah, Barjis or Princess Hijab, deploy their veils to resist
the hegemonic power of white and secular capitalism and its beauty games. They
celebrate their Muslimness not only by following Quranic teachings but also by
expressing their identity visibly. While they are, in a way, resisting the top-down
power  exhibited  by  the  mainstream  fashion  industry,  they  at  the  same  time
conform to British consumerism. By supporting high street and online brands, or
by  publishing  their  beautified  photos  and  tutorials  on  their  blogs  and  social
media sites, they are deeply submerged in the global net of consumerism. This is
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not  necessarily  a  critique  of  veiling  styles  among  British  Muslim women.  As
observed  by  Suterwalla,  such  complex  and  multi-layered  strategies  of  styling
religion produced through the interplay of cultural synergy and oppositionality
give them “an opportunity to morph into new Muslim subjects where they can
create hybrid identities beyond Orientalist tropes” (ibid.). 
The idea of new hybrid identities and the semiotic potentials of the hijab to be
interpreted in a subversive and emancipatory manner will follow us into the next
chapter,  where  I  will  explore  how  British  Muslim  hijabis  create  their  own
versions of feminism and gender roles. 
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Chapter V: Veiled feminism
Image 10: Hannah Habibi’s artstic take on Muslim feminism
143
It is a Saturday morning but Bristol City Academy is as bustling as on any given school
day. For the day, the school has turned into the venue for a nationwide conference on
female genital mutilation. It is not a coincidence that the event is hosted in this particular
school, for one of the leading British organisations in the field of anti-FGM campaigning
originates here. Started by a teacher who was consistently facing cases of FGM among
her female pupils, the organisation has now transcended the context of one school and has
turned  into  a  nationwide,  anti-gender-based  violence  campaign.  Despite  its  national
format, the core of the organisation is still formed by young local activists who are forging
dialogues with individuals and entities which play a crucial part in eradicating gender-
based violence. 
Today is an especially important day for these young activists. Dressed to impress, with
folders placed nervously in their hands and excited expressions daubed on their faces, they
are  about  to  address  hundreds  of  representatives  from  educational  institutions,  the
government, the police and the charity sector with a clear aim – to promote education
about gender-based violence at all levels.  
The  first  round of  workshops  is  about  to  begin  and Nawaal,  a  young trustee  of  the
organisation, enters the classroom. She is wearing a long black abaya with a matching
veil and simple black shoes. Despite the fact that she is at least half the age of the majority
of her audience, she delivers her workshop on the abuse of girls in a knowledgeable and
passionate manner. Not even difficult questions during a Q&A session seem to inhibit her
confident performance. This is not surprising at all – Nawaal has been speaking about
violence against girls for a number of years, and to the most select of audiences: as the
official ambassador of The Guardian's anti-FGM campaign, she has addressed members of
the royal family, chatted about violence against women with the Secretary General of the
United Nations, received compliments from Malala Yousafzai, and persuaded the then-
Education Secretary Michael Gove to contact all schools around the country about FGM,
and abuse directed towards girls more generally. 
144
Nawaal is a practising Muslim, and a proud one. Although consistently challenged by
elderly Muslims, especially from her own Somali community, she insists that feminism is
her right. “I think anyone can be a Muslim and a feminist,” she affirms when we speak a
couple of weeks after the event in her old school. “People don’t seem to like that word, the
way this label is used. I’m standing for my own rights and if that makes me a feminist, I
am a feminist!” She has also encountered antagonism from white Britons – particularly
women – burdened with prejudice about Muslim women. Wearing a headscarf,  being
black and being young sometimes make her ‘job’ extremely difficult, she admits. Despite
numerous obstacles, Nawaal is establishing herself as one of the leading feminist voices of
the future generation, who is fighting for her rights and the rights of girls and women –
head on, and while wearing the hijab. 
Nawaal, a young feminist from Bristol featured in the opening vignette, is just
one of many representatives of a young generation of British Muslim feminists
who are promoting the voices and rights of Muslim women, and mobilising their
public  visibility.  In  recent  years,  Nawaal  reports  encountering  countless
stereotypes  and  a  great  deal  of  prejudice  regarding  the  concepts  of  being  a
Muslim and being a feminist,  from white feminists and conservative Muslims
alike.  Whilst  the  latter  dismiss  feminist  engagement  as  a  possible  option  for
Muslim  women,  an  overwhelming  number  of  white  feminist  scholars  and
activists perceive the hijab as a symbol of centuries-long oppression, and as a tool
of institutionalised patriarchy.
The intersection between feminism and Islam is, however,  a particularly lively
field in Britain at the moment, especially in light of the debates regarding the
interdictions  of  Islamic  veils.  As  already  outlined  in  previous  chapters,  an
increasing number of  (self-identified) women, including Nawaal,  feel  a  strong
need to reclaim the meaning of the hijab imposed on them by selected historical,
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political and social discourses, and introduce it as a symbol of both their own free
choice and of profound spirituality. Rather than viewing it as a rigid structure
that  is  imposed  on  an  individual,  these  feminists  recognise  and  build  upon
semiotic potentials of the veil for subverting dominant meanings, thus welcoming
it as a conspicuous insignia for denouncing emancipation without conforming to
Western gender normativity or refusing Islamic values. 
This chapter will focus on these subverting techniques and meanings deployed
by  Muslim  feminists  in  order  to  collapse  rigid  social  structures  that  are
suffocating their  existence.  Following the examples  of  Nawaal  and her  fellow
Muslim feminists, this chapter will observe how women resist and rethink male
hegemony  and  narrowly-defined  gender  identities  as  dictated  by  Islamic
communities, various feminist groups and dominant British public discourses. I
will  investigate  how  these  processes  operate  in  various  organised  and
unorganised movements, artistic experiments and in the media. 
For that  reason,  the cover of  this  chapter displays a work by Hannah Habibi
Hopkin (see Image 10), a prominent feminist artist and white Muslim convert
based in South London. The chosen image of a famous 1943 feminist We Can Do
It  poster with a Muslim twist is just one of artist’s numerous striking drawings
that portray Muslim women in hijabs in ways that deconstruct their prevalent
depictions. “Joining the dots between pop art and Islam” (Di Consiglio, 2013),
Hannah  Habibi's  simple  and  playful  images  carry  deeper  socio-political
implications, as they call  for modern reinterpretations of  Islam, feminism and
their intersections. 
Hannah and Nawaal offer a strong backbone for the chapter on hijabi feminism.
They both challenge the junctures between Islam and feminism effectively and
publicly. They also raise the question about how the hijab can alter and challenge
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certain  existing  meanings  –  such  as  the  hijab  as  a  symbol  of  oppression  or
submission, for example – and how Muslim women can themselves become in
charge of these creative processes.
5.1 Colonial feminist crusades against the veil
“No, of course I don’t consider myself a feminist. I don’t think a Muslim woman
can  be  a  feminist,”  says  Roshan  during  our  long  chat  in  a  café  in  central
Newcastle. She categorically dismisses feminism in all shapes and forms. For the
purposes of her studies and personal interests, the recent social sciences graduate
from  the  North  East  has  read,  written  and  thought  about  feminism  and  its
connection to Islam, and drawn an educated conclusion: the two concepts are
simply incompatible. When I probe her about her argumentation, she does not
dismiss  Islamic  feminism  uncritically,  but  offers  a  well-argued  explanation
without pausing for a second: “Islam is a religion that places women very highly,
higher than men.  Women are giving birth to children and managing homes –
these are more sacred things  than going to  work and earning money,  so  yes,
women are treated more highly than men.” For Roshan,  Islam is in its essence
favourable to women, and being a good Muslim automatically dictates respecting
women. She is, thus, of a strong belief that feminism is not needed within the
domain of Islam as women’s equality, or even superiority, is inherently engraved
in its very dogma. 
Roshan's  explanation  expresses  a  position  shared  by  numerous  other
respondents. Several women – including Sumaiyah and Reema whom we met in
previous  chapters  –  refuse  the  feminist  label,  even  though  their  activist
engagements strive for asserting their  rights,  pushing for gender equality and
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combating patriarchal  hegemony.  Reema is,  for  example,  speaking up against
domestic  abuse,  while Sumaiyah is vocally protesting against the idea of men
making decisions about the wearing of the face veil on behalf of Muslim women.
The  reason  a  number  of  Muslim  women  reject  feminism  is  not  necessarily
because they concur with Roshan’s belief of Islam not requiring a systematic fight
to achieve gender equality.  As with the debates surrounding fashion from the
previous chapter,  many women feel  that  the concept of  feminism, too,  carries
heavy  colonial  burdens.  These  legacies  prompt  some  Muslim  women  to
vigorously disassociate themselves from feminist ideologies altogether. 
As already discussed (see Chapter  I),  the historiographies of  Muslim-majority
societies have been deeply affected by the colonial notions of women’s liberation
being employed to justify domination by imperial powers (Abu-Lughdod: 2002,
2013; Rostami-Povey, 2007: 139). Using the language of feminism, the rhetoric of
saving  Muslim  women  still  represents  a  prevalent  imperial  strategy.  In  her
influential  study  on  women  and  gender  in  Islam,  Leila  Ahmed  (1992:  151)
investigates this concept and speaks about ‘colonial feminism’, introducing the
terms as the feminist heuristics that is heavily co-opted into imperial ideology.
She refers to the case of Lord Cromer who was in charge of indicting gender
segregation, and subsequently the veil, during British colonial rule in Egypt by
citing the noble cause of liberating Egyptian women. At the same time, he was the
president  and a  founding member of  the English male league established for
opposing the women’s suffrage movement (ibid.: 153), which was one of the main
progressive  feminist  movements  of  the  time.  Lord  Cromer’s  double  morality
clearly demonstrates his disconnect with the feminist agenda, and shows how
putting on the mask of feminism helped him redirect the ideas of feminism, “in
the service of colonialism, towards Other men and the cultures of Other men”
(ibid.).  Recalling this  telling example of  the anti-feminist  feminism of colonial
oppressors,  Ahmed  warns  that  the  emergence  of  such  a  warped  version  of
148
feminism  was  essentially  a  deliberate  product  of  the  Victorian  male
establishment.  The  same  discourses  are  still  alive  and  are  now  inspiring
contemporary anti-veiling debates.
These colonial connotations of feminism, however, often remain ignored by some
feminist movements, especially those who mould their agendas according to the
ideas of first and second wave feminism. To recall, the first wave of feminism,
beginning in the mid 19th century, was focused on the fight to obtain the vote. The
second wave of feminism, which emerged in the 1960s, expanded the definition
of the political. Under the mantra 'the personal is political', it attacked inequalities
from manifold perspectives, and sought to improve women's position in society
(de Beauvoir, 1949; Burrell, 2004: 4).  The shift from public to personal reflected
the  growing  importance  within  feminist  theory  of  what  is  known  as  radical
feminism,  which  is  based  on  demolishing  the  systematically  oppressive  and
pervasive  institution of  patriarchy (Heywood,  2014:  416).  Many contemporary
feminists critique first- and second-wave feminism for reducing multiple female
experiences  into  a  single  and  whitewashed  chronology  of  feminist  history,
without acknowledging the challenges, issues and contributions of women from
minority  backgrounds,  of  colour,  faith,  sexual  orientation  and  socio-economic
class, for example.
An example of anti-veiling feminist action capitalising on the imperialist idea of
saving Muslim women occurred during the time of my fieldwork in connection to
FEMEN, the international feminist group, whose political demonstrations involve
bare-chested women with protesting slogans written across their bodies. The day
of action entitled  Topless Jihad was organised by FEMEN activists in April 2013,
following a  Muslim preacher’s  call  to  kill  one  of  their  Tunisian  members  for
having shared nude pictures of herself online. As part of the protests taking place
outside Tunisian embassies across Europe, some activists burned the Islamic flag
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outside  the  Grand  Mosque  in  Paris  and  merged  the  event  with  their  long-
standing campaign against the oppression of women in the Muslim world. Their
campaign featured calling on Muslim women to take off their veils. 
The combination of topless women, flag burning and a protest against the veil
generated  public  controversy  that  was  picked  up  by  the  majority  of  the
mainstream media in Europe.  The subsequent responses  to  their  actions were
particularly  vocally  condemned  by  Islamic  communities,  including  British
Muslim women.  A group of  British  students,  for  example,  plotted a  counter-
action in the form of  the Pride Muslimah Day. In response to the call of FEMEN
activists  to  protest  topless  in  revolt  against  alleged  Islamic  immorality,  the
campaign  was  initiated  by  a  self-organised  female  brigade  called  ‘Muslim
Women Against FEMEN’ to publicly criticise the colonial feminism of FEMEN,
and the idea that “Western feminism knows best for women all over the world”
(Muslim Women Against FEMEN quoted in Bacchi, 2014). 
Utilising various new technologies and the media, women started accumulating
pictures  with  messages  expressing  their  right  to  cover  up  and  speak  for
themselves. “FEMEN stole our voice,” read the posters of Birmingham Muslims
against FEMEN. “Hey #Femen I don’t need to be saved from my right and my
choice,”  protested  one  Twitter  user  pictured  with  a  headscarf,  while  another
posted: “You talk about freedom?! Then let me be free to wear my HIJAB!!” The
women taking part in the campaign were of the strong belief that their voices
should  not  be  represented,  or  even  hijacked,  by  those  feminists  who  fail  to
recognise the multiplicity of strategies to achieve and exhibit emancipation. 
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the legitimacy of naked protest
within the spectrum of political  campaigning. From Naked Bike Rides raising
awareness  about  sustainable  transportation  to  famous  nude  PETA
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demonstrations against animal torture, deploying naked bodies in order to attract
wider attention is a common and often effective method of protest.  Also, it is
important not to dismiss FEMEN's active feminist engagement throughout the
last  decade,  which  has  shed  light  on  the  wrong-doings  of  “three  principle
manifestations of patriarchy: religion, the sex industry, and dictatorship” (Smiet,
2015) in their native Ukraine and in Russia. From advocating for the legalisation
of  abortion,  to  critiquing  sex  tourism in  Ukraine,  to  opposing  the  politics  of
Russian president Vladimir Putin, FEMEN's naked bodies have indeed attracted
global media attention and given a voice to the concerns of women in eastern
Europe and beyond (ibid.). 
What  Muslim Women  Against  FEMEN  pointed  out  rightly,  however,  is  their
problematic  deployment  of  Islamophobic  and  Orientalist  narratives.  By
decorating  their  naked  bodies  with  messages  such  as  ‘better  naked  than  the
burqa’,  the  ‘naked  army’ reinforces  the  very  idea  exhibited  in  Leila  Ahmed’s
concept  of  colonial  feminism.  They  reproduce  and  promote  the  notion  that
Muslim women are necessarily oppressed by their men, and can be liberated only
by adhering to the Western idea of womanhood and emancipated bodies. It may
therefore  be  argued  that  by  doing  so,  FEMEN  activists  employ  discourses
patronise  women  who  proudly  represent  their  religion  rather  than  express
feminist  solidarity  for  the  struggles  these  women  are  leading  as  female
representatives  of  a  minority.  Whilst  the  same  protesting  method  might  be
successful  in  the  case  of  opposing  the  politics  of  the  Orthodox   Church  in
Ukraine,  the  analogous  approach  towards  critiquing  religion  is  not  equally
effective  in  Western  Europe,  where  their  campaigning  approach  feeds  into
existing  anti-Islamic sentiments  that  have evident  racist  and colonial  subtexts
(Smiet, 2015: 16).
While  the  imperialist  implications  of  the  'naked equals  free'  matrix  might  be
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easily detected, a strand of feminists who maintain loyalty to some second wave
ideas push the debates in a different direction. They claim that women should
refuse any supposed remnants of patriarchal oppression, ranging from sexualised
naked bodies to the Islamic veil.  For instance, after I  had published an online
newspaper article on hijab feminism (Sadar,  2014),  I  received an avalanche of
angry responses from self-declared feminists who refused to recognise the hijab’s
feminist potentials. One commentator, nicknamed ‘radical feminist’ complained:
“Wearing the veil  is  like wearing high heels  or lipstick – a sign that women’s
oppression  by  men  has  not  ended.  The  claims  of  the  veil  as  feminist  are  a
complete misunderstanding of feminist politics rather than a demonstration of
political resistance to illegitimate male power” (ibid.). Her comment concluded:
“When  women  no  longer  find  ourselves  […]  as  veiled  chattel  within  men's
religions, we might have taken some steps forward to our liberation” (ibid.).
Although it may be seen as dated, the argument has some fair, or at least well
intended, points. The author of the post defends radical strategies for dismantling
patriarchal orders, which entail the eradication of symbols and mechanisms of
women’s  oppression from any given time in  history.  The female body can be
liberated, implies the commentator, only when it is freed from being a slave to the
male gaze. Just like red lipstick was invented to satisfy it, the Islamic veils ensure
the  male  gaze  is  not  provoked  at  times  of  inconvenience.  The  commentator,
however,  fails  to  acknowledge  some  elements  crucial  to  understanding  the
significance of the veil to Muslim feminism, which cannot be easily translated
into secular codes.
Firstly, as shown by an influential group of third wave feminists who reclaimed
traditionally feminine emblems and consequently gained the popular nickname
‘lipstick  feminists’,  the  act  of  reclaiming  and  subverting  old  symbols  –  from
patriarchy  or  from  colonial  feminism  –  can  be  deemed  more  powerful  than
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simply refusing them (Leach, 2015: 244), an idea to which I will return later in this
chapter. 
Secondly, and probably most importantly from an emic perspective of Muslim
women, it is vital not to diminish the factor of religiosity. The ‘radical feminist’
voice appears to perceive religion from a purely secular perspective: as a man-
made product,  an institution established with a specific socio-political agenda.
Many  of  my Muslim respondents  refuse  to  accept  the  idea  of  religion  as  an
artificial creation. They believe their religiosity is not a simple personal decision
but is something significantly more divine. Their religious identity is – as Asmaa,
one of the respondents puts it – all-encompassing; it is not solely a domain of
adherents’ privacy but necessarily embraces all parts of their existence. Therefore,
Muslim  feminism  cannot  be  explained  by  the  language  of  secular  feminists,
especially when it comes to the discussions surrounding private-public divisions
and consequent gender segregation and veiling.  
5.2 Sexual apartheid
For  a  better  understanding  of  the  problematic  historical,  social  and  political
relationship between the hijab and feminism, some issues raised in the previous
section require further reflection. As exemplified by the politics of FEMEN and a
‘radical feminist’s’ online comment, the veil continues to be perceived as a symbol
of oppression – both for its literal implications, in terms of covering one’s body
and  hence  hampering  its  mobility,  as  well  as  symbolically,  for  it  represents
segregation of women and subsequent gender inequality. 
The  issue  of  gender  segregation  and  its  implications  for  gender  inequality  is
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commonly thrust onto the agendas of the British media and of politicians. Islamic
social segregation of men and women to gender-specific sites, with male places
supposedly shaping the public realm and the female ones being located in the
domain of the private, is subjected to harsh criticism premised on its equation
with  what  Maryam Namazie,  a  prominent  Britain-based  Iranian  advocate  for
human rights and a former Muslim, calls – sexual apartheid (2007).  
Maryam Namazie’s engagement with the veiling dilemmas was especially active
after the publication of  Universities  UK’s guidelines which legitimised gender
segregation at university events. As well as writing extensively on the issue for
various mainstream publications and starting an online petition, she was also one
of the organisers of the rally against gender segregation at British universities. In
her speech during a protest in front of the offices of Universities UK in London
on  a  cold  December  day  in  2013,  she  used  the  apartheid  allegory:  “We  will
continue the fine tradition of the anti-apartheid movement and Nelson Mandela
but  also  the  ongoing  resistance  of  the  people  of  Iran  and  elsewhere  against
gender apartheid by breaking up segregation wherever we can.” By comparing
gender  segregation  to  racial  segregation  exercised  in  South  Africa,  Namazie
suggested  that  Muslim  women  are  subjected  to  analogous  mechanisms  of
oppression to those that were imposed on black South Africans. 
According to Namazie and her Muslim and non-Muslim sympathisers, then, any
form of segregation of men and women – with the veil being a prime example,
and a symbol of this concept – resembles any other segregation of minorities in
any given historical and political context, and is as such a highly discriminatory
practice. Many Muslim women attribute these comparisons, too, to the effect  of
colonial feminism and its one-size-fits-all mentality. 
Among  them  is  Salma,  an  Islamic  scholar  and  activist  from  London.  “It’s
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appalling… what these people are doing is just appalling,” complains Salma with
a worried voice when we discuss the aforementioned initiatives. A week after the
rally, we are sitting in one of innumerable small halal restaurants in Whitechapel
in east London, located right next to one of London’s biggest and most important
mosques  and  Islamic  centres.  Our  table  is  surrounded  with  a  textile  curtain,
which separates us from the rest of the room. Many other restaurants around the
area have similar table arrangements, so as to accommodate their Muslim female
costumers. Women who wear the niqab can take off their veils whilst the curtain
around their  table  protects  them from unwanted gazes.  In the privacy of  our
isolated space, Salma can enjoy a cup of coffee and a sandwich in a public space
without her face veil. While slowly sipping her coffee, she goes on talking about
gender segregation and the erroneous belief that separate entrances for women,
divided  spaces  in  mosques  and  veils  render  Islam  patriarchal  and  Muslim
women  either  oppressed  or  “necessarily  brainwashed”.  “It  just  allows  us  to
maintain privacy,” she concludes. 
Through the eyes of Salma and many other Muslim women, gender segregation
is  seen  as  an  institution  that  is  empowering  women rather  than  suppressing
them. The veil as one of its manifestation is,  thus, seen as a welcome tool for
avoiding  surveillance;  women  themselves  govern  their  social  interactions  by
deploying the veil to regulate the male gaze.  Roshan, too, shares Salma’s views:
“We have power over men, that’s why it’s up to us how we use it.” She explains
this  thesis  further:  for  her,  women possess  inherent  sexual  power  which  can
wreak  havoc  if  not  suppressed.  By  controlling  their  sexuality,  women,  then,
perform a crucial role in maintaining the social equilibrium.  
This thesis is a commonly refuted one, even, or especially, within Islamic feminist
circles, by women who refuse to allow their actions to be informed by the male
gaze.  Probably the most famous criticism comes from Fatema Mernissi  whose
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seminal works Beyond the Veil (1987) and The Veil and the Male Elite (1991) continue
to  represent  the  leading  writings  in  Muslim  feminist  scholarship.  She  is
particularly  concerned  with  the  role  of  female  sexuality  in  constructing  rigid
gender roles. 
Mernissi  engages  in  feminist  readings  of  Islam’s  founding  texts  and  argues
against the compulsory wearing of the hijab. She writes: 
“Paradoxically, and contrary to what is commonly assumed, Islam does not advance the 
thesis of women’s inherent inferiority. Quite the contrary, it affirms the potential equality
between the sexes. The existing inequality does not rest on an ideological or biological  
theory of women’s inferiority, but is the outcome of specific social institutions designed to
restrain their power; namely, segregation and legal subordination in the family structure”
(Mernissi, 1985: 19).
This segregation, she claims, is not something that is prescribed by the Prophet
but is rather something that was introduced by his misogynistic companions, and
those  whom  the  Quran  refers  to  as  al-Munafaiqun (hypocrites),  who  were
allegedly well known for harassing women. According to Mernissi, this male elite
could not relinquish their  Jahiliya, pre-Islamic backwards customs that Islam in
fact wanted to eradicate. Their warped readings of the Quran were actualised in
various laws and practices, including gender segregation and its manifestation in
veiling (ibid., Rhouni, 2010: 116; Vahdat, 2015: 131). Mernissi suggests that the
current debates surrounding the hijab recall Jahiliya customs that are, ultimately,
against the teachings of Islam and are a product of the male elite faction who
want to persuade us that “their egotistic, highly subjective, and mediocre view of
culture and society has a sacred basis” (Mernissi, 1991: ix).  
This leaves us with two important theses. Firstly, according to Salma, Roshan and
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Fatema Mernissi, Islam as a religion (but not as a social institution built around it)
promotes gender equality and gives the utmost respect and power to women. All
aforementioned women agree that female sexuality is powerful, and disruptively
so (Mernissi, 1985: 45). However, what Mernissi sees as a male-led social order
that undermines this power (ibid.),  Salma and Roshan perceive as a conscious
decision on the part of women to take control of maintaining a balanced social
order. By veiling and complying with the principles of gender segregation, they
tone down their power to minimise the risks of a social mayhem.  
Secondly, while all mentioned women recognise female power and its impact on
social  order,  they  differentiate  significantly  in  their  interpretations  of  veiling
practices. In response to these differences, one could claim that their readings of
the Quran and of Islamic history arise from distinct cultural contexts. Mernissi,
born  in  a  1940s  Moroccan  harem,  experienced  gender  segregation  as  an
aggressive and oppressive institution. Roshan and Salma, born in the second half
of the 20th century in urban Britain, have, on the contrary, been introduced to the
institution of veiling as a matter of personal choice, liberated from its history of
subjugation. This thesis  will  be expanded on in the concluding section of this
chapter,  for  this  major  distinction  in  reading  Islamic  symbols  is  crucial  to
understanding contemporary British Muslim feminist thought. 
What was also demonstrated with the example of Salma – as well as Nawaal and
some  other  publicly  active  Muslim  women  introduced  thus  far  –  is  that  the
division between public and private spheres is historically contingent, and cannot
be subjected to normative European comprehensions of these two terms.  This
inevitably brings forward some dilemmas from the side of different feminists, as
– in the words of Pateman (1987: 103) – the dichotomy between the public and the
private is what feminism is essentially all about. 
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For further understanding of this conflict zone between Muslim and ‘mainstream’
feminism, the disparities in understanding the private/public divide should be
discussed further.  Following Aristotle’s  conceptions of  oikos (home)  and polis
(the  city)  referring  to  women  being  confined  to  the  private  sphere  and  men
managing  the  public  realm,  the  private-public  polemics  have  dominated  the
theories centring on women’s subjugated position in Western societies, both in
theory and in practice. Especially after the rise of Marxism and the civil rights
movements,  the  fight  against  this  division  was  reinforced and is  still  present
today, as women demand more access to the public sphere – for example, in the
form of more visibility in the media or at managerial level within companies. The
private and the public  are not conceptualised according to physical spaces,  as
much as they suggest  a different  set  of  responsibilities  and rights  (Burns and
Monro, 2015: 10; Goodman, 2010; Wolosky, 2013). 
Muslim feminists have been critiquing this binary distinction, noting the specific
construction  of  Islamic  space,  which  is  “characterised  by  the  spatial  and
interweaving pattern – the moving between sacred space and time and ordinary
worldly space and time throughout the day every day” (El-Guindi,  1999:  81).
According to Islamic beliefs, then, sacred spaces and rhythmic time cannot be
only private or public, but are necessarily the domain of both. Roshan previously
explained this notion by remarking how raising children is deemed sacred, for
example.  With  this  responsibility  being  typically  associated  with  women  –
Roshan claims –  their  work in  the domestic  sphere  can be  observed as  more
sacred than “a man doing a boring job just to earn money and bring it home to
his wife.” 
El Guindi (ibid.: 96), furthermore, observes how the private and the public are
intersected in a manner that cannot be detected in secular Euro-American spaces.
Many products  of women’s work,  including veiling,  are displayed ‘publicly’ –
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according to Eurocentric standards, as the Arabic language allegedly does not
even have a suitable lexis for describing these distinctions. For instance, an earlier
conversation with Salma in a restaurant in east London took place in a separate
space, created by a curtain (private) in a restaurant (public), therefore in a space
that is both public and private at the same time. With these concepts clearly not
being universally applicable, the veil, therefore, should not be seen as emblematic
of  the  boundaries  between  the  polar  spaces  in  their  Euro-American
understanding, even though veiling essentially continues to be “privacy’s visual
metaphor” (ibid.). 
These ideas illustrate the notion that the Eurocentric conception of the private
and the public cannot be applicable to Islamic modes of space division. Feminism
premised on critiquing the female-male divide according to this binary, then, fails
to incorporate perspectives that are unique to Islamic societies, in particular when
it comes to matters of veiling. 
5.3 Veiling against objectification
The division between the public and the private as well as the idea of regulating
the male gaze is closely related to the concept of  the objectification of  female
bodies. As pointed out by Salma earlier, the ability to maintain privacy whilst in
the  public  domain can help  women avoid the objectifying male gaze.  In  that
sense, the veil  functions as an “empowering tool of resistance” (Bullock, 2002:
216) for responding to increasing sexualisation of women and their bodies, and is
as such a powerful political mechanism for resisting hegemonic gender roles in
contemporary Britain.
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Especially in the British context, many Muslim women talk about the resisting
potentials of the veil for combating the extreme sexualisation of female bodies.
We should recall the street art of Princess Hijab presented in the previous chapter
(see  Image  8).  By  spraying  black  veils  onto  the  airbrushed  bodies  of  fashion
models,  the  artist  uses  the  veil  to  question  the  sexist  mechanisms  behind
capitalism. She raises a question about how hiding one’s identity behind a black
cloth is  in any way more oppressing than hiding behind the airbrushed skin,
glossy  paper  and  innumerable  beauty  products.  By  introducing  alternative
fashion  billboards,  she  challenges  and  deconstructs  the  Eurocentric  ideals  of
female beauty.
Similar arguments premised on the comparison of different forms of patriarchal
oppression, however, too often lack depth, and remain at the uncritical and non-
reflexive level of pointing fingers. 'Men forcing you to veil objectifies you', yells
one  camp,  whilst  the  opposing  camp shouts  'pornography  and nude  adverts
objectify you'.  
The issue of the veil operating as an anti-objectification screen is anything but
straightforward.  Analogous  to  the  matter  of  gender  segregation,  there  are
multiple  dissimilar  and  often  conflicting  theories  surrounding  this  claim.  As
discussed  earlier,  the  feminist  movement  FEMEN  suggests  that  women’s
liberation arises from women’s freedom to take off their clothes and display their
bodies, irrespective  of  the  promiscuous  male  gaze.  Following  this  vein  of
understanding, the need to veil in order to suppress or avoid male objectification
is  seen  as  counter-productive  for  realising  the   female  agenda  of  women’s
emancipation (see Khir Allah, 2014: 239). 
“I  really  don’t  see  at  all  how taking  my clothes  off  will  make me any  more
liberated. No offence but miniskirts and high heels appear quite objectifying to
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me,” claims Khadija when we chat about women’s freedom and objectification.
Sitting in the women’s section of a mosque in north London, Khadija takes off her
face veil and black textile gloves. “It’s not like I don’t want to look beautiful [...]
Yesterday we had a party with my girlfriends. We did our hair and make-up,
dressed up nicely,” a teenage niqabi explains further.  “The difference is that I
want to choose who I beautify for. I want to look beautiful for my family, my
girlfriends and one day, inshallah, my husband. I  don’t  have any desire to be
admired  by  some strangers  on  the  street.”  Echoing  Salma’s  views  on  gender
segregation, Khadija equates liberation with the ability to choose who to dress
nicely (or undress) for. She is not worried about hiding from the male gaze but,
instead, simply believes that her body is a result of god’s work and should not
serve as public entertainment. 
Such ownership arguments  are common ones.  During a Discover Islam Week
held in Newcastle, an all-women event was organised with the aim of addressing
any questions non-Muslim women might have about living as a Muslim woman.
After a couple of hours of activities and socialising over hot drinks and food,
conversations  became  more  intimate.  One  of  the  non-Muslim  women  in  the
audience asked a question about repressing one’s sexuality, which she assumed
was something that Islam does. A niqabi in her thirties who had not spoken until
then and was sitting quietly without her face veil, responded loudly and through
laughter: 
“A lot of people think that women like me are like nuns because of how we dress, that we 
live in some sort of celibacy and are asexual. I wear sexy lingerie, I definitely have a lot of 
sex, and I hope all my sisters do the same, all married sisters that is! I just think my body 
is for me and my husband to enjoy.” 
Nervous giggling ensued, while the moderator of the debate, a young, unmarried
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student, thanked the member of the audience for the comment and rounded up
by saying that she, too, agreed with this claim; Islam does not repress sexuality
nor does it encourage women to hide their bodies. The key lies in taking charge
of, and also following guidelines about, sharing them. 
As seen from these examples,  the mentioned women refuse to be exposed to
objectification from strangers,  be they random passers-by on the street,  or the
advertising  industry.  Unlike  FEMEN,  they  do  not  think  the  answer  is  in
undressing,  nor  is  it  in  displaying their  sexuality  publicly.  Rather,  it  is  about
taking full ownership of their bodies and deciding who has access to it. 
This argument is pushed further by Nadiya Takolia in an article for The Guardian,
published in 2012. The researcher and publicist donned the hijab after delving
into  feminist  theories  during  her  studies.  Appalled  by  the  omnipresent
“woman/sex  combination”  (Takolia,  2012),  she  reports  to  have  taken  several
months to carefully reflect on the issue and eventually decided to reject capitalist-
driven social expectations by covering up. In her opinion piece, she remarks: 
“Though my mode of expression may appear Islamic, and my experiences carry a spiritual
dimension, there is no theological monopoly on women’s empowerment; I really believe  
that a non-Muslim woman could do this if she chose to.” 
Rather than protecting herself from men’s lust, she employs the hijab to announce
that her “femininity is not available for public consumption” (ibid.). In this sense,
the veil transcends a solely religious dimension and becomes explicitly political.
Private is,  however,  always political.  Not only Nadiya Takolia but also Salma,
Khadija  and an anonymous  visitor  to  Discover  Islam Week perform a  highly
political act: it can be argues that repelling the sexualisation of female bodies by
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covering them, they demand a sense of self-worth without adhering to – what
Takolia (ibid.) would call – “capitalist culture’s beauty game.
5.4 #lifeofamuslimfeminist
Muslim feminists do not use the veil solely to criticise hegemonic gender roles in
Britain and in the West more generally as exemplified in the previous section.
Women also utilise it for revisiting gender roles that are considered normative by
some representatives of their Islamic communities, especially men.  
This  phenomenon  is  particularly  evidently  and  vigorously  adopted  by
burgeoning online movements which employ social media channels as platforms
for  addressing  gender  inequalities  in  Islamic  communities.  The  growing
popularity of online Muslim feminist activism has been illustratively exhibited in
the  form  of  a  trending  Twitter  hashtag  #lifeofamuslimfeminist  which gained
popularity  in  2014.  Manchester-born  Noorulann who initiated  this  movement
explains:  “Essentially  the  hashtag  began  with  me  trying  to  explain  the
frustrations I faced as a Muslim feminist – navigating between Muslims telling
you that you don’t need feminism and mainstream feminism rejecting you. When
this happens, there is nowhere you can position yourself comfortably” (quoted in
Graham and Shahid, 2014). 
Her  idea  snowballed and  now features  thousands  of  140-character  long  texts
narrating  the  main  challenges  and  aspirations  of  Muslim  feminists,  which
commonly involve the topic of wearing the hijab. “If only men obsessed over the
education,  health  and  justice  of  Muslim women like  they  obsess  over  hijab,”
complains one of the women, whilst another user objects to “getting lectures on
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how your hijab  isn’t ‘correct’ by brothers who clearly missed the memo about
lowering their gaze” (see Image 11).  
By publicly discussing the veil with regards to men’s double standards and male
control  over  women’s  dress,  the  women  reassert  their  right  to  shape  and
transform the dominant meanings of the veil. They use the potentials of Twitter
to  channel  their  opinions  on  veiling;  by  sharing  their  experiences  both  with
similar-minded  Muslim  feminists  around  the  country  and  beyond,  and  with
those who preach against their rights.
Image 11: A selection of tweets posted under the hashtag #lifeofamuslimfeminist
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In addition to online movements starting with the purpose of spreading Muslim
feminist ideas, Muslim women on social media commonly unite in response to
various sexist or Islamophobic events or trends. In 2014, a meme regarding the
hijab  went  viral  in  cyberspace.  It  featured  two  pictures  of  different  items,
commonly  food,  with  one  in  an  unspoilt  condition  and  the  other  one  being
somehow  deformed,  damaged  or  rotten.  One  picture  portrayed  images  of
lollipops, with one them wrapped in a shiny colourful paper and the other open
and covered with flies. On another meme a picture of a furry chicken would be
accompanied with an image of a plucked one. Yet another featured an inviting,
ripe apple and the other its rotten equivalent, and so on. Images, captioned ‘with
hijab’ and ‘without hijab’, were circulated widely, by Muslim men and women
alike. Synchronically, another trend gained popularity; online users were posting
pictures of pearls in a shell and comparing these images with women covered
with the hijab. 
Numerous Muslim women from across the world responded sharply, including
British  Muslim  feminists.  Shelina  Zahra  Janmohamed,  a  prominent  British
Muslim writer known for her strong feminist stance, for example, writes: “I don’t
want to be a pearl. […] Beauty is not my defining factor. I’m not an object to put
in  a  box  and  be  cooed  at.  I’m  a  real  woman,  with  aspirations  for  self-
determination,  whose  worth  is  recognisable  in  and of  myself”  (Janmohamed,
2014).  A blogger with a nickname Salafi  Feminist  further  reflects  on the anti-
feminist sentiments exhibited in these images. She writes:
“These memes – and there are definitely worse ones online – caricature female bodies, and 
dissect their attire in a dehumanizing manner. I am not sure how this is significantly  
different from teenage boys “rating” girls and women on a scale from one to ten. At least 
such teenage “ratings” don’t pretend to be voicing what God thinks of the women in  
question” (Salafi Feminist, 2014).
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Through antagonistic responses to lollipop and pearl analogies, hijabi, niqabi and
non-veiled  Muslim  feminists  took  a  strong  stand  against  being  compared  to
passive objects whose beauty needs to be protected, guarded and hidden (from
men). They demanded the recognition of their individual agency and self-worth
that extends far beyond their external appearance. Moreover, they made a strong
point in asserting that the hijab is ultimately a woman’s choice, which needs to be
respected – whether she decides to cover or not. 
What is fascinating in these examples is not only the messages that women are
spreading online but also the strategies they deploy in doing so.  While social
media definitely proffers a platform for spreading patriarchal and Islamophobic
sentiments, it can be simultaneously seen as a medium that embodies some core
feminist values: it functions on the principle of democratic participation without
adhering to hierarchies existing in so called 'real life'; it shares subjective accounts
and experiences, and encourages women to unite beyond geographical and social
boundaries (Messina-Dysert, 2014: 10). 
This democratic potential of social media has been recognised by various women,
from  female  scientists  and  business  women  facing  discrimination  in  the
workplace, to women of colour, to refugee and migrant women, amongst others.
These individual women would probably only rarely have opportunities to share
their experiences in person, either due to their physical distance or the different
symbolic positions they occupy in society. This notion is evident in the case of
women engaging in the above-mentioned initiatives. Not only are they scattered
around the country (and beyond); they come from very different walks of life in
regard to their socio-economic backgrounds, professional careers, ethnic profiles
and different views on feminism and Islam – as well as their overlaps. 
Another unique and attractive dimension of social media that is  distinctive to
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Muslim  feminists  lies  in  its  ambiguity  regarding  gender  segregation.  While
gender  segregation  might  be  much  more  determined  in  real  life,  Internet
guidelines of halal engagements between men and women are less clear.  This
idea is explained by Hawa, a Somali student from west London whom we have
met in the previous chapters:  “Twitter’s  a bit  of a grey area really.  I  wouldn’t
speak to single men in real life but on Twitter I can engage with them and I can
say what I want. That wouldn’t work in a face-to-face situation.” This potential of
engaging with men opens an opportunity for young Muslim women to establish
dialogues  and  share  their  perspectives  with  those  who  continue  to  maintain
patriarchal structures. The Internet gives women a platform to approach anyone
without necessarily compromising gender segregation. 
It is thus important not to ignore the emancipating potentials of social media for
British Muslim feminists. As seen through a short analysis of Muslim feminists’
usage of social media, the veil can serve as a good “feminist tool” (Contractor,
2012:  92)  which  grants them  the  agency  to  contest  patriarchy  and  the
objectification of female bodies. Women also employ the veil as a “dialogical tool”
(ibid.), which functions as a catalyst for establishing platforms for representing
themselves in their pluralist communities. By doing so, their messages can reach
similar-minded  fellow  Muslim  feminist,  feminists  with  radically  different
perspectives,  non-Muslim  audiences  and  parts  of  Islamic  communities  that
hamper the progression of women’s rights.  
5.5 The rainbow hijab
The democratic potential of social media is also keenly explored by Muslim queer
movements. Similarly to Muslim feminists, the issue of accessibility is crucial for
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queer Muslim women wearing the hijab. “Hijabs & [b]urqas are part of a Muslim
lesbian/bisexual/queer woman’s identity,” recently tweeted the Safra Project, one
of a few active British NGOs focusing on sexuality and gender in Islam, and in
particular  –  in  their  own  words  –  on  LGBT+19 Muslim  women  and  radical
feminism. The organisation’s prime concern is connected to confronting gender
biases  that  are  prevalent  in  Islamic  law,  and  campaigning  for  inclusive  and
reformed gender roles in Islam. Safra, however, is aware that their attitude is not
commonly  accepted  and  shared.  While  strong  criticism  of  LGBT+  Muslim
movements is generated by the majority Muslim population, similar exclusion is
exercised by non-Muslim queers as well. I will expand and reflect on both.
The synergy  between queer  and Muslim identities  is  still  a  largely  contested
topic, despite its prevalence in the United Kingdom. In his analysis of current
mainstream Muslim opinion, Bin Jahangir (2010: 299) concludes that the majority
of  Islamic  scholars,  including  those  espousing  democratic  and  liberal  values,
focus on the Quranic passages narrating the destruction of the people of Lot to
validate the notion of homosexuality being unnatural, pernicious and evil, and as
such, a crime comparable to adultery or even murder. As already established in
this thesis, the readings of the Quran are manifold; the accounts of homosexuality
therefore cannot be subjected to one single and uniformed interpretation. Whilst
scholarship in this  field is  still  largely absent,  queer interpretations of  Islamic
texts persuasively dispute Islam’s opposition to non-heterosexual  relationships
(see Ali, 2006; Siraj al-Hagg Kugle, 2010).
Those liberal scholastic interpretations of Islamic theology unfortunately  do not
always translate into the lived experiences of Muslim queers. In an interview for
Channel 4 broadcast in 2014, for example, a hijabi from the LGBT+ community
19 LGBT+ is an initialism that stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender. The added
plus sign (+) refers to other groups of sexual and gender minorities that are not included
in the original acronym.
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tells the reporter about the violent attack she was subjected to by her family after
a discussion about an arranged marriage for her: "There was no discussion, there
was no talking, it was just this is the guy, that's it - you're getting married. They
just  grabbed  a  hockey  stick,  and  went  nuts"  (Lynch,  2014).  According  to  the
report,  she eventually escaped the house,  leaving her  family and the area for
several years. Despite being ostracised by her family, she continued embracing
her religion and the veil, as well as her sexuality. 
Unfortunately,  the  responses  these  women  receive  from  non-Muslim  queer
communities are sometimes analogously negative. Returning to the social media
and blogs, numerous users – normally concealing their identities under avatars
and nicknames  –  share personal  anecdotes  about  Muslim gay (self-identified)
women being told off during various queer events on the basis of their visibly
Islamic attire. A user called Pacinthe, for example, reports a stranger pulling off
her friend’s hijab at a queer hip-hop jam, and asking why she was there in the
first place. On their Twitter profile, the Safra Project quotes some white women
saying: “You wear hijab and are a lesbian, that’s bizarre, try to look more lesbian.”
On Black Feminists Manchester’s blog, a blogger nicknamed Sonia shares similar
struggles in a post entitled My Hijab is Rainbow (2013) in a reflexive manner. She
recalls  her  attendance  of  a  national  conference  where  she  engaged  in  a
conversation with a gay person who thought she would not be willing to speak to
them because she was Muslim.  She writes: 
“Without losing my temper, I looked at myself. Did my brown skin and colorful hijab  
scream homophobe!!? The assumption this individual made was that I must dislike gays 
because I’m Muslim and of course I wear the hijab which obviously makes me a more  
radical Muslim, it would never occur to people that my hijab wasn’t forced upon me nor 
was it a religious compulsion, it was my feminism. Further, they assumed I was straight, 
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that clearly I can’t be a lesbian – that could never be, how can a Muslim woman who  
wears the hijab be a lesbian?”
The experiences of Sonia and the mentioned Twitter users indicate how the hijab
is commonly equated with the limited perceptions of gender roles in Islam. While
antagonism spreads from the side of Muslims for supposedly acting against the
Quranic teachings, the responses from mainstream LGBT+ communities are not
intrinsically  different.  Even  those  who  are  frequently  exposed  to  unjust
discriminatory treatment and are subjected to prejudice themselves commonly
fail  to comprehend the struggles of the minority within their minority.  This is
resonating with the earlier discussions on the inclusion – or rather the lack of it –
of Muslim women in colonial feminist discourses. 
The  struggles  of  queer  hijabis  are  yet  another  call  for  resisting  symbolic
connections between the Islamic veil and  narrowly defined gender normativity
that is maintained at several different levels. Just like the example of FEMEN’s
quest  to  unveil  women,  the  preconceptions  about  an  acceptable  femininity
highlight the deeply problematic idea of a preferred and universal femininity that
is promoted by movements that essentially work towards equal treatment and
rights  for  all.  The  peculiar  positionality  of  queer  Muslims,  located  at  the
intersection  of  the  two identities  affected by  constructed  political  resentment,
jeopardises their ability to be accepted by any of the groups representing them,
leaving them rejected both by mainstream Muslim constituencies and by LGBT+
community. 
These tensions between multiple identities that Muslim queer women exhibit are,
then, largely premised on specific and troublesome gender expectations, which
evoke some immediate and obvious correlations to Judith Butler’s canonic text
Gender Trouble  (1990). Introducing the term gender performativity, Butler claims
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that  gender  is  not  a  naturally  inherent  characteristic  but  proves  to  be
performative – “that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be” (1990: 36).
In this light, no identity can exist behind the expressions of gender because this
identity is necessarily constituted by “the very expressions that are said to be its
results” (ibid.: 25).  The subject, then, plays a subsidiary role in enacting gender
roles in order to reiterate an illusion of gender identity – mythical notions of the
perfect  woman (or  the  perfect  man).  These  ideals  are  a  mere  phantasm  that
cannot  be  achieved  but  are,  rather,  categories  that  are  heavily  imbued  with
cultural  ideals.  In  this  light,  Judith  Butler  famously  claims that  gender  is  not
being but always “a doing” (ibid.: 36); if individuals do not ‘do’ gender according
to the aforementioned ideals, they create so called “unintelligible gender” (ibid.:
41), which is not recognised by society because it is outside its gender economy,
and is, therefore, penalised.
What  is  suggested  by  Butler  is  that  due  to  cultural  influences  on  gender
identities, we cannot identify a single universal gender, but need to acknowledge
the existence of multiple gender expressions that are open to interventions and
re-significations. It is here that Butler encourages, what she calls, ‘gender trouble’
– subversions of established gender categories. Such manipulations, she claims,
can help establish a different and a less violent gender reality (ibid.: xxiv). Butler
illustrates this idea with an example of drags who stage a parodic illustration of
subverting identities by dressing, acting and essentially performing roles that are
not deemed normative. 
Returning to the women from this section, queer hijabis, too, work against gender
expectations  and  mobilise,  subvert  and  proliferate  alternative  outlooks  for
perceiving gender identities.  By deconstructing gender norms they promote a
different form of womanhood, one that is queer and religious but does not fit into
the preferred gender concept of any of them. In this light, the veil can be observed
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as  performing  a  crucial  role  in  the  processes  of  gender  deconstruction,  as  it
represents  the  most  visible  and  striking  symbol  of  these  subversive  gender
norms.
5.6 Conclusion
Judith Butler's fluid conceptualisation of gender and femininity both summarise
and provide a critical premise for the central theoretical messages of this chapter.
Although she has never written extensively on Muslims or the veil in particular,
her  theoretical  input  can help  significantly  with  unpacking  the  complexity  of
veiled  Muslim  women’s  gender  identities,  as  well  as  some  central  points  of
Muslim feminism. 
What became clear in the previous section on Muslim women’s queer identities
was Butler’s emphasis on multiple, fluid, performative gender identities. Butler
also acknowledges that these identities unavoidably coexist with numerous other
identities that are not necessarily in competition or conflict with one another, but
can in fact interface rather harmoniously. Butler writes: 
“If one ‘is’ a woman, that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive, not  
because a pregendered ‘person’ transcends the specific paraphernalia of its gender, but  
because gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different historical 
contexts, and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional  
modalities of discursively constituted identities” (Butler, 1990: 3). 
Butler  posits  that  feminist politics  which  insist  on  a  universal  concept  of
womanhood can and should be interpreted as damaging – even when they are
designed with an emancipatory agenda in mind and implemented in the name of
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advancing  women’s  rights.  As  observed  through  the  example  of  FEMEN’s
opposition to Muslim women and the practice of veiling, such conceptions of an
acceptable feminine appearance, of an acceptable emancipation and an acceptable
feminism construct  clear  boundaries  of  exclusion  and inclusion,  with  Muslim
women being a priori omitted from these feminist discourses. Butler is critical of
such  dangerous  generalisations  that  do nothing  but  reproduce  discriminatory
patterns within anti-discriminatory movements and ideologies. She calls for the
required  recognition  and  celebration  of  idiosyncratic  differences  exhibited  by
women and their subjective experiences. By doing so, she argues, feminist actions
can be more productive, as they would appear more congenial to those women
for  whom  the  meanings  of  certain  imposed  and  static  categories  are
“permanently moot” (ibid.: 15). 
Butler’s insistence on transforming gender identities can help us to understand
the claims of contemporary British Muslim feminist thought. As demonstrated
with the examples of Nawaal, Hannah Habibi’s artwork and some other women’s
testimonies  introduced  throughout  the  chapter,  gender  identities  within  one
religious entity cannot be reduced to a single interpretation of being a Muslim
woman. Whilst Fatema Mernissi perceives gender segregation, including the veil,
as an oppressive institution that was imposed on her at the beginning of the last
century  in  Morocco,  the  majority  of  British  women  are  not  subjected  to
comparable experiences.  The meanings of the veil  are therefore not static,  but
change when they travel through time and space.  
The notion of the veil’s ever-evolving meanings and connotations brings us to yet
another  important  angle  Butler  consistently  calls  into  consideration:  the  one
proposed  by  semiotics.  “What  does  transparency  keep  obscure?”  asks  Butler
(1999: xix), clearly suggesting that any representation is a distorted and limited
view of a reality. Her rhetorical question has, in the case of my research, a very
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direct answer in the form of numerous examples of emancipatory readings of the
hijab presented in this chapter, which show that representations of the veil in the
media, historical accounts or various texts by religious scholars cannot be taken
for granted. They indeed reflect only certain realities whilst obscuring others.
Alternative understandings  of  the symbol  of  the veil  emphasise an important
notion that was briefly evoked earlier in this chapter: just like in the case of any
other symbol, the connection between the veil and its meaning is in the causal
sense always arbitrary (Parsons, 1968: 484; Pierce, 1998: 5). It is hence impossible
to  insist  on  a  single  interpretation  of  the  hijab  according  to  the  dominant
definitions  of  gender  roles  and  expectations.  Instead,  it  is  essential  to
acknowledge the subjective nature of the hijab, which continues to leave it open
to  social  manipulations  by  individuals  in  different  socio-cultural  contexts.
Subsequently, the connotations of the veil are consistently subjected to dynamic
alternations through time and space,  and reflect  the norms and values within
certain  cultural  or  subcultural  circles,  including  their  omnipresent
metamorphoses. As such, the veil can be an effective mechanism for facilitating
social mobilisation, with the feminist ideas introduced in this chapter being an
especially illustrative example of that. 
As demonstrated by the women who were sharing their views in this chapter, the
continuous and ritual  acts of  resistance which are materialised in their  outfits
“fashion a new structure of categories” (Comaroff, 2013: 181), which reorganises
the pre-existing relationships.  Women take particular  objects  with sedimented
meanings and re-order them entirely. They relocate the veil out of the prevailing
semiotic domain of female oppression, heteronormativity and counter-modernity
into a novel total ensemble, thus generating a different discourse with a new set
of  messages.  The  most  vocal  of  these  messages  is  certainly  the  one  that
accentuates the significance of female agency and women’s freedom to fabricate
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and channel their own version of the hijab. For Nadiya Takolia it is a political
revolt against capitalism’s ideal body image; for Khadija it is a refusal to expose
her god-made body for the entertainment of strangers;  for Nawaal it  is  about
emphasising the intersectionality of new British feminist voices. 
Returning to Nawaal who opened this chapter,  her activist engagement has a
strong message. A feminist story belongs to all women. Black, Muslim, young and
veiled, she insists on retelling the story of feminism on her terms, liberated of the
secular Western metanarrative that has been marginalising the voices of women
who live different realities (Salem, 2013). For Nawaal and other women in this
chapter, religion is of central importance and they cannot accept its dismissal on
the basis of its supposed patriarchal foundations. “It’s  just about the way you
look at it, if you’re looking at bad things in the Quran, you’ll find them, you can
interpret it in a way that supports your prejudice.  People don’t read the same
thing in the same way, it’s the same for Muslims, we don’t believe in the same
things,” says Nawaal  in our interview on feminism, echoing the other women
from the chapter who emphasise that Islam is not inherently patriarchal, and that
gender  inequality  can  only  emerge  from  its  later  interpretations.  Therefore,
Nawaal and her fellow Muslim feminists call for independent interpretations of
the Quran, known as ijtihad.20 They do not wish to remake Islam but are seeking
emancipatory interpretations within its confines. 
Hannah Habibi’s image (see Image 10),  used at  the beginning of this  chapter,
underlines this notion. Just like she has added a headscarf onto a female figure
from a 1943 feminist poster, the women in this chapter, in a similar manner, add
new elements, interpretations and meanings to feminist engagement. As British
Muslim activists, artists, queer individuals and intellectuals incorporate the veil
20 Ijtihad refers  to  individual's  ability  to  interpret  the  Quran based on independent  and
contextual reasoning in the light of socio-cultural and historical rationality (see Bullock,
2002).
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into  their  everyday  sartorial  practices,  they  prove  that  “they  can  do  it”,  as
suggested by the poster: they have the right, means, creative solutions and will to
define the meanings of being British, Muslim, a woman and a hijabi.
The  idea  of  the  harmonious  coexistence  of  multiple  identities,  and  inevitable
challenges in which they are entangled, will be extended into the next chapter
which will focus on citizenship, race and otherness. 
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Chapter VI: The invisible veil of otherness
Image 12: Georgina Choueiri – A detail from an artwork Veils Mural
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It  is  a  gloomy Monday  morning in  late  February.  Strong  wind  mixes  with  discrete
raindrops as Sumaiyah exits the train in Cardiff and heads towards the main university
building.  The  commute  between her  home town and the  university  takes  nearly  two
hours, and Sumaiyah takes it several times per week. If she doesn’t travel to attend her
master's studies lectures, it is for the social and political activities on campus that she is
actively involved in. 
Today she arrived in Cardiff to help out her friend who is running for a position within
the student union. Sumaiyah puts on a T-shirt emblazoned with a handmade slogan and
grabs a box of halal jelly sweets to attract potential voters. She is ready to start. She is
mingling with the students enthusiastically, introducing them to her friend’s manifesto
and  confidently  addressing  their  questions.  She  seems  to  know  every  second  person
walking down the hall of the student's union and pauses her campaigning from time to
time to catch up on their latest news and gossip. 
“Stop it, you know that I can’t hug you,” she says with an entertained tone in her voice
to one of her male friends who wants to greet her with a hug. They both laugh and carry
on chatting. “I’m quite expressive, I like to think I’m quite expressive even in the niqab,
so it doesn’t make a difference,” she says later when we chat about the face veil  as a
barrier to interaction with her fellow students. With her positive attitude and bubbly
personality, she is a popular girl on campus, and her friendship circle includes Muslim
and non-Muslim students alike. Sumaiyah claims her experience with student life has
been great and blames the “hype” about the incompatibility of British and Muslim values
“when there shouldn’t be”. 
“I see myself first and foremost as a British Muslim. It means I adhere to British values –
my values of my faith don’t contradict British values. That’s also part of Islamic values,”
she explains. A master's student in Islamic studies and a citizenship education teacher at
a Muslim all-girls school, she is a poster girl for British Muslims who are proudly British
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and proudly Muslim at the same time, and demonstrates the harmonious coexistence of
the two identities in her attitudes, actions and way of life. 
However, not everyone recognises, or is willing to recognise, these intertwining identities.
Her  surname,  translating  as  ‘a  foreigner’  in  her  parents’  native  tongue,  reflects
sentiments  she  often  experiences  while  navigating  her  life  on  the  borders  of  many
identities. Whilst she’s seen as British in her parents’ homeland, she is also perceived as
foreign in her own homeland. Sumaiyah is well aware that people often perceive her in a
negative light because “that’s what they’ve seen and that’s what they’ve heard.” 
Fast forward a couple of hours, the student's union is slowly emptying and Sumaiyah
takes this as a sign to leave the venue. “I can still catch the Islamic society lecture,” she
says while checking the time on her phone. Today, they are hosting a lecture on Isa/Jesus
from an interfaith perspective and – not surprisingly at all – the organiser is one of her
many friends. She collects her belongings and rushes towards the mathematics building,
still  wearing her  friend’s  green campaigning T-shirt  over  a  black  skirt  and a  purple
sweater.  A  day  with  Sumaiyah  is  enough  to  believe  her  when  she  comments  on
antagonism she experiences due to her niqab: “If people knew me and spoke to me, I think
they wouldn’t think of me as a threat.”
Shadowing Sumaiyah for a day in Cardiff offers a perfect setting for opening and
leading the chapter on veiling, citizenship and otherness. An active citizen and a
devoted Muslim woman, she knows all of the above-mentioned categories inside
out, and brings them together in a harmonious manner. At the same time, she is
aware of the boundaries that are set by the societies which she inhabits and co-
creates, as we will see throughout this chapter. She is no stranger to the concept
of otherness,  for she has been seen as the Other for most of  her life – in her
homeland, in her parents’ native India and among her fellow students.
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I  met  Sumaiyah at  a  conference on European Islam in Cambridge during my
fieldwork, where both of us were delivering papers. After my presentation, she
approached me with a number of questions on feminism, and we immediately
engaged in a stimulating conversation that did not finish with the end of  the
conference, and is still continuing to this date. It was this very conference that
provoked  my  interest  in  the  theoretical  framework  commonly  deployed  by
Islamic scholars who were giving papers. From W. E. B. Du Bois to Frantz Fanon,
canonical black scholars were frequently referenced by speakers who discussed
Muslim identities in contemporary Britain. The concurrence of the two events,
meeting Sumaiyah and beginning to think about Muslim identities through the
prism  of  race  studies,  will  inhabit  this  chapter,  with  Sumaiyah  and  Du  Bois
holding a reflective mirror for observing the issues of veiling and otherness in the
context of Britishness. 
In his  seminal  work  The Souls  of  Black Folk (1903),  Du Bois speaks extensively
about the veil. Rather than concentrating on the actual physical item, he uses the
veil in an exclusively metaphorical sense to illustrate the concept of black folks’
‘double-consciousness’ –  a  self-realisation of  being different  due to  one’s  skin
colour and the ideology attached to it. He compares the veil to darker skin as a
palpable  manifestation  of  being  different  from normative  whiteness,  which is
inevitably wrapped around people of colour since they are born. Moreover, he
compares  the  veil  to  an  invisible  screen  that  is  distorting  white  people’s
observation of people of colour, thus preventing them from perceiving African
Americans  as  true  Americans.  In  addition,  for  Du  Bois,  the  veil  is  also  an
explicitly  internal  device  that  precludes  the  Blacks  from  seeing  themselves
outside of white America’s conceptualisation of them – hence the term double-
consciousness. 
All these points – that will be unpacked throughout the chapter – suggest Du
180
Bois’ interpretation of the veil of double-consciousness as a helpful analytical tool
for rethinking the otherness experienced by Muslim women, by those who don
physical  veils  and subsequently  wear  a  symbolic  one.  By  no  means  will  this
chapter simplistically compare veiling to race. Rather, the idea of a metaphorical
veil  will  be  deployed  to  illustrate  the  socio-cultural  burdens  that  come  with
donning the veil. The veil in Du Bois’ sense, hence, assists us in comprehending
both the ways these meanings are generated and projected onto individuals, as
well  as  the  ways  in  which  individuals  experience  and  deal  with  otherness
attached to their selfhood. 
This  overarching  concept  of  otherness  and  symbolic  separation  is  neatly
visualised in the opening artwork by Georgina Choueiri (see Image 12). A Beirut-
born and London-based artist has dedicated her painting career to exploring the
concept of veiling. Having grown up in an Arab Christian family and having
lived in Britain for half of her life, she perceived the veil as “a curtain between our
worlds” (International Museum of Women). Reflecting on her work she further
writes: “I couldn't understand why these women had to cover themselves, only
allowing others the sight of their deep dark eyes.  Why was it forbidden for a
woman to reveal herself to the outside world? Why did she have to be hidden
away like some fragile bird in a golden cage?" Based on interviews conducted
with  Muslim  women  around  the  world,  from  the  Middle  East  to  Pakistan,
Choueiri  has  used the medium of  art  to  dissolve,  explore  and reconsider  the
barriers around the piece of cloth – not only physical but also religious, social,
political or psychological. The opening image portraying women in transparent
and overlapping veils is an excellent example of the artist's artistic explorations of
multiple barriers. 
These barriers, these various metaphorical veils stitched by political and historic
mythologies will be questioned throughout the chapter. Through the stories of
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Sumaiyah and her fellow Muslim women, this chapter will explore how British
Muslim women fit and do not fit into the ideological conception of Britishness,
according to them and to the perceptions of the societies in which they reside.
6.1 The veil of double-consciousness
Having briefly introduced Du Bois’ veil of double-consciousness, I will engage
this   concept  further  and  investigate  its  potential  implications  for  discussing
Muslim female identities and the ways in which they are moulded through the
ideas of self-realisation and the acknowledgement of difference. 
As already mentioned, W. E. B. Du Bois (1903) did not draw any connections to
Islamic garments, nor did he refer to Muslim identities at any point in his work.
For Du Bois, the veil is a merely symbolical concept that serves as an illustration
of invisible boundaries that are surrounding, and to a large extent determining,
‘the souls of black folk.’ As evoked in the previous section, this invisible veil is not
a simple emblem of dark skin that indicates palpable physical difference; it  is
rather a reflection of African Americans’ ‘double-consciousness’ that transpires
from the self-realisation of being different due to their own skin colour and the
ideology surrounding it. As a metaphor for skin colour as well as for the socio-
political implications attached to it, the veil, on Du Bois’ account, stands between
the  black  population  and  the  white  American  majority;  it  prevents  black
Americans from accessing the privileges enjoyed by their white compatriots, and
simultaneously disables white Americans' capacity to see the problems of race
and racism. Black Americans, then, navigate their lives through this challenging
dual experience; being aware of one’s own identity and having an understanding
about how they are read through the prism of race. Due to this veil, this “peculiar
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sensation,  this  double consciousness” (ibid.:  12),  a  person of  colour is  always
looking at her  or himself through the eyes of others. Du Bois claims poetically:
“One ever feels his twoness – an American, a negro, two souls, two thoughts”
(ibid.). 
It  is  precisely  these  experiences  that  Muslim women commonly  speak  about.
Sumaiyah is  well  aware  of  the  twoness  –  being British,  being a  Muslim.  She
perceives the antagonism from the side of the majority white British population
“who have not come across Muslims and who have not seen a veiled woman
before,” and their belief that Muslims are foreigners and that their culture is alien
to the British one. “I’m seen as a Muslim who can’t integrate,” says Sumaiyah
about the way the society in Britain observes her. She adds: “I think that’s very
damaging.  It  kind  of  says  that  Muslims  are  not  part  of  this  society.  But  for
Muslims who are born here, this is their home.” 
Despite Britain being very much her home, Sumaiyah acknowledges that she is
commonly perceived as the Other; her outfit – the niqab –  her name and her skin
colour prevent her from accessing the same privileges white Britons have a full
access to. She is simultaneously struggling to position herself in this contradictory
conglomerate  of  identities;  perceiving  herself  as  “British  first  before  anything
else”, as she puts it, and society refusing this label; her family in Saudi Arabia
and India  seeing her  as  British but  the majority  of  British  society back home
seeing her as a foreigner. “Like how damaging is it for people – I'm a confident
girl so it doesn't matter – but for people who don't think like that, how damaging
is it to not have an actual identity – I think that's really heartbreaking,” concludes
Sumaiyah.
It  is  precisely this  feeling of  uncomfortable positionality and ideological  strife
between the two worlds – one reserved for whites and the other inhabited by
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blacks – that Du Bois centres his critical reflections on. What he posits is the need
for African Americans to not only know their own world but also to understand
how the other world perceives them and how this affects their own selfhood –
whilst knowing that the other world will remain ignorant about their struggles
arising from racial differences. This idea resonates loudly in Sumaiyah’s struggles
to position herself comfortably in British society; although she perceives herself
as  an active  and loyal  citizen,  she  is  aware  of  the  negative  sentiments  she  is
stigmatised  with  by  the  majority  British  population.  The  language  Sumaiyah
utilises – for example, speaking about herself as being seen as a Muslim who can’t
integrate – suggests that she is aware that, in the eyes of white Britons, she is not
only a foreigner, but also a problematic foreigner.  
To explain this further, Sumaiyah tells me that she is not regularly told  directly
that she is a Muslim who can’t integrate, nor do people call her a foreigner in
face-to-face interactions. However, she is strongly  aware that tension surrounds
her like an invisible veil, suggesting prejudice that is not vocalised but does exist.
Du Bois documents this exact tension. He writes: 
“Between me and the other world there is ever an unmasked question: unasked by some 
through feelings of delicacy; the others through the difficulty of rightly framing it. All,  
nevertheless, flutter round it. They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me  
curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly, How does it feel to be a
problem?  They  say,  I  know an  excellent  colored  man  in  my  town;  or,  I  fought  at  
Mechanicsville; or, Do these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At these I smile, or 
am interested, or reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. How does it 
feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word” (1903: 11).
Here,  the concept  of  ‘being a problem’ is  suggested at  two different  levels.  It
exists amongst the majority privileged population whose emphatic gaze fails to
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penetrate the invisible racialised veil. Secondly, this belief is internalised by the
Other as well;  even when unspoken, the lingering sensation of being a problem
continues to wrap their presence – just like a veil. To put it differently, although
people on the street might not call Sumaiyah a problem in her presence, she is
aware they do think of her as a problematic element of their society.
Even though Du Bois' work focuses on the experiences of African Americans, it
resonates more widely. Nasar Meer (2010) asserts the importance of Du Bois for
studying Muslims and citizenship in contemporary Europe. He claims that Du
Bois  bequeaths  us  an  important  corpus  of  work which  can help  us  “theorise
minority  social  formations  that  strive  for  an  elevation  of  their  civic  status,
specifically  through  the  incorporation  of  their  difference  into  prevailing
citizenship  practices”  (ibid.:  31).  Meer  applies  the  concept  of  double-
consciousness to describe the twoness of European Muslims who continue to be
subjected to the processes of othering. I take this argument further and deploy it
for contextualising the otherness of veiled women in Britain. 
The veil – with (remote) similarities to skin colour – is an emblem of difference
for arbitrary reasons. It is not just a piece of cloth – it is a highly politicised piece
of cloth. It is not the cloth per se that obstructs integration, if I return back to
Sumaiyah’s example. It is the work of ideological implications that are embroiled
deep into the fabric,  weaving an invisible veil  over the physical one. This veil
automatically  renders  women  ineligible  for  access  to  certain  privileges,  for
example holding specific jobs or walking down the street without being stared at
or even harassed. At the same time, women themselves recognise that the veil
distorts  the  ways  in  which  they  are  seen  by  society  –  as  evident  from  the
language and examples used by Sumaiyah earlier on.
Many, if not most, of other hijabis and niqabis share reflections that are similar to
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Sumaiyah's. Another brief example comes from a Twitter user and hijabi named
Brown  Shakespeare.  Her  name  –  a  combination  of  brownness  as  a  symbolic
adjective  for  her  non-white  and  immigrant  origin  and  Shakespeare  as  the
ultimate emblem of Britishness – suggest the 'twoness', as Du Bois would put it,
of  two  identities.  In  her  tweet,  Brown  Shakespeare  compares  the  hijab  to  a
flashing  sign  which  reads:  “Yo  people,  I'm  an  alien.”  In  a  conversation  with
another Twitter user, she then complains about how this alien identity tends to be
seen  as  incompatible  with  British  identity,  saying:  “I  think  it's  more  people
conflating hijab with 'otherness'.  Some alien identity that is  incompatible with
British way of life.” This Twitter user connects the actual material veil and the
ideological weight that comes with it. 
Following this idea, women are inevitably wearing two veils: a physical one and
an invisible one. It  is  the latter that comes with the baggage – in many ways
similar  to  skin  colour.  That  said,  comparing  the  veil  with  skin  colour  is  a
dangerous avenue, for a removable piece of cloth cannot be simply compared to
skin. The veil can be removed, which is not the case with one's skin. For example,
in the chapter on fashion, we met Noora, who decided to remove her hijab in the
post-9/11  period  in  order  to  protect  herself  and  her  daughter  from  potential
Islamophobic attacks. This choice cannot be assumed by people of colour: the veil
in Du Bois’ sense is an organic part of one's being and is with an individual from
the cradle to the grave. 
However, it is important not to overlook an emic perspective on the matter on
being  Muslim.  It  was  at  the  aforementioned  conference  where  a  burning
discussion  surrounding  race  and  religion  developed  among  some  of  the
participants.  “It’s  not  my  choice  to  be  a  Muslim,  I  am a  Muslim,”  said  one,
implying that religion is not something one chooses but is bigger than that. This
idea is echoed by Saba Mahmood (2013: 81) whose discussions on controversial
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Danish cartoons21 deconstructs the normative idea that being Muslim is simply a
matter of choice. Mahmood challenges the presumptions of the civil law tradition
“in which the epistemological status of religious belief has come to be cast as
speculative  and  therefore  less  'real'  than  the  materiality  of  race  and biology”
(ibid.). Reducing religion to a simple set of beliefs is further reflected in claims
about what “counts as evidence, materiality, and real versus psychic or imagined
harm” (ibid.).
This idea was briefly evoked in the previous chapters which brought forth the
concept  of  Islam  not  being  translatable  into  Christian,  secular  or  Eurocentric
codes.22 The religion is seen as all-encompassing, and as such grander than the
individual’s personal choice. Sumaiyah agrees; she deems the niqab to be a part of
her body and her selfhood, not just an item she dons in the morning and can
choose to take off whenever she decides to.
Similar sentiments are shared by her fellow niqabi Rahena Sidat from Leicester,
who was attacked on the street and had the veil torn from her face by a stranger.
"To some people the removal of a veil may be a very minor thing, but for me he
may as well have touched my body,” she commented to the Leicester Mercury
(2014) and added: "That is what the veil means. It is a part of me. I have been
wearing  it  for  nearly  16  years  and  I  feel  naked  without  it.  He  invaded  my
personal space, my privacy. It is not like touching my coat; it was as bad as him
touching my body." For Rahena and Sumaiyah, a veil is not just another piece of
clothing but is an integral part of their selfhood. 
21 In  September  2015,  the  Danish  newspaper  Jyllands-Posten published  several  cartoons
depicting  Prophet Mohamed. Supposedly satirical cartoons evoked multiple complains
and  eventually led to international protests. 
22 Some theorists claim that secular and Christian can be used interchangeably. For example,
in her discussion on Edward Said's Orientalism, Gil Anidjar states that "secularism is a
name Christianity gave itself when it invented religion, when it named its other or others
as religions" (2008: 48).  As a result,  Christianity can be thus seen as 'neutral',  which is
particularly interesting when observing how religions are perceived in (European) public
spheres and what becomes permissible or forbidden, e.g. wearing a cross versus wearing
the hijab. 
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Back at the conference venue, the debate continued and many participants agreed
with the idea of being born Muslim. Even self-proclaimed moderate Muslims,
who approached the subject pragmatically and distanced themselves from the
aforementioned  divinity  argument,  acknowledged  that  it  is  not  so  simple  to
“escape” a Muslim identity. For the majority of Muslims it is their name, their
family background, their ethnic origin and physical appearance, alongside skin
colour, that swiftly announce their ‘problematic difference’– to refer back to Du
Bois and Meer. 
In one of the previous chapters,  Shanaya, a woman of Mauritian descent who
resides  in  a  predominantly  white  neighbourhood,  told  us  the  story  of  being
subjected to racism due to her appearance. Realising she was ‘the Other’ whether
she wanted it or not due to her dark skin colour, she decided to take up the veil
and practise her religion the way she wanted. She knew that the invisible veil of
race could not be removed, and donning an additional veil did not drastically
alter the way society perceived her. Racism, she agrees, is an issue for Muslim
women,  and it  is  absolutely  vital  to  acknowledge the  racial  dimension  when
discussing  the  prejudice  against  veiling  in  the  United  Kingdom.  A Muslim
identity,  especially an identity of veiled women, is  inevitably a racialised one,
thus making Du Bois’ metaphor of an invisible veil highly relevant. 
6.2 Hoodies and hijabs, race and religion
Although  the  history  and  experiences  of  black  descendants  of  transatlantic
slavery and British Muslims of a South Asian, North African or Middle Eastern
ethnic background, to mention just a few examples, are vastly different, it is not
difficult  to  see  the  common patterns  of  racialisation  they  are  all  undergoing.
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When I  speak about  racialisation I  embrace  the working definition coined by
Robert  Miles  (1989:  76)  who maintains  that  racism is  a product  of  social  and
historical processes of racialisation, whereby certain somatic characteristics – real
and  imagined  –  become  introduced  as  either  superior  or  inferior.   Miles
emphasises that these characteristics, and the meanings attached to them, are not
static entities but undergo transformations across time and space. In response to
Miles’ definition of racialisation, Cole (2009: 29) investigates the meaning of the
word ‘somatic’. Quoting common dictionary definitions, he claims that somatic
refers  to  things  that  are  pertaining  to  the  body  in  the  broadest  sense.
Subsequently, one can claim that people can be and are racialised on the grounds
of clothing, with Islamic headgear providing a practical example for this theory. 
The parallels between these two types of racialisation, one based on allegedly
biological features and one grounded in religious clothing, have been commonly
highlighted by British  activists  who recognise  the  importance  of  emphasising
racist patterns in different minority discourses. One illustrative example occurred
in the spring of 2012, following two murders that took place close to each other in
the United States. Travyon, a black teenager in a hoodie, and Shaima, an Iraqi-
American woman in a hijab, were killed brutally in – what it was then thought –
were  hate  homicides.23 These  two  brutal  crimes  evoked  strong  reactions  in
Britain,  where  both  black  and  Muslim  activists  recognised  themselves  in  the
archetypes that majority American and British societies discard as unwanted. A
series of solidarity events was organised in London and elsewhere in the United
Kingdom, both commemorating the victims as well as raising awareness about
the  danger  of  discourses  that  condemn minorities.  The overarching  theme of
these demonstrations were hoodies and hijabs as two symbols of otherness in the
'Western' world, with hoodies being associated with black youngsters and hijabs
23 The death of Shaima Alawadi was initially seen as a hate crime due to the note left with 
the body. However, it was eventually her husband who was charged with killing her.
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referring to the Muslim minority, especially visibly Muslim women. 
To  complement  the  protests,  social  media  users  shared  photos  of  themselves
condemning racism in all shapes and forms. One user, for instance, tweeted: “In a
supremacist world, hijabs and hoodies affect your life expectancy.” Another user
shared the following post: “Hoodie or hijab; racism is racism. I’m Iraqi & I want
justice for Trayvon.” During Trayvon Martin’s family’s visit to London – attended
by  many  Muslim  women  –  spoken  word  poet  Zita  Holbourne  performed  a
touching poem about the similarities between hijabs and hoodies. Sitting on the
stage of the University of London Union, she recited:
“Hijabs and hoodies,  deemed baddies not goodies,  blamed for society’s ills,  justifying  
reason to kill, looking for a scapegoat, taking us by the throat or with the shot of a gun, no
need after to hide or run, because the law doesn’t protect the victim, it defends them, the 
murders and racists, endorsing their hatred. […]
But really it is about the race, the religion, the face of the person wearing not what they 
are  wearing.  Call  it  ignorance  of  fiery  but  it  is  the  hatred  of  being  racist,  
Islamophobic, xenophobic, thinking that justifies the theft of lives…” 24
What the activist poet clearly asserts here is the idea that clothes themselves are
irrelevant in the discourses of xenophobic hatred. It is the invisible veil – “the
race, the religion, the face of the person wearing” as Zita Holbourne puts it – that
motivates the emergence of racist hatred. The visible veil is just another item in
the assemblage of visible symbols that have been hijacked to justify racist hatred.
In  a  way  similar  to  skin  colour,  the  veil  has  turned  into  a  demarcation  of
undesirable alterity through a conscious and deliberate process of othering which
serves to legitimise the excommunication of a certain strata of society and for
24 This is my transcript of the performed poem and thus might not be entirely accurate. 
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denouncing white supremacy. 
Expanding on the concept of white supremacy, Frantz Fanon writes about the
need to produce blackness prior to constructing the concept of whiteness. In Black
Skin, White Masks (1967 [1952]), Fanon talks about the concept of blackness as a
product of white colonial society. For generating its dominant social position and
banishing its collective guilt, whiteness needs to create a counterpart, onto which
it  can  project  negative  sentiments  and  meanings.  This  counterpart  has  to  be
mutually exclusive and absolute, as it is only then that the concept of whiteness
can  be  seen  as  a  unified  and  stable  identity.  The  concepts  of  whiteness  and
blackness  are,  thus,  both  highly  essentialised,  for  only  when  the  boundaries
between the two are clear cut, can the idea of white supremacy be effective. The
Other – the projection of all impurities and incongruities – is used as the ultimate
scapegoat for the atrocities, crimes and guilt of the whites. 
Alia Al-Saji (2010: 875-902) draws illuminating parallels between Fanon’s theory
on the construction of blackness and Muslim female identities that were brought
forward in another of  Fanon's  seminal works,  entitled  Dying Colonialism (1965
[1959]).  In  the chapter  Algeria  Unveiled (ibid.:  35-67),  already discussed in this
thesis, Fanon speaks about the French initiative to unveil Algerian women as part
of its 1930s colonial project. The veil, on Fanon’s account, was not seen as a mere
item of clothing but a symbol for Algerian culture and Islam more generally. In
the  analysis  of  his  work,  Al-Saji  notes  the  similarities  between  mechanisms
deployed in both Fanon’s works. The French coloniser saw the veil  as unified
attire – overlooking the vast variety of veils sported by Algerian women; in a
similar  manner,  he  perceived  the  Algerian  culture  and  Islam  as  equally
homogeneous and essentialised (ibid.: 882-887). The category of Algerian Muslim
women served as an absolute category onto which the coloniser projected the
negative features and located it in binary opposition to whiteness. 
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To wrap up this theoretical detour into Fanon's work, it  could be argued that
Muslim and black identities share strong similarities in terms of the analogous
processes of racialisation they undergo in predominantly white societies. They
are  essentialised,  homogenised  and  totalised  as  absolute  categories  with  the
deliberate intention of justifying the supremacy of whiteness. Similar to the black
population in the context of the pre-civil rights United States, or veiled Muslim
women  in  colonised  Algeria,  British  minorities  face  comparable  social
antagonism from the groups in power. 
To conclude, when discussing the Islamic veil in the United Kingdom it is vital to
acknowledge a strong interlink between race and religion. Yulia Egorova (2015:
494) points to a growing body of literature highlighting that the racialisation of
religion has been “occurring throughout the history of Christianity's encounters
with  non-Christian  groups  and  in  the  contemporary  Western  world,”  which
resulted in the category of race becoming co-constituted with religion. Discussing
the status of Muslim women in British society is impossible without taking into
account British historical engagements with those countries from which a high
proportion of Muslim communities initially emigrated, and the role whiteness
has played in defining British identity throughout recent centuries. 
Secondly, it is important to reinforce the idea that discrimination in any shape or
form is necessarily a societal product based on socially defined categories rather
than biological  facts.  Whilst  racism against  African-Americans  is  dramatically
different to discrimination of British veiled women, both groups of people share
comparable  experiences  of  walking  through  life  with  metaphorical  veils  that
announce their difference both internally and externally.
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6.3 The otherness of white hijabis
As established in the previous section,  the otherness of  Muslim women often
stems  from  deep-rooted  racism  and  a  colonial  preference  of  whiteness,  as
demonstrated with Sumaiyah’s experience of feeling like a stranger in her own
country or Shanaya’s realisation of being the Other – regardless of her clothes or
behaviour. As already mentioned, the somatic elements that profile 'the Other'
and subject them to racialisation are not limited to supposed biological features
but can incorporate other visible categories, including clothes. An illustration of
racialisation  based  on  clothing  styles  can  be  found  in  the  example  of  white
Muslim women, especially those who have converted from non-religious or other
religious backgrounds. 
Women who are born white, secular/Christian and English tend to be less often
subjected to discriminatory othering than women of colour and minority ethnic
backgrounds, as they are not born with racialised invisible veils. This is, however,
not to  ignore the existence of  other  potential  invisible  veils,  such as a  visible
disability or socio-economic class. However, for several women I have spoken to,
the conversion to Islam and their decision to embrace Islamic dress was their first
major experience of being ostracised on the basis of their appearance and identity.
Among them is Emma, a white convert from east London, who experiences the
effects of Islamophobia first hand and “traumatically,” as she puts it. Raised as a
Christian girl, she converted to Islam in her mid-teens, following the example of
her  older  sister  who  found  adopting  Islam  a  solution  for  escaping  on-going
conflicts in their immediate family. Accepting her sister's invitation to join her for
social and religious events at a local mosque, Emma, too, found allies, friends and
family among Muslim sisters who provided the needed warmth in times when
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she needed it most. Her conversion did not immediately affect her appearance.
Being a young school girl, she did not want to attract unnecessary attention in
class  in  the middle of  a  school  year,  and she  wanted to  ease her  family  into
accepting her choice. 
However, with a new school year and starting at a new college, Emma recalls that
she decided to manifest her new religious identity visibly by embracing the hijab.
She remembers how the veil immediately altered the ways in which she was now
seen by society when in public spaces – from sitting in a classroom to walking on
the streets of London. And with the change came Islamophobia. In addition to
passing comments in the street, she also experienced prejudice at work, which
was already described in one of the previous chapters (see Chapter III). Coming
into a new traineeship at a restaurant, her boss was – according to Emma – visibly
annoyed by her appearance, and made some remarks about the incompatibility of
a headscarf  with health and safety requirements.  Having carried out all  prior
correspondence  via  email  and  telephone,  Emma’s  name  and  accent  did  not
prepare the boss for accepting a Muslim girl into her team. 
The  worst  resentment,  however,  was  displayed  by  Emma’s  father.  Emma
remembers how, following her sister’s conversion, her dad and her sister had a
serious argument which resulted in the severing of all  the ties between them.
Emma did not think the same thing could possibly happen to her: “I’ve always
been my daddy’s little girl. Out of all our sisters, I was always his favourite one.”
Before she had a chance to collect enough courage to approach her dad, he had
already  found  out  about  Emma’s  conversion  through  word  of  mouth.  She
remembers: “He called me and shouted at me. He didn't let me explain anything.
He said that I wasn't his daughter any more. I couldn't say anything, I still can't
say anything. I'm not his daughter anymore.”
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The  case  of  Emma  demonstrates  the  level  of  hatred  that  is  attached  to  the
invisible  veil  of  being  a  Muslim.  Not  only  did  prejudice  against  Muslims
jeopardise her professional recognition; the fact that her own father was willing
to disown his ‘favourite daughter’ is far more telling. Emma is not sure about the
genesis of her dad's prejudice towards Islam, as he has never spoken to her about
it. Whether his disapproval was of political, social or theological nature, he was
willing to cut all ties with her on the basis of her conversion. He was not willing
to meet her half way and discuss her motivations behind embracing Islam. Her
conversion  to  Islam  meant  that  Emma's  relationship  with  her  dad  was
terminated.
Emma's  story  is  not  an  isolated  example  of  white  converts  experiencing
Islamophobia. During my fieldwork, I attended an event featuring Lauren Booth,
a  renowned English  journalist  and commentator  (also  known as  Tony Blair’s
sister-in-law), who spoke about her own personal experiences of Islamophobia
and  the  media.  Similarly  to  Emma,  Lauren  Booth,  too,  has  experienced  a
transformation – as she puts it – from being “a 6 foot white European member of
the  master  race”  to  the  US  Homeland  Security  asking  her  “Do  you  speak
English?”  at  the  border  control.   Being  a  public  personality,  her  conversion
challenged both her private and public life. She experienced Islamophobia at an
intimate level – for example by observing her white, blond, English daughters
being  bullied  simply  for  having  accepted  faith.  Moreover,  she  was  attacked
publicly in the media sphere. During her talk, she showed us an article published
in The Independent reading: “What sort of woman freely converts to a religion
which supports the oppression, torment and murder of thousands of Christians,
homosexuals and spirited women, worldwide, every year? The sort of woman
who writes love letters to a serial killer, I reckon” (Burchill, 2010).
In an attempt to comprehend this sudden shift from being a respectable journalist
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to being degraded as a second-class citizen, Lauren Booth reflected on the effect
of  the  media  –  the  area  that  she  knows  best.  Being  an  absolute  insider,  she
understood  how  media  discourses  are  produced  and  reproduced.  She  spoke
about  how journalists  and columnists  are  pressurised by editors  with  a  clear
marketing  agenda.  With  the  media  competing  to  sell  more,  journalists  –
according to Booth – appropriate their opinion to fit the preferred narrative. With
the Murdoch media empire, she stated, a single story of the Muslim Other always
prevails. 
As already demonstrated in the introductory chapter on etic discourses on the
veil, antagonism towards Islamic garments has emerged through the interplay of
various historical  discourses that  served socio-political  schemas of demonising
the Muslim Other for the purposes of asserting power, with the same agenda
being nowadays replicated by the media and party politics. As pointed out by
Esra Özyürek  in her analysis of German converts to Islam, the case of converts
bring forth an extra layer of complexities as it provokes “new anxieties about the
changing  realities  of  being  European”  (2014:  136),  and  in  this  case,  of  being
British. The converts thus expose national apprehensions about a British identity
and its potential future alternations. Booth’s personal experiences with the media,
and  its  reaction  to  her  conversion,  illustrate  how  these  anxieties  and  hatred
towards Muslims are generated in the realm of hegemonic media and how they
influence the lay audience, potentially also including Emma’s father. 
Although Islamophobia is often intertwined with racism, and imitates its modes
of operation, the stories of Emma and Lauren Booth demonstrate how the idea of
a  Muslim foe  stretches  beyond the  notion  of  race.  Born  and  bred  as  English
Christians,  both  women  underwent  a  transformation  into  unwanted  aliens
literally in seconds. By taking up something as simple as a relatively small piece
of fabric, they also donned an invisible veil of prejudice. This act has changed
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how they are now perceived by society – by officials, by employers, their family,
friends and the media. This idea, once again, establishes parallels between the
mechanisms of biological determinism and Islamophobia, and brings us back to
the writings of Du Bois and Fanon. Demonising visible indicators of difference
facilitates  the  reinforcement  of  preferred  collective  identities.  Being  a  fully-
fledged  British  citizen  presupposes  whiteness  and  a  Christian/secular
background. Any deviations from this norm result in social sanctions.  In the case
of Emma and Lauren Booth, embracing Islam – and especially taking up the veil –
pushed them onto the symbolic margins of British society, despite having been
born white and British.
6.4 Unavoidable Islamophobia
The imposed status of unwanted citizens legitimises and justifies discrimination
against  veiled  women.  As  already observed,  women are  often  excluded from
various  social  circles,  be  they  professional  or  intimate.  Additionally,  such
resentment  is  not  limited  to  social  isolation  but  is  commonly  materialised  in
verbal and physical abuse. Not a single veiled woman I have spoken to for the
purposes  of  this  research could say she that  has never been subjected to  any
abuse on the basis of her appearance. Not a single woman has gone through life
without  feeling  threatened  due  to  her  attire.  The  women  appear  unison  in
recognising Islamophobia as one of the biggest hurdles in their lives. 
Although  Emma  and  Lauren  Booth,  alongside  the  overwhelming  majority  of
other respondents, frequently cite Islamophobia to describe their experience of
discrimination at a personal and institutional level, it is paramount to highlight
the contentious nature of the concept itself. As the term Islamophobia has been
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widely used for several decades in varied social and political contexts, there is no
scholastic  consensus  as  to  its  meaning  (Özyürek,  2014:  9;  Shyrock,  2010).
Originally defined as “an unfounded hostility towards Islam and therefore fear or
dislike of all  or most Muslims” (Runnymede Trust Commission, 1997: 4),  it  is
nowadays applied to a plethora of phenomena, ranging from xenophobia to anti-
terrorism policies,  to  overt  forms  of  violence  against  Muslims  (Shooman and
Spielhaus, 2009: 199).
Subsequently,  many scholars doubt that all  of the aforementioned phenomena
“emanate from an identical ideological core, which is a 'fear' or 'phobia' of Islam”
(Maussen,  2006:  101;  see  Shooman  and  Spielhaus,  2009:  199).  As  such,
Islamophobia is often deemed “too vague to be fruitful” (Özyürek, 2014: 9) or
“redundant” (Miles  and Brown,  2003:  116)  due to  is  numerous overlaps  with
existing  theories  of  racism  and  xenophobia.  Despite  its  analytical  challenges,
Islamophobia continues to be the most common term applied by respondents
themselves to describe the varied experiences of discrimination and resentment
which they experience in their lives.
These experiences of Islamophobic abuse can be manifested in a variety of forms.
The most  commonly mentioned type of  harassment  is  verbal,  and commonly
occurs at street level. All respondents have reported at least one incident of verbal
abuse directed towards their headgear.  “Why would you buy soap, you don’t
need to  wash your face anyway,”  said a  man in  a  shop to  one of  the niqabi
women  who  was  standing  next  to  the  shelves  displaying  washing  products.
“Don't hide your pretty face,” was said to another, whilst a third reports being
subjected to rude shouts featuring swear words. 
“I’m  quite  lucky  because  I  haven’t  had  many  negative  experiences,”  says
Sumaiyah positively when we discuss Islamophobic abuse while sitting in the
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cafe of  her student union. Not many negative experiences,  however,  does not
stand  for  not  having  had  any  negative  experiences.  She  speaks  about  being
shouted at in the queue at a supermarket by a self-proclaimed feminist who was
angered  by  Sumaiyah’s  attire,  namely  the  niqab.  She  also  recalls  a  story  that
occurred  recently  in  her  home  town.  She  was  walking  to  work  early  in  the
morning  when  a  man  suddenly  approached  her  and  shouted:  “You  effing
terrorist,  get  off  the  street.”  It  was  early  morning  and  still  really  dark,  and
Sumaiyah was scared. She decided to take another footpath but the change of the
route  did  not  prevent  the  screaming  man  from  following  her.  Luckily  for
Sumaiyah, a passer-by offered to escort her to work and tried to encourage her to
report the event to the police. 
Sumaiyah  considers  herself  lucky  for  having  only  had  limited  negative
encounters,  but she is well  aware that many of her fellow hijabis  and niqabis
cannot claim the same. “After the Woolwich murder,25 I was pretty shocked about
the Saudi female student who was killed, somewhere in London I think it was. I
never thought something like that could happen. It does worry me thinking that
that could have been me – because I fit that same criteria – but it's not going to
stop me wearing the  niqab or  from being me.”  The case  Sumaiyah mentions
refers to a brutal murder of a Saudi PhD student Nahid Almanea who was fatally
stabbed as she walked to the University of Essex in June 2014. At the time of the
killing, she wore an abaya and a headscarf. 
Attacks  on  hijab-clad  women  are  not  a  rarity  in  the  UK,  and  occur  equally
frequently in metropolitan areas and in more remote parts of the countryside.
During my fieldwork in the autumn of 2013, two attacks were reported in the
25  On 22 May 2013, a British Army soldier, Fusilier Lee Rigby was murdered by Michael
Adebolajo  and  Michael  Adebowale  near  the  Royal  Artillery  Barracks  in  Woolwich,
southeast London. The men told witnesses and the police that they had killed a soldier to
avenge the killing of Muslims by the British armed forces.
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North  East.  Yasmin,  a  22-year  old  niqabi  and  a  recent  law  graduate,  was
travelling on the metro in Newcastle when a man approached her shouting that
he wanted to see her face. “I didn't say anything so he put his arm around me,
grabbed me and tried to pull, physically pull, my headscarf and my face veil off,”
recalls Yasmin (Engage, 2013). None of her fellow passengers helped her and it
was eventually the man’s friends that pulled him off her. Just miles away, another
attack took place following the murder of the soldier Lee Rigby. An unknown
man approached Khadija, a Newcastle-based hijab-wearer and a nurse, grabbed
her body firmly and started shaking her aggressively shouting: “You’re one of
them!”  None  of  them  reported  the  event  to  the  police  immediately  after  it
occurred.  Yasmin  remained  silent  for  two  months.  Similarly,  Khadija,  a
Newcastle-based  hijab-wearer  and  a  nurse,  did  not  report  the  harassment
immediately and waited for five months before speaking to the police. 
These two cases highlight some important issues. Not only do they show that the
victims of Islamophobic attacks were subjected to violent interactions simply for
wearing the hijab. They, moreover,  emphasise another significant idea: women
who are the victims of Islamophobic attacks often refuse to report the issue, as
they are fearful they might be misunderstood or even mocked by the police, who
are located on the other side of the invisible veil. 
To fill this lacuna of hate crime reports, Fiyaz Mughal established an organisation
Tell  MAMA,  a  national  project  which  records  and  measures  anti-Muslim
incidents  in  the  UK.  Tell  MAMA  monitors  Islamophobic  abuse  through
anonymous reports  in  a  confidential  and non-judgemental  manner.  Sumaiyah
praises Tell Mama: 
“I think with this Tell Mama stuff I now feel that I do need to start reporting incidents 
that happen because I've had some incidents which I've never reported. The police just  
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put it down as hate crime as opposed to Islamophobia – that's very important nowadays 
because there's an evident prejudice against Muslims whether people like to think of it or 
not.” 
According to Sumaiyah, having incidents flagged as Islamophobic helps build a
bigger picture which reflects the extent of the situation. In email correspondence,
the director tells me: “We have especially interesting data on the niqab or the veil
at  street  level,  these women suffer repeated and more aggressive anti-Muslim
incidents”. Tell MAMA recorded 584 Islamophobic attacks in the span of one year
(2012-2013),  both online and offline.  Out of  attacks in the physical  world,  the
majority are targeted at women, especially at those who are visibly identifiable as
Muslims because they wear the veil (see Image 13). In their report, published in
2013,  Tell  MAMA revealed  that  out  of  20  British  Muslim  female  victims  of
Islamophobia whom they had interviewed for the study, 80 per cent wore some
type of Islamic headgear. A 2009 report entitled Data in Focus: Muslims produced
by European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) also points out to the
high levels  of  Islamophobia in the context  of  the European Union;  the report
shows that 28% of women polled, from various European countries, experienced
Islamophobic attacks in the span of one year. 
Image 13: An anonymous report sent to Tell MAMA (Copsey et al, 2013: 19)
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However, statistics are not the best  approach to illustrate the consequences of
abuse  for  women  like  Sumaiyah,  Yasmin,  Khadija  or  the  Saudi  PhD  student
murdered  in  Essex.  Mughal  agrees:  “For  far  too  long,  people  talk  about  the
number of victims, the statistics of victims and the kinds of cases. They simply
miss  out  on  the  core  facts;  that  there  are  people,  emotions  and  familial  and
psychological impacts to hate incidents and crimes” (Elgot, 2013). However, with
the media being saturated with the narratives of Muslim-led crimes, there seems
to be little room for reframing reports from the perspective of women who have
been subjected to abuse themselves.
6.5 Making the invisible veil British
Recalling the cases of two violent events in Newcastle, namely the attacks against
a law graduate and a nurse, another important dimension to Islamophobic abuse
has to be highlighted. These attacks did not occur due to the women’s behaviour.
They were motivated only by their attire, and the meanings this attire represents.
As  shown  throughout  this  thesis,  these  meanings  are  a  deliberate  result  of
historiographies and current political narratives that support agendas of those in
power. 
Both attacks took place in the North East of England in the same year the English
Defence League (EDL) held two significant gatherings in the region. In May 2013,
a  reported  crowd  of  1500  supporters  of  the  extreme  right-wing  organisation
gathered in the centre of Newcastle, just days after the murder of Drummer Lee
Rigby in Woolwich. The soldier was murdered and mutilated by two British-born
Muslim  converts  whose  criminal  activity  was  supposedly  linked  to  Islamist
terrorism. The second gathering took place in the autumn of the same year, when
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the EDL hosted a rally titled ‘Ban the Burka’. Ironically enough, the protest took
place in Hartlepool, a seaside town where 689 Muslims lived at the time of event.
No niqabis were known to reside in Hartlepool at the time of the protest. 
With the women who were attacked clearly not posing any direct threats,  the
issue  with  Muslim  women  stems  from  social  and  political  events  past  and
present.  In the previous sections, I  spoke about Frantz Fanon's writing on the
colonial  setting in  which  resentment  towards  the  Islamic veil  developed as  a
convenient  tool  which  France  deployed  for  justifying  attacks  on  Algeria  and
Muslims.  Earlier  on in  the  thesis,  I  also  delved into  PR strategies  of  the  US-
facilitated  war  on  terror,  revolving  around the  warped  ideology  of  liberating
female  victims  of  oppressive  Islamic  regimes.  The  United  Kingdom  holds
parallels  to  both  examples,  with  a  strong colonial  legacy,  and  active  military
engagement in the present. 
Especially  in  the  context  of  ISIS,  British  Muslim  women  are  frequently  and
aggressively  targeted “as symbol  of  the problems perceived to be inherent  to
Islam” (Karlsen, 2015) and are ascribed “the particular role” in Government anti-
radicalisation  agendas  (ibid.;  Ameli  et  al,  2007;  Geaves,  2005).  This  modus  of
political  and  press  preoccupation  with  the  Islamist  terrorist  threat  associates
veiled Muslim women ‘with narrow types of specialities within Britain’ (Bhimji
2012: 47) linked to religious extremism and a potential danger for the security of
the nation. The consistent equation of Muslim women, especially niqabis, with
terrorism is familiar to most respondents. Especially after the rise of ISIS, the fear
of Muslim female terrorists is reflected both by political narratives and in street
discourses. For example, I have already touched on the government's counter-
terrorism strategies, which render all Muslims a suspect community and veiled
women supposedly vulnerable for radicalisation. 
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According to some respondents,  especially niqabis,  the continuous bashing of
veiled women often leads to frustration. As devoted Muslims they (are required
to) advocate for peace for all and actively contribute to the general well-being of
(British)  society.  In  return,  they  are  held  responsible  for  crimes  caused  by
perverted forms of Islam on the other side of the globe. Among those who share
their annoyance is Khadija, a niqabi from north London. She states: “All niqabis
that I know of are against terrorism. There should be a clear distinction between
Islam that is taught by the Quran and Islam that is promoted by Islamists who
are using the religion for all wrong reasons.” She believes that connecting the
niqab  with  crime  and  terror  is  paradoxical:  “The Quran claims  that  Muslims
should treat people of all faiths and beliefs with tolerance and compassion.”  
With those accounts being only rarely channelled to a broader audience, many
Muslim women have decided to take a strong stand against terrorism. Under the
lead of  Sara Khan,  some British  Muslim women joined forces  in  a  campaign
#MakingAStand. With a campaign poster featuring a pale woman in a Union Jack
hijab  (see  Image  14),  the  initiative  calls  for  Muslim  women  to  fight  against
radicalisation, in particular by ISIS. In a video that was released to promote the
campaign, British Muslims – predominantly hijabis – speak about ISIS’ atrocities,
from operating slave markets, selling and buying women, beheading aid workers
and stoning women to death. “Stop and think, sister,” urges one hijabi, calling on
Muslim women to rethink their real duties as Muslims. 
Although the campaign ultimately aims to combat ISIS and radicalisation, the
usages  of  language  and  visuals  support  another  objective  –  one  trying  to
eliminate the invisible veil that is, in the current political climate, thicker than
ever.  “We  are  British  Muslim  women  –  proud  of  who  we  are  –  British  and
Muslim.  We  cherish  the  values  of  peace,  democracy,  citizenship,  and  human
rights. As women we know our role in challenging extremism is essential,” said
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the founder of the initiative at its launch. By speaking about values that are both
British and Islamic,  and using Union Jack hijabs,  she attempts to demonstrate
how British British Muslim women are. 
Image 14: A pale woman in a Union Jack hijab 'making a stand'
Yulia Egorova (2015: 500) emphasises that minority groups are sometimes put in
a position when they have to alter their sartorial practices to demonstrate that
despite  their  perceived  'foreignness'  they  are  loyal  to  the  state.  Making  their
hijabs more British can be considered one such sartorial practice.  Moreover, by
emphasising the role of Muslim women in the fight against the state’s number
one  enemy,  the  founder  Sara  Khan  also  asserts  the  idea  that  British  Muslim
women are not only not dangerous to the British nation, but are rather essential
for defending its existence.
A  similar  objective  can  also  be  recognised  in  the  ‘poppy  hijab’,  a  highly
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controversial initiative launched to mark Remembrance Day in November 2014.
Designed for Muslim women to commemorate the occasion and co-religionists
who fought alongside British troops,  the poppy hijab plays with the motif  of
poppies that are traditionally worn at the anniversary to mark the end of World
War I. The headscarf  has not been welcomed by everyone.  "The fact that it  is
being promoted by the likes of the Daily Mail, part of the thinking is, 'Okay, you
are a little  bit  British but  not British  enough. We will  accept you,  but on our
terms,'"  commented  Faezza  Vaid,  executive  director  of  the  Muslim  Women’s
Network UK,  on Al  Jazeera  (Hooper,  2014).  Similar  sentiments  are shared by
Sofia Ahmed. In her piece for Media Diversified (2014),  she explains how she
refuses to wear a poppy hijab – not because she is an extremist Muslim, but due
to her “ideological position based on anti-war sentiment.” She shares the story of
her grandfather  fighting with British troops, who ended up being shunned and
perceived as someone who did not belong in Britain. The writer realises that she
would always “be seen as the ‘other’” regardless of how much she tries to fit in
(ibid.).  According  to  Sofia  Ahmed,  it  is  this  antagonistic  attitude  from  the
majority  of  Britons  that  needs  to  be  addressed,  and  not  the  alleged  lack  of
Britishness among UK Muslims. She concludes:  
“If there’s one thing I am sure of, it is that given Britain’s never ending lust for war  in  
Muslim lands, and the use of the poppy campaign to garner support and  sympathy for 
the military, my grandfather and those countless other Muslim men  who took part in  
the world wars, would turn in their graves at the sight of their grandchildren wearing 
that hijab” (ibid.). 
As pointed out by Faezza Vaid and Sofia Ahmed in the respective media pieces
(Ahmed, 2014; Hooper, 2014), this method of demonstrating one’s Britishness is a
highly problematic one. It implies that British Muslim women are deviating from
the preferred mytho-historical  norms.  They need to adhere to  the white  non-
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Muslim population’s ideas of Britishness in order to be fully accepted into the
inner circle of citizenship.  This notion resonates with the writing of Homi K.
Bhabha.  In his essay Of Mimicry and Man (1984),  Bhabha theorises the civilising
missions of new lands by employing the concept of colonial mimicry. It refers to
“the desire for a reformed recognisable Other, as a subject of difference that is
almost  the same but  not quite”  (Bhabha,  1994:  86).  The discursive practice  of
mimicry  is  constituted  around  the  process  of  double  articulation  that
simultaneously  appropriates  the  Other  and  at  the  same  time  “continually
produce[s] its slippage, its excess, its difference” (ibid.: 122). 
In other words, the colonised aim to imitate the behaviour or characteristics of
their colonisers in the hope of acquiring their power.  However, the mimicry can
never be applied fully, but necessarily includes a certain level of hybridisation
with  the  cultural  identity  of  the  colonised.  Drawing  on  Bhabha,  the  method
deployed by nationalistic  hijabs fits into the concept of colonial mimicry with
British Muslim women demonstrating their belonging to their home country by
adopting the symbolism of those in power. 
Although  these  seemingly  para-colonial initiatives  of  almost  but  not  entirely
equal  British  citizens  can  be  seen  as  an  opportunistic  action,  Bhabha
acknowledges the subversive potentials of any acts of colonial mimicry, an idea
that will be further explored in the following chapter. 
6.6 Conclusion
The  title  image  of  this  chapter  portrays  a  number  of  niqab-  and  burqa-clad
women.  Their  transparent  veils  create  multiple  layers  that  overlap  with  each
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other.  The  resulting  effect  appears  to  offer  an  artistic  illustration  of  Du Bois’
famous metaphor of the veil that has represented a theoretical backbone of this
chapter. Just like the women represented in this art work, the protagonists of this
research inevitably wear multiple veils. Apart from a physical veil which they
choose to don consciously, society wraps them in an additional invisible veil – a
thick veil of prejudice, mythological narratives and denied privileges. No matter
what they wear and how they behave, the invisible veil continues to denounce
their status as unwanted British Others. For example, even though Sumaiyah, the
leading  female  character  in  this  chapter,  is  an  active  citizen,  a  proud British
woman and a citizenship education teacher, the invisible veil prevents her from
obtaining the symbolic standing of a fully-fledged Briton. 
Although the colour line between the black and white populations in the pre-civil
rights movement USA is intrinsically different from a Muslim-non-Muslim divide
in the 21st century United Kingdom, observing the two in parallel can indeed be a
productive  analytical  process.  Just  like  the  construction  of  a  colour  line  is
embedded in  the  colonial  past,  discrimination against  British  Muslim women
cannot be comprehended without acknowledging British political agendas from
its  imperial  past  onwards.  Centuries-long  military  engagements  in  various
Muslim states are crucial to understanding why women today remain demonised
solely on the basis of their attire and what it represents. 
The toxic process of othering is expressed in various ways. As observed in the
cases of two white converts, it can be shown through ostracising practices. For
example, Emma was pushed away by her own father and her employer, and the
journalist Lauren Booth has experienced antagonism in her professional circle.
The decisions by society members did not appear to have been linked directly to
their behaviour or performance. Donning the hijab did not introduce Emma as a
less loyal or less loving daughter, or eradicate Lauren Booth’s journalistic talents
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and capabilities. It could be assumed, to at least a certain degree, that the act of
shunning was informed by mytho-historical discourses and current political and
media  narratives  premised on  the  concept  of  perilous  otherness  of  a  Muslim
woman. 
The  power  of  anti-Muslim  contempt  can  be  observed  in  the  frequent  abuse
experienced by all veiled Muslim female respondents. Either in the form of verbal
abuse or physical violence, women are continuously subjected to attacks that are,
once again, motivated by nothing but an invisible veil  that  casts a shadow of
ungrounded  prejudice  over  the  women’s  bodies.  Due  to  the  existence  of  an
invisible veil between the women in question and the majority white population,
women  often  do  not  feel  confident  reporting  these  violent  incidents  and
harassment to the police, who occupy a symbolical space on the other side of the
invisible veil. 
This disconnect between two parts of one society experienced by women, creates
a poignant self-realisation about  their  own difference.  For instance,  Sumaiyah
demonstrates that she is aware that her own society sees her as a Muslim who
cannot integrate.   This idea strongly echoes the writing of Du Bois, who talks
about this precise sensation of the twoness of two unreconciled identities, which
represents “two warring ideals  in one dark body.” In Du Bois’ account,  Afro-
Americans are granted a unique position of observing themselves from within
the veil and from outside the veil, replicating the gaze of the white majority. They
see themselves not only introspectively but, moreover, experience “the sense of
always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by
the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (Du Bois, 1903:
3). 
Realising that the invisible veil cannot be lifted, women resort to different tools to
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demonstrate their legitimacy in their own home country. ‘Patriotic’ hijabs with the
motifs of the Union Jack or poppies, for example, are just some of the attempts to
paint  the  veils  British,  both  in  a  physical  and  metaphorical  sense.  Such
appropriation of the hijab to the preferred standards of the majority in power is,
however,  highly  problematic.  As  demonstrated  by  Muslim  women’s  frequent
critiques, the idea of becoming British on the British majority’s terms resonates
with the notions of colonial mimicry. Following Homi K. Bhabha’s theorisation of
the term, the coloniser strives for “a reformed, recognisable Other” who is almost
the same, but not quite. Drawing upon Bhabha’s understanding of this double
articulation,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  veil  as  an  ultimate  visual  emblem  of
difference is appropriated in the way that celebrates the power of the dominant
group rather than questions it. 
Bhabha speaks about mimicry as an opportunistic method of copying the person
in power. This idea echoes theories of Frantz Fanon whose writing, too, paved the
theoretical paths of this chapter. In Black Skin, White Masks Fanon famously writes
about the desire of a black man to mimic the white, which haunts him day and
night,  saying:  “For the black man there is  only  one destiny.  And it  is  white”
(Fanon, 1952: 12). Putting a white mask over an invisible veil is precisely what the
Union Jack and poppy hijabs are an illustration of. They depict the neo-colonial
political strategies that send a clear message: we will accept you, but only on our
terms. 
There is, however, no need to don a white mask, suggests Sumaiyah. “I’m British.
I just happen to wear the niqab,” she states,  adding: “We are living in British
society,  we are British and it's  important for the British people to  know what
Islam stands for. And at the same time it's important for Muslims to be entwined
with  British  society  and learn  more  about  British  society  and be  more  active
citizens.” Sumaiyah deconstructs the complexity of multicultural and multi-faith
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cohabitation in a simple manner. She knows that a cloth itself is not a barrier. She
herself  is  living  proof  that  the  headscarf  and  face  veil  do  not  prevent
communication and integration, nor do they embody radical Islamist ideas. She is
a  highly  expressive  person  who  is  actively  integrated  into  student  life,  is
employed as a part-time teacher of citizenship education, and is involved in a
variety of political and social causes.  Sumaiyah, and some of her fellow veiled
Muslim women whom we have met in this chapter, strive to be recognised and
accepted as equal citizens without compromising their faith, dignity and their
preferred life-styles. 
Striving to be recognised and accepted is indeed a challenging task, which will be
expanded on in the following chapter focusing on resistance and social change. I
will look at some inventive strategies that British hijabis employ in a pursuit of
removing the invisible veil of otherness. 
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Chapter VII: Hijab Metamorphoses
        
Image 15: Shamsia Hassani's mural in Kabul, Afghanistan
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The Library of Birmingham is a majestic building occupying Centenary Square, right in
the  heart  of  the  city.  The  building  that  houses  an  amalgamation  of  thousands  and
thousands years of  wisdom, stories and histories is  not typical of  those libraries with
green study lights, oak desks, Victorian windows and the obligatory dusty smell. With a
contemporary design and feel, the largest public library in the United Kingdom conveys
an impression of change, future and forwardness.
Similar  sentiments  are  embodied by Wahida who can be  found sitting quietly  at  her
regular table in the library café. Notebook in hand, she is drafting her next spoken word
piece.  It  might  be  on rape within Muslim communities,  or on the  war in Yemen, or
perhaps on something completely different. Despite the subject, it will be, almost without
doubt, highly controversial  and bold,  challenging the prevailing opinions and offering
alternative ones.
Everything about Wahida feels fresh and almost revolutionary. In her early twenties –
and with a five-year career under her belt already – she is among the youngest established
artists on the Birmingham underground scene. And one of a very few hijabis in those
circles, too, she says. Her style is striking from the inside and the outside; she accessorises
heavily, does not hesitate to don bright colours and brave patterns, and she almost never
leaves  the  house  without  her  signature  bow  tie.  Today  it  is  a  shiny  one  and  it
complements her attire,  from her stylish headscarf  to her glittery trainers.  She is  not
afraid to look in the mirror, she says. She is equally vocal about global politics and about
issues that happen behind closed doors in her own community. She is reflective and deep,
and hence goes by the stage name 'soul poet'.
The choice of her favourite table at the Birmingham library is not an arbitrary one. “At
this  very table,  I  had  one of  the  most  epic  photos  taken,” says  Wahida  and tells  the
anecdote  about meeting Prince  William during his  visit  to  the  new library.  She  was
selected  to  sit  next  to  him and when joking  about  his  favourite  rap  artists,  a  photo
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portraying the two laughing hysterically was snapped. She is not one of the artists who
categorically rejects the establishment; she works hard towards changing it by promoting
a constructive dialogue.  “Earlier this  week,  I  went down to London to parliament to
discuss moving the voting rights age to 16+,” Wahida tells me enthusiastically.
She  stands  up  and  packs  away  her  stuff,  including  a  precious  notebook  containing
countless lucid ideas that might be soon seen on stage, or at least in a YouTube video. She
walks out of the futuristic building down Birmingham high street to a meeting for an
upcoming workshop, and towards new challenges.
This chapter is opened by two young and bold artists, Shamsia (see Image 15)
and Wahida. Although they reside in different parts of the globe, namely in Kabul
and Birmingham, they have a lot in common. At a superficial level, they are both
young, female, religiously observant and are engaged with the underground art
scene. More symbolically, they are both challenging and changing society, and
promoting societal transformations in their local  settings and globally.  As role
models,  transmitters  of  novel  ideas  and  critics  of  the  social  status  quo,  both
Shamsia and Wahida create a different version of reality – with their words and
their cans of spray respectively. It is thus not a coincidence that these two artists
have been chosen for the final chapter on resistance, refusal and reformation.
As seen in the opening vignette, Wahida's resistance does not necessarily fit into
conventional conceptions of resistance by participating in public demonstrations
or causing violent disruption, for example. Her resistance is subtle and informal.
She utilises her poetry and creative skills to resist the prevailing stereotypes and
injustices that she faces as a young Muslim hijabi, ranging from violence against
women in her community to the ignorance about young people demonstrated by
the  British  government.  Wahida's  social,  cultural  and  political  engagement
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illustrates the idea that resistance comes in various shapes and forms; it is not
limited  to  revolutionary  upheavals  but  stretches  to  private  everyday  acts  of
resistance that are equally significant despite receiving considerably less public
attention (Scott, 1987; Martin, 1999). Just like the sites of power vary in size and
form,  the  responses  to  the  means  of  power  come  in  an  impressive  array  of
variations (Lilja, 2016: 20). They can be informal or formal, violent or non-violent,
held at street-level or digitally, deconstructing or reconstructing, subtle or loud
(ibid.).
Despite its form, they all contribute equally importantly to the disruption and
challenging of existing power structures in their own unique ways. As famously
summarised  by  Michel  Foucault,  “where  there  is  power,  there  is  resistance”
(1978: 95). Lila Abu-Lughod, who has been our theoretic partner throughout this
work, toys lucidly with Foucault's words when she states that “where there is
resistance, there is power” (1990: 42). As suggested by the artwork featured on
this chapter’s opening page (see Image 15), by Shamsia Hassani, resistance is not
only about undermining power but about claiming and reclaiming it as well. By
painting  oversized,  bright  and  dynamic  figures  of  burqa-clad  women,  for
example, Shamsia Hassani presents veiled women as powerful individuals with a
strong sense of agency. She resists patronising portrayals of Afghan women by
local politicians and the global media alike, and promotes a new vision for herself
and her fellow Afghanis.
This chapter will explore different forms and motivations of resisting sentiments
and acts that are expressed, and also questioned, by British hijabis without falling
into anthropological  traps of  over-romanticising and fetishising resistance and
the  subjects  central  to  its  implementation.  I  will  examine both organised and
subtler everyday forms of resistance, and all modalities in-between, and explore a
sense  of  choices,  creative  approaches  and  aspirations  experienced  by  British
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hijabis.
7.1 The dilemmas of recognition and intention
“Once upon a time, resistance was a relatively unambiguous category, half of the
seemingly  simple  binary,  domination versus  resistance,”  claims  Sherry  Ortner
(1995: 174). She reminds us how early scholarship on resistance saw domination
as a relatively institutionalised form of power, while resistance was perceived as
its organised opposition.  In popular discourses, too, the concept of resistance is
often  equated  with  protesting  crowds,  overtly  political  language  and  violent
disruptions. As already outlined in the introduction of this  chapter,  resistance
cannot  be  reduced  to  simplified  definitions  of  collective  and  contentious
mobilisations against the dominant structures of power (see Hoffman, 1999: 672;
Seymour, 2006: 305). It is a much broader and more fluid concept, which comes in
various shapes and forms.
It  is  precisely this fluidity and broadness that has made resistance difficult  to
define. The last half of the century of anthropological theorisations of resistance
have framed the acts and actualities of resistance in a plethora of definitions, and
the consensus on one single working definition of the term is still pending. This
analytical incoherence is not necessarily counter-productive, for a diverse breadth
of attempts at a definition can do nothing but help us embrace a range of acts,
sentiments and behaviours within this conceptually contested category.
According to Hollander and Einwohner (2004: 539), this contention surrounding
the  definition  of  resistance  is  predominately  generated  around  two  major
parameters:  the  question  of  recognition,  and  the  discussions  about  the  intent
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behind resisting acts.  As the authors emphasise, much of the scholarly discussion
centres  around the  question  of  whether  oppositional  action  has  to  be  readily
apparent to others and recognised as resistance (ibid.). In addition, the issue of
intentionality, too, occupies a central role in polemics about the applications of
resistance. It refers to exploring whether the actors are consciously resisting some
exercise of power or are even aware that their actions are perceived as resisting
(ibid.:  542).   As  I  will  show  throughout  the  chapter,  the  recognition  and
intentionality of resisting acts are not always apparent, or even present.
Before I focus on exploring such ambiguous forms of resistance among British
hijabis,  it  would  be  beneficial  to  look  at  some  conventional  modalities  of
resistance which fulfil both of the mentioned criteria in an apparent manner.
7.1.1 Protesting against the burqa ban
When France introduced the so-called 'burqa ban'  in 2011,  niqab-wearers and
their allies responded to the new policy with conspicuous rage. Several protests
were staged within and beyond national borders, exhibiting the demonstrators’
disagreement with imposed political decisions. In addition to the 'epicentre' in
Paris,  the British branch of the international pan-Islamic organisation Hizb ut-
Tahrir  organised parallel  protests in London. Gathering in front of the French
embassy,  niqab-wearers  expressed  their  strong  disagreement  with  French
lawmakers  across  the  channel.  The  protesters  shouted  slogans  and  exhibited
various banners displaying messages such as 'Our peace is one, our war is one,
our honour is one', 'Niqab: Honour for Women' or 'Shariah 4 France'. The protests
were  planned,  coordinated,  advertised  and  documented.  The  group  of
demonstrators gathered intentionally and with a clear aim, and their expression
of resistance was recognised as such by various audiences, from random passers-
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by to the media, such as the Daily Mail, which documented the event extensively
(2011).
Moving ahead two years, and about 130 miles from the previously mentioned
protest, another set of public demonstrations took place in front of Birmingham
Metropolitan  College,  which  I  visited  during  my  fieldwork.  Following  the
decision by the college to prohibit the wearing of face veils by staff members and
students,  its  student  body  organised  a  rally  which  vocalised  their  opposing
opinions. Heavily backed by social media users, the demonstrations were well
organised and advertised.  For  example,  the  campaign was accompanied by a
Facebook page,  a  press  release  and a  group of  designated spokespeople.  The
group's  manifesto  was  communicated  clearly  and  campaigning  updates  were
published regularly. The well-developed communication strategy thus left little
space for questioning the intentions behind the protest.
As part of the communication campaign, the organisers distributed leaflets and
posters  (see  Image  16),  mostly  through  social  media.  The  imagery  on  the
promotional  leaflet  featured a sharp font and was printed in black-and-white,
thus embracing visual approaches that are commonly deployed for advertising
political protests. The illustration on the leaflet portrayed several niqabis; whilst
the women in the background were dressed in black, the woman in front of the
image  sported  a  white  niqab,  which  made  her  stand  out  from  the  graphic
artwork. The symbol of the white niqab is a well-known and established emblem
of resistance among young Muslim female protesters. Having been continuously
donned by  Arab  female  students  during  Palestinian-Israeli  conflict,  the  white
niqab  goes  well  beyond complying  with  its  religious  meanings  within  Islam.
Throughout recent decades of use by student movements, it has turned into an
instrument  that  is  often  deployed  for  demanding  political  change  and  peace
(Guibernau, 2013: 12).
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Image 16: A leaflet calling potential protesters to join the rally against the burqa ban at
Birmingham Metropolitan College
Choosing this imagery for the campaign zooms out the focus from a very local
college-based  event  and  highlights  the  struggles  of  Muslim  women  globally.
Although the protest was organised around a specific issue – the prohibition of
face veils on this Birmingham college campus – the campaign exhibited a broader
aim of fighting Islamophobia and injustices faced by the Muslim population. For
example,  the  campaign  was  eventually  endorsed  by  the  National  Union  of
Students, a nationwide body of students. Its black students' officer Aaron Kielty
commented that the ban, “is a complete infringement on the rights to religious
freedom  and  cultural  expression”  (Sherriff,  2013).  BBC  News  (2013)  also
responded to the campaign and published a collection of opinions on burqa bans,
in Birmingham and globally, by various British opinion makers.
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These two campaigns offer  prime examples of  –  what  might  be deemed as –
'traditional' types of resistance. They generate little room for potential polemics
around  the  aforementioned  issues  of  recognition  and  intention.  The  two
described protests follow a similar operational matrix. They were both organised
by  Muslim  women's  groups;  they  were  advertised  extensively;  they  were
implemented in the form of a public gathering, and their effective communication
strategy attracted wider public attention and generated broader debates on the
issues. Despite an analogous format, the sentiments of the two campaigns were
vastly different,  with one transmitting what  could be considered conservative
Islamic  views  and  the  other  one  promoting  liberal  values  of  freedom  of
expression.  The  accompanying  manifestos,  banners  and  slogans  all
communicated these messages clearly, thus not leaving space for misreadings and
confusion  among  protesters  themselves  and  their  various  intentional  and
coincidental audiences.  Such a degree of clarity is, however, not present in all
forms of resisting acts, with many expressions of resistance failing to address one
of the parameters fully or altogether.
7.1.2 Coincidental and unrecognised resistance
Redirecting our attention back to Kabul, the birthplace of this chapter’s opening
image (see Image 15), the artist Shamsia Hassani tells me that the genesis of her
work is not necessarily linked to resistance and protest. In an online interview,
Shamsia talks about the various institutional constraints she faced as an aspiring
artist.  Being  a  young  woman  instantly  disqualified  her  from  working  and
exhibiting her work in institutionalised spaces and conventional artistic venues.
At  the  same  time,  she  was  also  tired  of  multiple  restrictions  that  prevented
Afghan audiences from accessing, consuming and enjoying art. “Many Afghan
people have no opportunity to  visit  exhibitions.  If  I  do art  that  is  there for a
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longer time and does not require paying for a ticket, people will slowly recognise
it  and it  will  become part  of  their  lives,”  stated Shamsia.  Seeking the needed
alternative, she enrolled herself onto a street art course with a British graffiti artist
and has thus found a new avenue for her creative endeavours in graffiti art.
Her artistic engagement was originally not meant to be either a critique of Afghan
internal politics or a counter narrative to patronising international discourses on
veiled women. However, her images were soon reclaimed by political movements
and  the  media  nationally  and  internationally.  From  CNN  to  The  Guardian,
international  media  outlets  quickly  noticed  her  work  and  framed  it  into  the
discourses  of  resisting the  Afghan regime (e.g.  Rose,  2014).  This  can serve  to
demonstrate  how  certain  unintended  actions  can  be  recognised  as  forms  of
resistance  by  the  audience.  Although  Shamsia  admits  that  resistance  did  not
initially  motivate  her  art,  it  has  quickly  turned  into  her  trademark,  and  she
eventually started capitalising on the potential  of  street  art  for  staging public
protest.
Contrary to Shamsia's example of unintended acts being recognised as forms of
resistance, numerous deliberate acts of resistance might also go unrecognised. For
instance, earlier in this thesis I introduced Nadiya Takolia, a feminist intellectual
who decided to don the niqab as a political gesture against capitalism's unjust
and unrealistic beauty games, which pressurise women to constantly modify and
beautify  their  bodies.  Although  her  actions  carry  clear  ideological  aims,  her
motivation  might  be  recognised  by  an  extremely  limited  audience.  The
hegemonic group that is targeted by her resistance, namely the global marketing
industry, will not necessarily recognise nor acknowledge her actions as resistance
against their industry and their values. For random audiences whom she might
encounter  during  everyday  interactions,  her  niqab,  too,  will  not  necessarily
constitute an act of protest. Even though the outcomes of her act might not be
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recognised,  Scott  (1985:  290)  claims that  it  is  the  actor's  intention that  can be
considered a significant indicator of resistance.
Although  Shamsia  Hassani's  work  might  not  originate  as  a  manifestation  of
resistance, and Nadiya Takolia's political niqab might not be recognised as an act
of  protest  by  the  majority  audience,  these  examples  demonstrate  that  the
theoretical  scope  of  resistance  is  broad  and  fluid,  opening  a  vast  field  for
deviations in different directions. Even if particular acts are not meant to resist or
are  not  recognised  as  resisting,  they  still  contribute  towards  diluting  the
structures of power in their own capacities. Whilst Islamic headgear has elicited
public protests and marches in the UK and beyond, it is precisely these hidden,
everyday, low-profile and indirect strategies of resistance that have played the
leading role in fuelling hijab metamorphoses over the last decades.
7.2 From hidden to veiled transcripts
The examples  of  latent  resisting  strategies  exhibited by  Shamsia  Hassani  and
Nadiya  Takolia  are  illustrative  of  the  insights  made  in  James  Scott’s
groundbreaking  work  on  everyday  resistance  (1985).  His  ethnographic  and
theoretical contribution focuses specifically on the ordinary acts of subordinated
groups that both challenge and accommodate the imposed dominant regimes.
Coining the term 'token resistance' (Scott, 1985: 291), Scott claims that this type of
resisting scheme contrasts greatly with the organised, systematic and principled
counterparts,  which  embody  “ideas  or  intentions  that  negate  the  basis  of
domination  itself”  (Collins,  2009:  10).  Token  resistance  is  consequently  often
unsystematic, individualistic and opportunistic, and exists within the limits of the
power that is imposed on the subordinated group. Whilst resisting in its nature,
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these acts  of  resistance are hidden or disguised enough to avoid major  social
sanctions  (Scott,  1985).  The  actions  of  token  resistance  are  thus  sufficiently
subversive to challenge the power structures but are also discreet enough to fall
within the remit of what is considered acceptable, legal and appropriate by the
groups in power.
Following such understanding of resistance, Scott introduces the notion of public
and  hidden  'transcripts'  as  the  established  modes  of  social  actions  and
interactions with accordance to a particular socio-political setting. He claims that
resistance is essentially a subtle form of contesting 'public transcripts' by making
use of prescribed social roles and imposed language to resist the abuse of power
(Scott, 1990: 137). Or to put it differently, hidden transcripts represent a set of acts
and  activities  that  exist  parallel  to  public  hegemonic  culture.  By  playing
creatively with the dominant 'modus operandi', the oppressed groups resist the
abuse from the oppressors with minor but gradual acts (ibid.).
Rumena's wedding preparations offer an illustrative example. I met Rumena, a
Bengali woman in her early forties, about four months before her big day. At that
time,  Rumena  was  buried  in  hectic  planning  of  what  would  be  her  second
wedding, having married her first  husband decades ago.  Rumena had a clear
vision of the kind of wedding she wanted – she was hoping for an intimate and
romantic affair with her closest family, especially her two children, and without
hordes of distant relatives and friends. Especially as this would be her second
wedding, she wanted to avoid any unneeded pomposity and celebrate the union
with her new husband privately. However, her mother-in-law did not share her
vision, and was, in fact, very persistent in promoting the exact opposite. Rumena
eventually  gave  in  and  decided  to  accommodate  her  new  in-laws'  wedding
ambitions, thus agreeing to organise a grand event with two separate halls for
men and women. The latter arrangement was something that especially bothered
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the  bride,  who had initially  opted for  a  joint  celebration.  She  wanted all  her
family, including her adult son, and her friends from different backgrounds to
enjoy the day in the same space, as opposed to having her wedding segregated
by gender.  
“I decided, I won't wear the hijab for the wedding party,” Rumena announced to
me some weeks after telling me about the problems with her in-laws's vision of
her wedding. “I want to do my hair professionally, so that it looks really nice” she
added. Given that the event would be segregated anyway, her not covering up
should  be  irrelevant,  she  further  commented.  Surprised  by  her  decision,  I
questioned her further and mentioned the photographs in her wedding album
that would be shared with strangers.  “They [in-laws to be] are paying for the
album so they can figure something out,” she replied.  The conversation soon
crystallised Rumena's intentions. Angered by her future mother-in-law's level of
engagement with planning her wedding and the conservative nature of her plan,
Rumena deployed the hijab to perform a hidden act of resistance. Knowing her
partner's mother's obsession with following veiling protocols precisely and at all
times, she used the act of unveiling to dilute her authority. As her mother-in-law
pushed for segregation – something which Rumena strongly disagreed with –
going bare-headed for  the day was her  strategy of  resisting her  new in-laws.
Although  her  decision  would  be  considered  acceptable  since  the  halls  were
segregated, it would still anger and potentially embarrass her new family.
Sumaiyah, whose story took us through one of the previous chapters, offers yet
another  ethnographic  example  illustrating  the  notion  of  hidden  transcripts.
Following the Israeli military’s assault on the Gaza strip in the summer of 2014,
the  British  public  responded  with  mass  protests  which  brought  together
hundreds  of  thousands  protesters  around  the  country.  Beyond  the  loud
demonstrations  in  English  towns  and  cities,  Sumaiyah  joined  a  silent  protest
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organised by Muslim sisters online. Connected by a Facebook group, hundreds of
women  decided  to  don  the  keffiyeh,  a  Palestinian  scarf,  and  wrap  it  as  a
headscarf  or  niqab.  This  gesture expressed their  solidarity with the people of
Palestine and conveyed their messages of resistance to the Israeli occupation and
its policy towards Palestinians. 
Popularised in late 1960s by Leila Khaled,26 the famous female member of the
Popular  Front  for  the Liberation of  Palestine,  the keffiyeh-hijab has  become a
popular symbol of resistance by Muslim women. By reclaiming the keffiyeh, an
item of clothing that is usually associated with Arab masculinity, women not only
pronounce their solidarity with the Palestinian independence movement but also
denote gender equality within Islam and beyond. Sumaiyah's act of donning the
keffiyeh-hijab was subtle;  instead of  her usual  floral,  stripy or mono-coloured
headscarves,  she  merely  chose  a  different  textile  to  serve  as  her  headscarf.
However, her act was recognised as political by those who were familiar with the
symbolism  of  her  headgear.  This  act  of  resistance,  as  she  commented  later,
enabled her to minimise the calculated risks a single woman marching in a mass
protest or attending an evening solidarity event. Sumaiyah's act of resistance fits
into Scott's notion of hidden transcripts. By wearing the keffiyeh she manifested a
hidden discourse of dignity and self-assertion within the prevailing public script,
whilst disguising and muting ideological resistance for the sake of her own safety
(Scott, 1990: 137).
However,  the  example  of  Sumaiyah's  resistance  challenges  Scott's  concept  of
hidden transcripts and invites us to rethink it from a new angle. Firstly, in his
writing on everyday resistance, Scott focuses on highly individualised modes of
26  Leila Khaled is a vocal advocate for the independence of Palestine. She has been involved
in various direct actions to protest the Israeli occupation of her homeland. For example, she
is credited as the first woman to hijack a plane, having been part of a team that hijacked a
plane on its way to Tel Aviv in 1969.
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resistance as he discusses it in the terms of unplanned, uncoordinated and small-
scale actions against the oppressor. As this might indeed be the case with some
particular examples, for instance with Rumena's decision to take off the hijab to
challenge  her  in-laws,  the  overemphasis  on  singular  engagement  fails  to
recognise, what El-Kholy (2002) and Turton (1986) would call the 'middle ground'
– the various forms of resistance that might be everyday and hidden, but which
require  active  engagement  and  involvement  of  different  social  networks  and
informal groups.  
Drawing on Turton's concept of 'patrolling the middle ground',  Heba Aziz El-
Kholy (2002:  17)  applies  this  critique in an attempt to 'gender'  the concept of
everyday resistance and study unbalanced relations of power between genders.
With a reference to her ethnographic study of gender in low-income Cairo, she
enunciates  that  it  is  precisely  the  informal  networks  of  women which play  a
crucial  role  in  gaining  power,  either  in  the  context  of  their  families  or
communities at large. As seen in the example of the keffiyeh-hijab, the actions of
resistance are carried out in a planned and coordinated manner by an informal
group of women who share a similar belief; Muslim hijabis utilised Facebook to
plan a collective response to a global political event.
Furthermore, Scott contrasts his hidden transcripts with public transcripts, thus
suggesting a different type of avenue into which these transcripts are channelled.
In his own words, the place of hidden transcripts is, as suggested by the name,
“off stage” (Scott, 1990), beyond the public eye and the limelight. As observed in
the  aforementioned  case  studies,  the  public-hidden  dichotomy  does  not
necessarily extend to the types of everyday resistance we have been witnessing
throughout this work. The actions are not always hidden; on the contrary, they
are often deliberately and visibly featured on various cyber platforms, from social
media channels to blogs and e-zines – even though the subversive  content may
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seldom penetrate hegemonic public discourses,  such as the mainstream media
and politics.
The critique of Scott's notion of everyday resistance, in particular his notion of
hidden transcripts, invites us to rethink his original concept and propose a new
concept that is congruent with the vein of this thesis. I thus propose the concept
of ‘veiled resistance', which refers to everyday token resistance that is counter-
hegemonic  in  its  origins,  discreet  in  its  manifestation  and modest  in  its  size.
However, rather than being an individual domain that is separate from the public
transcript, veiled transcripts are ambitiously and intentionally attempting to enter
and become a part of the public realm by mobilising informal groups of engaged
individuals. Due to veiled meanings and embodiments, these acts are not always
recognised as resistance, nor are they communicated in manners that “conform to
conventional understanding of politics” (Vinthagen and Johansson, 2013: 10). It is
essentially  about  everyday  practices  that  are  not  conventionally  and  openly
resisting,  for  example  the  way  of  dressing  or  even  a  choice  of  lifestyle.  The
resisting messages are veiled into everyday phenomena that the groups in power
would not automatically recognise as political. This veil simultaneously enables
the  agents  to  avoid  any  potential  sanctions  and  at  the  same  time  offers  an
effective camouflage for having open access to the official public transcripts. To
outline and clarify this concept, I will offer further ethnographic examples.
7.3 Veiled resistance and humour   
No example of veiled transcripts is more explanatory and exciting than humour.
Jokes, Internet memes, one-liners and caricatures do not merely serve to entertain
audiences. Through an anthropological lens, humour is perceived as particularly
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insightful  as it  “pervades all  aspects  of human behaviour, thinking and socio-
cultural reality” (Apte, 1988: 7), and often “manifest[s] a consciousness of group
identity and solidarity” (Apte, 1985: 66). Humour on the one hand serves as a
mirror reflecting society and its issues.  On the other hand, it  also possesses a
unique  power  to  inflict  the  existing  power  relations  in  a  socially  acceptable
manner.  As  such,  it  holds  the  potential  to  stage  resistance  and  subsequently
generate political tension.
In his discussions on everyday resistance, Scott (1985) often refers to joke-telling
as the weapon of the weak, and talks about its significance for diminishing power
in his fieldsite in a Malaysian village. Numerous later scholars (see Constable:
2007;  Johansson:  2009;  Peteet:  1991; Richter-Devroe:  2011; Sorensen:  2008),  too,
have recognised how various expressions of humour can be deployed to resist
different  formal  and  informal  oppressing  groups  alike,  ranging  from
dictatorships  to  patriarchal  figures.  British  hijabis  similarly  offer  countless
examples of resisting through humour.
At the talk in east London, I asked a group of women – otherwise also passionate
activists with strong feminist views – if they knew a good joke.  One of the ladies
responded: “Today’s cover of the Sun says that British women should not wear
the burqa. Below the title it is written: for a detailed recommendation on how
British women should be dressed see page 3.” The joke, which initially emerged
online  as  a  response to  The Sun's  obvious pro-burqa-ban position amidst  the
debates  in  Europe,  criticises  the  tabloid  paper's  problematic  political  stance
towards women:  while  it  opposes face veils  due to  their  allegedly oppressive
nature,  it  simultaneously  supports  objectifying  women  by  publishing  naked
photographs on its (formerly) notorious page 3. By sharing this joke, the joke-
teller resists the newspaper's deplorable politics which promote hatred towards
her and her Muslim and non-Muslim sisters.  Even though it is packaged as a
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simple joke, it contains strong campaigning messages backed with short yet clear
argumentation.
Similar short jokes are often shared online. Even more frequently, however, social
media users resort to popular memes – typically amusing images with a short
caption that  are easily  circulated in  cyberspace.  A popular  example  is  a  viral
trend 'What people think' that emerged in 2012 and sustained its popularity in
subsequent years. People from all professions, studies and walks of life started
sharing  images of how different parts of society perceive them and how they see
themselves,  with  humour  being  generated  by  the  disconnect  between  these
different  representations.  Not  surprisingly,  some  of  these  memes  have  been
created by hijabis about hijabis. Unlike some more casual takes on this particular
meme, the variations focusing on hijab-clad women tend to be politically loaded.
They  focus  on  distorted  representations  of  veiled  women  as  oppressed  or
dangerous, explore the contradictions within their own family and community's
expectations, for example to be pious and successful, and share their own desired
role  within  society,  such  as  being  powerful  and  resisting.  For  example,  one
compilation  of  images,  published on Pinterest,  depicts  a  caged niqabi  with  a
caption 'what society thinks I  do';  an ISIS female fighter corresponding to the
supposed government's  perception of  hijabis;  a  belly  dancer  as  a portrayal  of
what hijabis' friends think of her;  a praying hijabi as her parents' vision of an
obedient daughter, and a hijabi with a protesting sign subtitled 'what I think I do'.
These memes give the women who create and share them a welcome opportunity
to identify the problematic perceptions and attitudes of dominant groups and
resist  them  by  promoting  alternative  modes  of  representation.  In  that  sense,
humour can generate a distance to the oppressive conditions and can create a
space for “breathing and manoeuvring, therefore a way of creating themselves as
agents of change” (Vinthagen and Johansson, 2013: 19).  They use this space for
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resisting  the  sexist,  Islamophobic  or  racist  cultural  framework  and  discursive
structure  that  subordinates  them by  making  the  oppressing  groups  complicit
(ibid.).
These examples, again, deviate from the notion of hidden texts and point towards
the  altered heuristics  of  everyday resistance  that  I  developed in  the  previous
section. The discussed examples of humour exhibited by British hijabis channel a
response to socio-political situations publicly, and work to establish a collective
trend that surpasses the domain of the individual. Despite their frequently open
resistance against established meanings, the memes avoid any social reprisal as
they are rarely recognised as a form of resistance but are instead perceived as a
form of entertainment.
The previous examples have briefly demonstrated how the medium of humour is
deployed creatively to widen the reach of the message by making it relevant and
accessible to broader audiences. Although the majority of activities are limited to
social  media  sites  and  other  informal  spaces,  the  facetious  take  on  political
debates surrounding the Islamic headgear often grants women the access to the
mainstream media as yet another form of a public transcript.
An example comes with The Guardian's 2013 publication of a humorous article
entitled ‘Nine uses for a burqa… that don’t involve bashing them’ (Aly, 2013).
Circulated  to  a  wider  audience  amidst  the  tensions  of  pan-European  niqab
interdiction debates,  the author Remona Aly,  a veiled Muslim woman herself,
lists various funny tips for rejuvenating “the black onesie’s image” (ibid.). She
proposes using it as fire blanket during a Guy Fawkes event, bringing it to court
to generate some media furore and chase away boredom or attending a flashmob
without  feeling  ashamed.  The  author  utilises  humour  to  enter  the  public
transcript and transform it into a site of resistance. Using obvious cynicism, she
230
releases  her  political  frustrations  in  a  manner  that  does  not  appear
confrontational, threatening or obviously political.
A brief  overview  of  humour-fuelled  methods  of  resistance  –  from  informal
interpersonal  jokes  to  wider  Internet  communities  to  broader  audiences  –
explicates how the routine use of casual entertainment can effectively articulate
resisting  sentiments.  Unlike  Scott's  previously  mentioned  research  among
peasant populations, British hijabis often promote a bolder and louder version of
everyday resistance. Rather than performing their actions secretly – out of sight
and  without  recognition  by  their  oppressing  targets  –  they  position  their
resistance  in  the  limelight,  thus  blurring  the  boundaries  between hidden and
public transcripts. Humour is not used to hide the messages of resistance from
the public eye, but is rather employed to enable resisting content to enter, and
manoeuvre freely within, the dominant discursive frame.
7.4 Veiled resistance in art
Just as apparent as humour, the idea of hidden texts entering the public discourse
is evident in the field of arts. Exhibited, performed or published, various artistic
artefacts  and texts  hold the power to convey resisting messages  in the public
arena. Anthropology has long recognised the role of art as a tool of resistance,
especially in times of social and political crisis (Gal 1995; Gell, 1998). Holding the
power to challenge and change public perceptions, art creates effective platforms
for reflecting on the dominant and subordinate views alike,  and subsequently
fostering  solidarity,  change  and  resistance.  From  street  art  such  as  Shamsia
Hassani's opening mural to spoken words, such as those of Wahida, who was
presented in the introductory ethnographic vignette, artistic interventions frame
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political processes into aesthetically or poetically appealing and explicitly public
formats.
This idea is further developed by Charles Tripp (2013). In his discussion of paths
of resistance in the Middle East, he compresses the interactions between art and
the politics of resistance into three main categories. Firstly, he claims that art has a
powerful way of announcing presence and reclaiming public space. Secondly, art
can  contribute  towards  promoting  a  shared  vocabulary  of  solidarity  and
collective  identity.  Finally,  artistic  interventions  can create  a  common imagery
which  challenges  existing  hegemonic  discourses  and  replaces  them  with
alternative imaginaries of the past, present, and future. Drawing on Tripp, Salih
and  Richter-Devroe  (2014:  16)  maintain  that  resistance  art  does  not  only
“challenge the status quo through alternative political  messages” but can also
“disrupt established hegemonic aesthetic forms or act as visualized evidence of
political, social, and cultural imaginaries and identities” that counter those that
are  imposed  by  the  groups  in  power.  These  three  categories  of  engagement
between art and the politics of resistance can be examined further in the light of
artistic interventions exhibited by British Muslim women.
As  already  discussed,  Tripp  talks  about  the  importance  of  art  for  signalling
presence  and  consequently  reclaiming  public  spaces  (ibid.:  306).  Shamsia
Hassani's artwork offers an illuminating example of this synthesis between art
and resistance. On display and accessible to a wide audience, her stone canvases
commonly feature over-sized women with explicitly female figures in striking
turquoise burqas. “My women are big, strong and modern.  I  capture them in
movement and draw them bigger than in real life. I want people to perceive these
women differently,” says Hassani. By introducing fully-veiled Afghan women as
powerful  and  independent,  she  contests  unilinear  narratives  about  Afghan
women as oppressed victims of patriarchal regimes and burqas that have been
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carved out  by local  authorities  and global  superpowers,  and refocuses  media
attention onto the real problems of Afghan women.
Her  art  is  not  only  decorating  physical  walls  but  is  also  breaking  down the
metaphorical  walls  that  Afghan women have been forced to stand behind for
several  decades,  from  Taliban  rule  to  the  US  occupation.  The  artist  liberates
female issues from the invisibility and anonymity of four walls, and secures their
permanent  presence  on  the  public  side  of  the  wall.  By  reclaiming  the  public
space, she redefines the symbolic border – or rather the wall – between her public
and private space, between a hidden and a public transcript. She enters the public
realm and leaves a permanent mark of her existence. Her problems of being a
woman move from the private side of the house wall to the public walls exposed
to everyone’s attention. Shamsia Hassani deploys the medium of art to resist the
prevailing version of history, women, veiling and Afghanistan imposed by those
in power.  Or in  words of  Charles  Tripp,  she reclaims public  spaces  to  signal
women's presence.
In addition to reclaiming public spaces, Tripp identifies the second link between
artistic interventions and resistance in creating powerful shared vocabularies that
foster solidarity and collective identities (Tripp, 2013: 307). Earlier in this chapter,
I  mentioned  the  symbolism  of  the  white  niqab  as  an  emerging  emblem  of
resistance  within  younger  Muslim  communities,  from  Palestine  to  England.
Artistic representations of the white niqab are just a minuscule example of how a
certain symbol can become a part of global visual vocabularies that forge a sense
of shared cause among otherwise unconnected individuals and groups.
Another  interesting  example  of  building  common artistic  vocabularies  lies  in
various zines that are prevalent and popular among the younger generation of
'underground' artists in the United Kingdom. One of My Kind, popularly known
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under  its  abbreviation  OOMK,  is  an  independent  publication  that  focuses  on
young women, art and activism, and places a special focus on women from black
and minority ethnic backgrounds. OOMK has been consistently utilising art – be
it drawings, poems or cartoons, amongst other forms – to explore the identities of
young Muslim women. "Art is so powerful," said Sofia Niazi, one of the founders
and editors of the zine who is a hijabi herself when being interviewed by The
National (2013).
"If you write an essay to make a point, you block off so many people: people who can't 
read  that  language,  people  who  aren't  academic.  But  as  soon  as  you  turn  to  
illustration, barriers are broken. People are drawn in. They ask questions. They start  
debating. That's a really powerful connection. People are exploring issues in  creative  
ways (ibid.)"
The OOMK collective has served as an incubator for such creative explorations. It
has facilitated emerging artists coming together and sharing their creative takes
on Muslim female  identity,  including  aesthetic  reflections  on  the  Islamic veil.
Many of the artworks from this thesis, including the feminist poster of Hannah
Habibi, which opened one of the earlier chapters (see Image 10), were featured in
the mentioned activist zine. The broader global appeal of OOMK's shared visual
language  of  resistance  was  proven  apparent  when  the  zine  opened  a  sister
magazine in Malaysia, where its artistic content, too, resonates with young female
Muslim audiences. Returning to Tripp's second category of linking resistance and
art,  the  women  of  OOMK  demonstrate  the  importance  of  creating  shared
vocabularies  of  resistance  which  provide  the  basis  of  new  solidarities  –  “the
performances that escape and challenge the everyday ordering of power (Tripp,
2013: 7).  The proliferation of shared symbolic languages and spaces opens the
door to new imaginative possibilities that enable British hijabis to express and
explore their identities through solidarity and resistance.
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This  example  leads  to  the  third  category  of  cooperative  overlaps  between
resistance and art according to Tripp. He underscores the importance of art for
collapsing hegemonic narratives of the past, present and future, and redefining
them with alternative representations (2013:  307).  An example can be found a
short  walk  from  Rich  Mix  in  Bethnal  Green,  where  new  editions  of  OOMK
usually come to life with public launches. In east London, various street art works
manifest  the  need  to  collapse  the  dominant  representations  of  the  hijab  by
offering alternative imagery.  “This  one is  my all-time favourite,”  says fashion
designer Hannah, pointing towards the famous image of a niqab-clad woman
holding hands with, what appears to be, a white man. The symbolic image was
sprayed onto a wall in Brick Lane by British male artist Stik, a renowned name in
the street art scene. “It shows how open and multicultural London is, and how
Muslim girls don't just hang out with other Muslim girls, if you know what I
mean,” comments Hannah whom we met in the chapter on fashion.
In close proximity to Hannah's favourite mural, more hijabi-inspired art works
are on display above the streets of east London. Many of them are signed by BR1,
an Italian male artist whose art focuses exclusively on depicting Muslim women
in different everyday situations and in diverse social roles, such as playing golf,
listening to music, drinking Pepsi (see Image 17), gossiping, doing make up or
smoking. Graduating on the topic of veiling and actively studying the veil for
several years, the artist claims to be careful about rendering different  types of
headgear, from the Afghan burqa to the Iranian chador, and multiple identities of
Muslim women. Tired of the continuous homogenisation of Muslim women, BR1
tries  to  promote  an  alternative  representation  of  veiled  women in  the  public
space.  “They live with us,  they are in public  spaces with us,  they are Italian,
French and Australian,” the artist tells me when I ask him about the subjects of
his  work.  He further  explains  that  he  feels  the  need for  veiled  women to  be
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represented  in  ways  that  counteract  negative  stereotyping  promoted  in  the
Western media and in politics.
However,  his work has been largely criticised by those who feel a white man
representing Muslim women using Western methods of  street  art  bolsters  the
Orientalist  paradigm  rather  than  deconstruct  it.  BR1  dismisses  criticism  by
questioning why the Western graffiti toolbox is incompatible with women who
have been living and breathing this culture for several generations. He moreover
rejects  the  claim he is  attempting  to  speak  on behalf  of  anyone,  and says  he
merely depicts women who inspire him. “In general, a woman is the best source
of inspiration for artists, why wouldn’t Muslim women be the same?”, he asks.
He is sure that artistic depictions of white blonde women would not evoke such
vocal controversies.
Image 17: BR1's artwork in Hoxton Street, Shoreditch
Rumena, who we met earlier in this chapter, has lived close by her entire life. She
says that she is fond of the murals and explains this further: “Growing up, I never
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saw anyone who looked like us, like myself, my family members, my friends on
any graffiti in Shoreditch. These graffiti pieces give a sense that we are here, that
we are part of this city.”
Art, accessible and ready for public consumption, once again highlights the idea
of veiled transcripts. The resisting messages, be they in the form of graffiti art,
poems or art  zines,  display private messages of resistance in a public  setting.
They  enter  and  reclaim  public  transcripts,  foster  collective  movement  and
solidarity, and ensure that counter-hegemonic readings of the hijab are present
and recognised in public transcripts.
7.5 From resistance to refusal
As observed throughout  the  chapter,  the  young generation of  British  Muslim
women fight  hard and persistently  for  a  different  vision of  the  hijab  in  their
communities  and  society.  However,  not  all  hijabis  who  think,  act  and  react
differently  from  the  predetermined  norms  are  necessarily  staging  acts  of
resistance. Whilst veiled discourses are definitely apparent and carry significance
for altering the perceptions of veiling practices,  hijabis simultaneously operate
openly  within  the  realm of  public  transcripts,  with  their  existence  not  being
imbued  with  subversive  sentiments.  Rather  than  resisting  the  dominant
discourses they simply refuse (parts of) them.
Although genealogically linked, the concept of refusal cannot be seen as a mere
extension of resistance. Rather than creating parallel discourses, as it is the case
with  resistance,  refusal  generatively  chooses  preferences  within  the  existing
system.  It  is  about  actively  selecting one option over  another,  or  strategically
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deciding to refuse one or all of them. It is not a coincidence that anthropological
conceptions  of  refusal  became prominent  with  Mauss'  seminal  work  The  Gift
(1967),  in  which  he  addresses  refusal  as  a  dynamic  force  in  creating  and
regulating social complexities.  Indeed, refusal is not simply about rejecting an
authority altogether and insisting on a new systematic order but it rather implies
“a dialogue with exchange and equality” (McGranahan, 2016: 319) that redirects
levels of engagement. Refusal thus subsumes the notion of two equals rather than
the  idea  of  having  a  classic  dominant-oppressed  binary  model  of  power.
Individuals or groups refuse certain prescribed roles, identities and activities “in
ways that are not about domination or class struggle but instead about staking
claims to the sociality that underlies all relationships, including political ones”
(McGranahan, 2016: 320; see also Scott, 1985; Sivaramakrishnan, 2005).
An  illustrative  example  of  such  refusing  practices  can  be  found  on  a  small
community  pitch  in  south  London  on  a  cold  late  winter  morning.  Amongst
children dressed in T-shirts which proudly display the names of their favourite
footballers, stands Jenny, their coach. She wears a fashionable track suit, a hoodie
from the football club where she coaches professionally and a black headscarf.
Jenny is a full-time football coach who spends her free time volunteering with
various sports community projects in London and the Midlands. Although she
has  strong opinions  and frequently  vocalises  them publicly,  Jenny would not
describe herself to be of a rebellious type, nor does she perceive her career choices
as  acts  of  resistance.  Rather  than  resisting  the  system,  she  has  been  making
conscious and strategic decisions about the ways she wants to live her life, and
has fought hard to achieve it her way.
“It is not a norm for a woman like me to be a football coach. People from my
community would expect me to be a doctor or a lawyer,” comments Jenny. She
tells a story about how she began coaching men whilst studying for her master’s
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degree in the North East of England. She remembers the looks on the faces of
bulky “Geordie men” when a woman in a headscarf walked onto the pitch and
introduced herself as their coach. They weren't prepared for a woman, let alone a
Muslim woman, recalls Jenny. However, over the course of the year, the players
accepted her as one of their own, and respected and followed her coaching. Jenny
thinks that is about the magic of the pitch. Once you get onto it, it is about your
performance, about your skills, about football. Headscarves become irrelevant.  
For the love of football and faith, Jenny has refused many identities, alliances,
relationships  and  expectations  imposed  on  her  by  her  family,  community  or
society. She refused to become a doctor or a lawyer. She refused the stereotype of
white and male football coaches. Jenny did not resort to resistance, but instead
refused to walk her predetermined path. Her potent decision resulted in creating
new possibilities that had been missed and unexplored before. As observed by
Audra Simpson (2014: 107),  the point of refusal can reveal  something new, “a
stance, a principle, a historical narrative, and an enjoyment in the reveal.” For
Jenny,  this  enjoyment  came  as  a  possibility  of  establishing  herself  as  a
professional football coach.
Reflecting on the opening vignette,  Wahida,  a poster girl  for hijabi  resistance,
often  employs  similar  tactics  when  she  speaks  about  her  engagement  with
government  campaigning  or  discussions  with  Prince  William.  Rather  than
resisting their authority and their hierarchical order altogether, she – in her own
words – engages in a dialogue. Therefore, some of her actions cannot be seen as
resisting in the context of the refutation of the dominant groups as a differential
force. Rather, she positions herself as a partner who discusses and implements
potential  changes  within  the  system itself,  thus  refusing  public  transcripts  as
much as legitimising them at the same time.
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It is not fortuity that the concept of refusal plays a central role in Sherry Ortner's
critique  of  resistance.  Ortner  (1995)  expresses  her  discomfort  with
anthropological  romanticisation  of  resistance  by  proclaiming  many  resistance
studies  as  ethnographically  thin.  She  observes  how  many  of  anthropological
studies sanitise politics by insulating the act of resistance from wider contexts
and  subsequently  overlooking  various  systemic  and  individual  conflicts  and
contradictions that are an inevitable part of them. By focusing on the oppositional
relationships of those in power and those who resist, such approaches contribute
towards creating a “monolithic, romantic notion of subaltern agency” (Grandin,
2003: 243) that fails to recognise the plurality of subjectivities within its realm.
Ortner  refuses  the  almost  reflexive  equation  of  subalterity  with  resisting
sentiments, and realistically assesses that for most of the people resistance will
not constitute a part of their daily routines, at least not a significant one.
Indeed,  this  idea  has  been  reinforced  throughout  this  chapter.  In  addition  to
Jenny's example of refusal, I have explored two public demonstrations with the
niqab at the centre of their campaigns. One of the groups campaigned against the
French ban by promoting Sharia law, whilst the other protest on a Birmingham
campus  took  an  almost  oppositional  approach  by  promoting  diversity  and
inclusion for everyone. These tensions highlight the complexity of relationships
and psychological  ambivalence that exist  within – what tends to be seen as –
subordinate groups. As summarised by Ortner (1995: 190):
“These ambivalences and ambiguities […] emerge from the intricate webs of articulations 
and  disarticulations  that  always  exist  between  dominant  and  dominated.  For  the  
politics of external domination and the politics within a subordinated group may link up 
with, as well as repel, one another; the cultures of dominant groups and of subalterns may
speak to, even while speaking against, one another.”
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Therefore,  prioritising,  selecting  and  refusing  certain  options  should  not  be
perceived  as  simply  rejecting  the  legitimacy  of  public  transcripts,  but  rather
suggests  that  these  conscious  decisions  represent  individual  or  collective
ambitions to modify those transcripts in one's own best interest.
7.6 Conclusion
In  light  of  the  socio-political  climate  of  Islamophobia  and  racism  that  was
painfully apparent during my fieldwork, and is presently equally ubiquitous, the
idea of resistance has been brought up continuously among the women in the
centre of this thesis.  Countless discussions have revolved around resisting the
burqa ban, everyday Islamophobia pertaining to the hijabis, the excluding anti-
radicalisation policies which target visibly Muslim women and an increasingly
right-leaning  mainstream  politics,  both  in  the  UK  and  globally.  Many  of  the
respondents could not hide their desperation about the status quo and urgently
wanted to see change.  
In response, women deploy different tactics to tackle their disagreement with the
current political and social system. Some of them take it to the streets and shout
their messages loudly and clearly, while others resort to intimate methods and
resist quietly on their own. However, the need to organise and resist, which is
shared almost across the board in one way or another, can even be perceived as a
social glue that brings together various women from different walks of life, and
across borders,  both geographical  and invisible.  By developing and deploying
shared vocabularies, young Muslim women from different parts of the UK and
the world come together in what appears to be an urgent quest to change the
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existing hierarchical orders in their communities and societies. Whether it is the
symbol of the white niqab,  Shamsia Hassani's  signature turquoise burqas,  the
hijab-keffiyeh  or  Instagram memes,  to  mention  just  some examples  from this
chapter,  the shared language of  resistance builds upon the mutually accepted
visual  and  symbolic  lexis  that  is  then  manifested  in  different  context-specific
ways.
It  is  precisely  the  symbolic,  veiled  resistance  that  can  be  observed  more
frequently  and  with  greater  curiosity  when  it  comes  to  resisting  practices  of
young  British  hijabis.  Building  upon  Scott's  concept  of  everyday  or  token
resistance, the discussed resisting interventions operate in the field of everyday
conventionalities,  such as art,  humour,  fashion and lifestyles.  However,  unlike
Scott's  peasant-led  construction  and  promotion  of  'hidden  transcripts'  that
clandestinely reject the official 'public transcripts', I have dedicated a large part of
this chapter to delving into a different heuristics of everyday resistance. Rather
than being individual, unorganised and hidden, the 'veiled transcripts' of British
veiled  women operate  slightly  differently.  Whilst  remaining  grounded  in  the
realm of the everyday, veiled resistance aims to penetrate into public transcripts
and  promote  resisting  messages  from  within.  As  it  remains  veiled  into  the
seemingly apolitical cloak – by channelling itself through the medium of humour
or art,  for example – it  is  only rarely recognised for its resisting objectives by
those in power.
Despite the shared need to resist, not all acts of living and thinking differently
can  be  deemed as  consciously  subversive  and  resisting.  Sherry  Ortner  (1995)
reminded us not to be tricked and trapped by the attractive poetics and politics of
resistance, as for the majority of people, subaltern or not, resistance will never
represent a significant part of their lives. It is with this in mind that we need to
acknowledge the importance of refusal – both as an individual choice of subjects
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to address their everyday tensions with the dominant groups and their systems,
as well as an ethnographic practice of taking into account thick descriptions and
wider contexts that frame individual's choices and actions.
Following  Ortner's  insistence  on  removing  the  veil  of  romanticism,  I  have
demonstrated how not all acts of refusal necessarily deny an authority and carry
ambitions  to  dilute  it.  Some  of  the  seemingly  resisting  discourses  not  only
cooperate  with  dominant  groups  but  moreover  legitimise  their  power.  For
example,  having an outspoken underground artist  captured joking in a photo
with Prince William, the ultimate representative of the establishment, suggests
the message that those in power can accept and accommodate everyone, even
representatives of youth activism.
This brings us back to discussions on the close interdependence of power and
resistance that was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The two concepts
can never exist in isolation but are interdependent and consequently entangled.
Power and resistance cannot, therefore, be seen as two binary poles, but have to
be  observed  as  an  interaction  of  dynamic  power  relations  (Vinthagen  and
Johansson, 2013: 26).  As demonstrated in the examples of women presented in
this chapter, power breeds resistance, but in turn this resistance brings power to
the women, even if only on a small scale.
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Chapter VIII: Moving beyond a single image
As I edit the final pages of this thesis, I am observing dramatic events unfolding
in  my  close  proximity.  Days  after  the  Westminster  attack,  discussions  on
terrorism and extremism are  high  on  the  agenda  of  the  international  media,
politicians  and the  general  public.  Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  the  veiled  Muslim
women have again been thrust into the limelight. 
Shortly after the attack, a photo of  a hijab-clad woman was circulated widely
online (see Image 18). She is pictured looking at her phone on Westminster Bridge
whilst passing a group of people helping an injured victim of the attack. Turned
into  innumerable  memes,  the  image  has  been  shared  by  thousands  of  social
media users who pointed out the woman's supposed ignorance, and turned it
into a symbolic portrayal of Muslim's lack of concern for the effects of terrorism.
For example, one of the memes compares the photo to a picture of the MP Tobias
Ellwood kneeling next to one of the victims performing CPR, with the caption
'the main difference between us and them'. 
Following  the  circulation  of  the  photo,  the  woman  from  the  picture  has
approached the organisation Tell Mama to issue an official statement, in which
she said that the photo  captures  her  in  the moment of  distress following the
confusion of the attack. Her statement reads: 
“My thoughts at that moment were ones of sadness, fear, and concern. What the image 
does not show is that I had talked to other witnesses to try and find out what what  
happening, to see if I could be of any help. […] I then decided to call my family to say 
that I was fine.” 
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She also reported severe online abuse “by those who could not look beyond [her]
attire” and drew “conclusions based on hate and xenophobia.” (Tell Mama, 2017).
 Image 18: The hijab-clad woman on Westminster Bridge (photo: Jamie Lorriman in
Hung and Pegg, 2017)
 
The  image  of  a  Muslim  woman  on  the  Westminster  Bridge  is  just  one  of
numerous examples of how the veil is interpreted, or misinterpreted, in British
society. Although women have been covering their heads and faces for millennia
in  a  variety  of  ways,  and  in  different  religious,  geographical  and  historical
contexts, the veil has become the subject of wider and more frequent public and
scholarly discussion in recent decades, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the
consequent war on terror and rise of right-wing politics. Entangled in ferocious
semiotic wars,  the veil  has become a powerful political,  religious and cultural
symbol, which is deployed, exploited and manipulated for omnifarious political
goals  –  by  Western  powers  and  Islamist  regimes  alike.  Amidst  these  global
tensions, Muslim women manoeuvre their own paths of conceptualising the hijab
and their relationship with it. 
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This thesis has focused on such creative yet challenging processes of negotiating
meanings,  practices and identities.  Pursuing multi-sited ethnographic  research
among a diverse group of British Muslim women, I have aimed to contextualise
the experiences of wearing the hijab, or not wearing it, in the particular temporal
and  spatial  context  of  contemporary  Britain.  More  specifically,  I  have  been
interested in exploring the personal dimension of veiling in the United Kingdom
and locating the Islamic veil within the social milieu of contemporary Britain.
Combining women's voices captured in ethnographic interviews with media and
social  media  accounts,  I  tried  to  move  away  from  conventional  media  and
political discourses which commonly frame the hijab into a singular, gendered
and  fixed  monolithic  definitional  category,  and  to  explore  the  diversity  and
importance of ethnic, cultural and subcultural, social, historical and, above all,
individual differences. Building upon these differences, I have been particularly
interested in observing nuanced and often contradictory  meanings  of the hijab. 
Drawing on the semiotic approaches to symbols (e.g Parsons, 1973; Peirce, 1931), I
argue that  the  causal  link  between the  hijab  and  its  meaning  is  unavoidably
arbitrary. It is hence paramount to acknowledge the very subjective nature of the
hijab that leaves its definitional frame open for social,  individual and cultural
interpretations.  Throughout  this  thesis,  I  have  shown  how  such  subjective
meanings are not only shaped by particular normative and cultural systems but
are the result of women's individual and intimate negotiations. These, too, are
unfixed  and  floating,  and  are  thus  subjected  to  dynamic  metamorphoses
throughout the life of each woman. 
These fluid meanings, I  argue,  are situated on a vast  and diversified semiotic
spectrum. The hijab can manifest sentiments of piety, political beliefs, anti-racism,
collective  identities,  revolt,  tradition,  new  subcultures,  gender  roles,  stylistic
246
preferences and otherness, to mention just a few. In this concluding chapter, I will
cluster such varied meanings of the hijab into three main thematic categories,
namely faith, fashion and feminism. I will  summarise and reflect on how this
dissertation  has  addressed  all  three  of  them and highlight  some of  the  most
interesting findings. I will also expand on the politicisation of the veil in Britain
and offer some final remarks on the entanglement of the hijab into the perpetual
cycles of power and resistance. Lastly, I will summarise the contribution of this
thesis  to  the  anthropological  knowledge  and  identify  some  areas  for  future
academic consideration. 
8.1 Faith
This thesis has focused on Islamic practices of veiling. Although I have briefly
mentioned and reflected on examples of non-Muslim women donning the veil
(see Chapter IV), the real protagonists of this research are Muslim women. Islam,
and the way it is perceived by hijabis and wider society, thus plays a particularly
important  role.  What  has  become  crystallised  through  various  ethnographic
accounts in this research, is the existence of frequent disconnects between etic and
emic perceptions of Islam and consequently the hijab; between hegemonic media
and political discourses on one side and personal experiences of faith and religion
on the other. 
It was therefore essential to critically reflect on historiographies of the veil and its
place  in  the  recent  global  and  local  political  spheres  in  order  to  identify  the
origins of discriminatory conceptualisations of the hijab in Britain. It has become
evident  that  the  concept  of  the  oppressive  hijab  stems  from warped  colonial
perceptions of Muslim women.  Burdened with colonial legacies,  narratives on
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Muslim women in Britain and other Western countries are further informed by
emerging  stories  about  forced  veiling  and  various  gender-based  atrocities  in
certain Muslim countries. Rather than discussing the coerced veil in the wider
context of female oppression and radical Islamist politics, they instead introduce
it as the main problem of Muslim women in general.  In these times of political
crises, entailing various military interventions in the Middle East, the subsequent
refugee crisis and the threat of international terrorism, demonising the hijab is a
convenient propaganda strategy (Ghosh, 2010).  This type of narrative suggests
that veiled women need saving (Abu Lughod, 2002; Abu Lughod, 2013),  with
such  presumptions  legitimising  everyday,  state  and  military  discrimination
against the Muslim population and veiled women in particular (see Chapter II).
Beyond the frequent condemnations of Islam as the religion of  terror and the
Quran as the book of oppression, female accounts suggest alternative outlooks.
All  veiled  Muslim  women  interviewed  for  the  purpose  of  this  research  don
various  types  of  headgear  voluntary  and  for  spiritual  purposes.  Surprisingly,
especially in the context of media portrayals of the veil, many women are in fact
the first  members of their  families to embrace the hijab.  This was particularly
evident  in  the  case  of  the  face  veil,  with  the  majority  of  my  niqab-wearing
respondents not having a close family member or even a friend wearing it. Their
autonomous decision to veil their heads and faces is evidently not imposed on
them by the  institutionalised religion  but  is  instead a  reflection  of  adherents'
connection with their god, and a manifestation of their faith (see Chapter III). 
This notion is epitomised illustratively in the metaphor of a journey which has
been articulated by a number of respondents. The women presented in this work
have  reflected  on  the  process  of  exploring  their  spirituality,  which  differs  in
length and intensity. The hijab, for many, is a reflection of these explorations. For
some, the journey of taking on the hijab or niqab, has taken years of studying the
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Quran,  whilst  for  others  it  has  come  more  organically  and  without  much
deliberation. Moreover, what respondents have pointed out is that their practices
of  veiling  do  not  necessarily  measure  their  progress  on the  spiritual  journey;
some women might wear the niqab but are not proficient in reading the Quran,
for example, whilst some other women might practise Islam intensely but veil
only occasionally, or not veil at all. Again, these choices and considerations are a
reflection of each woman's religious journey. Hence, the degrees of veiling and
choices behind them do not only vary from woman to woman but are equally
dynamic within each individual.  Veiling can indeed be an enunciation of  her
growing  or  declining  relationship  with  a  god,  and  with  spirituality  more
generally.
The diversity of practising Islam, and consequently observing the hijab, suggests
how different women explore religion and interpret Islamic texts, particularly the
Quran. As demonstrated,  women are engaging in the process of ijtihad,  thus
interpreting the Quranic verses for themselves (Chapter III; Bullock, 2003: 156).
This refutes the claims of some (Islamic) feminists, who believe that the Quran
restricts women's liberation. Due to its poetic style, the Islamic holy book is prone
to  different  interpretations,  with  its  guidance  on  the  hijab  no  exception.  The
women in this research have shown that the Quranic guidelines on observing the
hijab can be not only read differently but also, to a certain degree, appropriated,
negotiated and compromised by the adherents. 
Spiritual  journeys,  with the hijab or without it,  are highly individualised and
person-specific. However, this is not to undermine the importance of Islam as an
institution and a collective identity. Pnina Werbner (2012) has reminded us about
the role of the hijab in expressing the wearer's participation in a global Islamic
movement,  and  her  thesis  has  indeed  been  echoed  by  a  number  of   'sisters'
featured in this study. Just as with any other sartorial choices, the veil, too, can be
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deployed for expressing belonging to a certain cultural, political or social group.
For instance,  wearing the hijab can serve to explore and articulate a woman's
ethnic roots. Equally, it can express solidarity with Muslim women who reside in
the countries that are facing warfare, such as Palestine, Iraq and Syria, and those
who are fearing prosecution for wearing the veil, such as niqabis in France. As
also evoked at several points in this thesis, the veil can emphasise the notion of
sisterhood and mutual care for each other. Some respondents have spoken about
turning to  Islam following an emotional  upheaval,  be it  domestic  violence  or
family alienation (see Chapter III & VI).
The discussions surrounding the hijab should not underestimate the role of faith
and  religion,  for  the  journey  closer  to  god  is  ultimately  what  motivates  the
majority of women to take on the veil.  In that sense, the practice of veiling is
highly  individualised  and  reflects  the  adherent's  spiritual  growth  and  her
perceptions of faith. At the same time, it is important to observe the role of the
hijab in a global Islamic movement  which is for many wearers an important part
of expressing a collective identity of belonging to Islam and Islamic culture.  
8.2 Fashion 
The notion of diversity and individuality follows us to discussions on the hijab
and fashion. As argued in the previous section, explorations of religion are highly
individualised processes which are manifested in different types and styles of
veiling. Whilst some Muslim women might opt for a face veil, some others settle
for the hijab, observe the hijab by wearing loose clothes or do not express faith by
their choice of dress at all. Whatever their choice may be, women make conscious
sartorial decisions on how to express, or not express, their religious sentiments
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through  the  selection  of  clothes  and  potentially  headgear.  Each  of  these
expressions  is  idiosyncratic  and no woman styles  her  faith  in  the exact  same
manner. 
This  thesis  has demonstrated that styling faith is  indeed a highly contentious
subject for many hijabis. Consequently, many find styling and Islam a paradox,
and state that the very purpose of the hijab is to move away from beautifying
female bodies.  At the same time, some respondents do not mind styling their
outfits but are cautious about using the term fashion, for the fashion industry has
been consistently failing women who wanted their style to comply with Islamic
guidelines. The lack of suitable clothes, the continuous sexualisation of women,
the unethical  production of  clothes and the absence of  hijabi  or even Muslim
models have all contributed towards a problematic relationship between the hijab
and fashion (see Chapter IV). 
However, most of the respondents embrace fashion to a certain degree in their
everyday  lives  and  seek  vestimentary  solutions  that  are  both  Islamically
acceptable and fashionable. They do not perceive fashion and faith as mutually
exclusive,  but locate their  styles at the intersection of  the two.  As I  have also
shown with the examples of  Muslim fashion designers,  some Muslim women
create modest fashion themselves. This type of fashion not only attracts Muslim
consumers  but  is,  as  my  respondents  suggested,  equally  popular  with  non-
Muslim women. Most British hijabis who feature in this research, however, do
not necessarily choose Islamic brands but instead pick and choose clothes from
high street fashion brands or, in the case of those with greater financial means,
haute couture designers who do not create clothes aimed specifically at Muslim
consumers.  As  a  result,  the  growing  trend  of  Muslim purchasing  power  has
influenced a number of high profile mainstream retailers to incorporate the hijab
into their lines. 
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I have thus argued that Islamic dress, and the hijab in particular, is not about
specific items, but is about the context in which these items are deployed. Any
mainstream clothing item can be styled as part  of  the hijab by deploying the
technique  of  layering,  and  any  Muslim  attire,  too,  can  be  donned  by  a  non
Muslim  consumer  –  either  by  those  seeking  modesty  or  public  personalities
looking  for  publicity.  In  that  sense,  the  hijab  and  its  observers  have  to  be
contextualised  within  wider  nets  of  global  consumerism.  By  buying  clothes
online, watching the hijab beauty tutorials on YouTube, or buying high street and
high fashion  brands,  British  hijabis  are  unavoidably  embedded into  capitalist
circuits of exchange (see Chapter IV). Drawing on that, I propose that modern
British  hijabis'  stylistic  presentation  does  not  replicate  their  families'  dressing
practices,  nor  does  it  follow  specific  ethnic  or  national  sartorial  codes.
Throughout  the  research,  it  has  become  clear  that  women  pick  and  choose
elements  from  different  cultural  spheres  and  assemble  them  into  their  own
stylistic expressions. 
I  further argue that clothing is necessarily an extension of the Self.  Physically
positioned between the self and the environment, clothes hold a high degree of
linkage to the body, person and personality.  Thus, the eclectic fashion of British
hijabis reflects their necessarily hybrid identities (Suterwalla, 2013: 167), which
merge influences from transnational popular culture, the cultures of their parents
and the  trends  that  their  peers  follow and consume –  to  mention  just  a  few
factors. This is equally true for hijab fashionistas or niqabis who favour all black
and simple attire. 
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8.3 Feminism 
The idea of ever-transforming and hybrid identities extends into the argument
about Islamic feminism. The intersection between feminism and Islam has been a
particularly contentious topic in Britain during my fieldwork, especially in light
of the debates regarding the interdictions of Islamic veils. As has become clear
with  a  media analysis,  Islam and gender  equality  are  often  introduced as  an
impossible contradiction (Chapter II). However, my ethnographic work suggests
that British hijabis, particularly the younger generation of women, feel a strong
need  to  promote  their  rights  in  public.  These  women  want  to  dismantle
patriarchy in British society and Islam, and they want to wear a headscarf while
they do it.
Returning to my earlier argument about the fluid and unfixed symbolic meanings
of the hijab, I claim that the veil should not be seen as a rigid structure that is
imposed on an individual. British hijabi  feminists recognise and build upon the
semiotic potentials of the veil to subvert dominant meanings, thus welcoming it
as  a  conspicuous insignia  for  channelling voices  of  the subaltern  (see Spivak,
2010).  By  resisting  male  hegemony,  narrowly-defined  gender  identities  or
capitalist modes of objectifying female bodies, the veil represents a new version
of  feminism that  is  embodying  emancipation  without  conforming  to  Western
gender normativity or refuting Islamic values. 
 
This  argument  moves  away from some of  the established theories  on Islamic
feminism for example Fatema Mernissi's argument from her canonic text Beyond
the Veil (1975). Unlike Mernissi, who links gender segregation – and the veil as a
physical and symbolic manifestation of it – to male elites, I argue that the hijab
should not necessarily be seen as an oppressive patriarchal institution. Just like
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the argument about fashion, which I developed earlier in this chapter, the veil is
exposed to perpetual temporal and spatial transformations, which continuously
change its meanings. 
In contemporary Britain, the hijab can therefore be seen as a feminist symbol. As
demonstrated in this thesis,  women reclaim the hijab to fabricate and channel
their own conceptualisations of what feminism means for them. For some, it is
about  resisting  capitalism's  beauty  games,  which  objectify  female  bodies  and
impose unrealisatic demands upon them. For some other women it can be about
having ownership of their bodies and exposing them only to selected people. For
others,  the hijab represents an opposition to non-Muslim and male politicians
and  self-proclaimed  Islamic  leaders  who  have  a  symbolic  monopoly  on
regulating their dress and bodies. 
In that sense, many women recognise the patriarchal oppression entangled not
only  in  the  fabric  of  wider  societies,  but  also  in  some  Islamic  practices  and
teachings.  However,  all  hijabi  respondents  agreed  that  Islam  itself  it  not
oppressive or discriminatory towards women; in fact, many of them emphasised
the privileged and sacred position that a woman holds within Islam. This notion
once  again  brings  forth  the  openness  of  the  Quranic  readings,  and  the
significance  of  women's  own  interpretations.  The  latter  appear  to  be  more
influential in informing women's sartorial choices and their meaning, as do the
teachings in the hadith and some later Islamic texts. 
Against  this  backdrop,  I  echo Judith Butler's  insistence on deconstructing the
damaging  notion  of  a  universal  concept  of  womanhood,  which  promotes  a
culture  of  exclusion  within  a  supposedly  inclusive  and  anti-discriminatory
feminist  movement  (1990:  3).   Recognising  and  celebrating  idiosyncratic
differences can open new feminist  possibilities.  As illustrated by many of  the
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women in this thesis, hijabs and niqabs can be part of them (Chapter V). 
8.4 Politicising the veil 
I  have argued that British hijabis inevitably wear multiple veils. Apart from a
physical or material veil, namely a headscarf or a face veil, which women choose
to don consciously, society also dresses them into an invisible veil – a thick veil of
prejudice,  mytho-historical narratives and denied privileges. This invisible veil
introduces  them  as  unwanted  British  Others.  I  have  turned  to  Du  Bois's
interpretations of the invisible veil (1903) which theorise the persistent colour line
between the black and white populations in pre-civil rights movement America.
Whilst  Du Bois's  account of  invisible veils  focuses  on a gradual  realisation of
one's difference and the resulting lack of privilege in society, I claim that for the
majority of hijab-wearers such realisation is almost instantaneous. Taking on a
visible veil unavoidably alters how she will be perceived by society and modifies
the ways in which she will also perceive herself. I use the metaphor of a reflection
in the mirror to illustrate the crucial moment in which a woman recognises and
internalises her new identity. Although I have acknowledged intrinsic and major
differences between the discussions on race and the hijab, deploying the theory of
invisible veils has proven to be a useful analytical tool for dismantling centuries-
long demonisation of Muslims as part of various political and military agendas
(Chapter VI). 
As expressed by my respondents, the processes of othering are experienced at an
institutional and personal level. For example, all veiled women featured in this
research recalled Islamophic abuse at the hands of strangers, either in the form of
verbal  attacks  of  physical  violence.  Moreover,  there  have  been  mentions  of
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institutional discrimination, which was especially apparent whilst at work as well
as at state level. Stop and search interventions at international airports and the
government's soft counter-terrorist strategies, such as Prevent, are just some of
the  examples  of  how  hijab-clad  women  continue  to  be  rendered  suspicious,
dangerous and negative. Drawing on Du Bois, I claim that such discriminatory
practices are a direct  result  of  invisible veils,  stitched by centuries of politics-
fuelled anti-Muslim sentiments (Chapter II & VI). 
This disconnect between two parts of one society experienced by women creates a
poignant self-realisation about their  own difference.  The women in this  thesis
have addressed  such  realisations  differently.  For  example,  some women have
attempted to lift the invisible veil by removing their physical veils in the hope of
protecting themselves and their families (Chapter IV). Some others have admitted
they work hard to appear happy, and bubbly in the public in order to transform
the prevailing and predetermined opinions  of  the  majority  British  population
(Preface  &  Chapter  III).  Furthermore,  some  other  women  have  attempted  to
'britainise' their hijabs to pledge their allegiance to Britain and selected British
values (Chapter VI). The examples of patriotic hijabs featuring the Union Jack or
poppies are illustrative of such approaches towards legitimising one's position
within British society and seeking acceptance. 
Alternatively  to  these  strategies  of  addressing the  invisible  veils  of  otherness,
many hijabis whom we have met in this thesis, have decided to challenge the
status quo and resist excluding practices, attitudes and policies (Chapter VII). As
observed, women  develop  and  promot  different  strategies  to  challenge  and
change  the  current  political  and  social  systems.  Some of  them take  it  to  the
streets, whilst others resort to everyday forms of resistance. I have paid particular
attention to the latter, for such subtler forms of resistance can be observed more
frequently when it comes to the resisting practices of young British hijabis. Scott's
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notion of everyday resistance (1985) discusses the resisting interventions in the
realm of everyday conventionalities, such as art, humour, fashion and lifestyle.
However, ethnographic accounts of British hijabi resistance identify some crucial
disparities with Scott's peasant-led 'hidden transcripts' which operate in secrecy
and  reject  the  official  'public  transcripts'.  Rather  than  being  individual,
unorganised and hidden, the 'veiled transcripts' of British hijabis penetrate into
public transcripts and promote resisting messages from within. By being veiled
into  seemingly  apolitical  discourses,  they  are  only  rarely  recognised for  their
resisting objectives by the groups in power. 
Discussions on oppression and resistance, on invisible veils and veiled resistance
recapitulate illustratively the omnipresent power struggles that are unavoidably
experienced  by  British  hijabis.  Their  lived  experiences  reflect  the  continuous
tension  created  by  the  existing  centres  of  power  –  such  as  the  government,
religious institutions and the mainstream media – on the one hand and creative,
subversive and persistent quests to dilute those hegemonic forces of power on the
other. As seen through the discussions on faith, fashion and feminism, power and
resistance not only engage in semiotic wars on the hijab but also feed each other.
In  other  words,  where there  is  power,  there  is  resistance,  and where there  is
resistance there is power (Abu-Lughod, 1990:42; Foucault, 1978: 95). As a result,
the hijab is caught in a state of perpetual contestation, which keeps its meanings
and practices dynamic and fluid. 
8.5 Contribution to anthropological knowledge
With a unique research scope,  which focuses on a diverse range of  UK-based
Muslim women from different class, age, geographical, ethnic and educational
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backgrounds,  this  thesis  offers  an  illuminating  anthropological  insight  into
Islamic veiling practices in contemporary Britain. Capitalising on the broad and
diverse selection of respondents, this thesis renders intelligible the plethora of
Muslim women's  approaches  to  veiling,  alongside  their  interpretations  of  the
hijab in light of faith, politics and gender. These various and varied ethnographic
accounts of women's subjective conceptualisations of the hijab have assisted me
in critically evaluating the existing anthropological body of work on the hijab and
enriching  it  with  new  perspectives.  These  perspectives  have  resulted  in  the
formation of novel theoretical arguments which were presented at the beginning
of this concluding chapter.  The theory of multiple veils,  the reflections on the
hijab's temporal existence in women's lives, the definition of Islamic dress that is
based upon a context rather than upon specific clothing items, and the examples
of semiotic subversions of the hijab based on resistance, refusal and mimicry are
just  some  of  the  fresh  contributions  to  the  anthropology  of  veiling,  religious
dress, feminism and Islam.
Furthermore, this research has approached the topic of Islamic veiling from an
innovative  methodological  vantage  point,  as  it  has  inter-weaved  women's
subjective  accounts  elicited  in  ethnographic  interviews  and  participant
observation with cyber-ethnographic data, critical discourse analysis of the media
and political reports, and the analysis of artistic portrayals of the veil. Utilising a
multi-method  approach  has  been  particularly  informative  in  accentuating  the
apparent  disconnect  between  emic  and  etic  perspectives  of  the  veil;  between
dominant  media  and  political  discourses  which  promote  a  determining
perception  of  the  hijab,  and  British  Muslim women more  generally.  This  has
assisted me in unravelling the ways in which these different discourses interact
and feed each other.  Given that my fieldwork took place in turbulent political
times,  the  thesis  has  contributed  to  the  timely  anthropological  analyses  of
contemporary social challenges which relate to the hijab and Muslim minorities,
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including – but not being limited to – various hijab and burqini interdictions and
gender segregation.
The unique scope of the study, the innovative methodological approach and the
resultant  theoretical  arguments  all  contribute  to  the  existing  anthropological
knowledge of the hijab in contemporary British society and to anthropology of
Islam, dress and gender more broadly.
8.6 Coda
During  my  ethnographic  fieldwork,  I  have  identified  several  topics  which
appeared to be under-represented in scholarship but call  for further academic
reflection. One element of my research I was unable to investigate to the level of
detail  I  would  have  wished  to  was  the  role  of  the  hijab  in  Muslim  LGBT+
movements and various challenges encountered by self-identified women who
are  seeking  to  accommodate  their  faith  and  sexuality  in  a  harmonious  way.
Moreover, I would have liked to further explore the artistic articulations of the
hijab,  something  that  eventually  became  part  of  my  many  small-scale  side
projects.  From provocative street  art  murals  across the world to graphics  and
collages, the veil has been explored in various artistic forms, which indeed call for
in-depth anthropological reflections. 
Moreover, I would like to see practical applications of this research, especially in
the context of policy making. I am of the belief that a study of Muslim women's
responses to veiling could establish a welcome dialogue between policies and the
clients of government programmes (see Apthorpe, 1997: 43; Geilhufe, 1979: 577).
This  might  be  particularly  insightful  when discussing the  existing and future
259
legal interdictions of the hijab in the United Kingdom or the implementation of
various counter-terrorism schemes which target Muslim women specifically. 
During the past  four  years  of  researching Islamic veiling practices,  there was
barely  a  month without  any new hijab-related interdictions  being passed and
implemented across Europe and elsewhere. A never-ending emergence of new
bans on face veils, burkinis and religious symbols in public, at workplace and in
schools not only dominated daily news headlines but often provoked lazy and
partial reporting which reinforced toxic narratives, similar to the one mentioned
at the beginning of this concluding chapter. These affected my respondents. They
were  manifested  in  frequent  Islamophobic  abuse  and  discrimination  at  a
personal,  community,  social  and state  level,  and reflected  the  prevalence  and
degree of misunderstanding surrounding the hijab and women who observe it. 
The original idea behind this thesis arose from such prevailing ignorance and its
effects on British Muslim women. However, what eventually inspired  the final
version of the thesis  was the vigorousness and creativity of British hijabis that
exists  beyond  the  various  legal,  political  and  social  challenges.  As  shown
throughout this  thesis,  women continue to create their  own coping strategies,
generate their own meanings and develop their own practices. Their intimate and
social  engagements  with  the  hijab  result  in  its  varied  physical  forms  and
diversified semiotic meanings. It is thus important to go beyond a single image of
the hijab and acknowledge a woman’s freedom to choose not only her own form
of a dress but also to shape its meanings – whatever they may be.
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